Hmm.... I'm not sure why, exactly, but I'm having a real hard time with Dennet's list. According to Dennet: if one is mute, they are not a person; if one has autism, they are not a person; if one is in a coma, they are not a person; if one is developmentally disabled; they are not a person. However, if one is a psychopath, they are a person. ?
Dennet focuses mostly on the cognitive aspects of being a person. I don't understand how having a body (or a virtual representation of oneself that can be seen and that appears as a body) could be left off of the list of what it means to be a person. I can see lots of reasons for imagining one does not have a body, or that one has more than one body--clearly many humans have a desire to "transcend" their body in some way for various reasons--but the fact remains that persons do have bodies. I also have a hard time believing that if avatars could not be seen--only appeared as sound or text--that we would be having this discussion. It seems to me that being a person involves several aspects: behavior, emotions, sensation, and cognition, at a minimum. One may have limited ability to fully express oneself in one or more (if not all) of these domains--or prefer to express oneself in one or more of these domains--but still be a person. Dennet's list suggests that not all humans should be considered persons. I think that is what is bugging me about his list. On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 2:10 PM, Sal Armoniac <[email protected]> wrote: > Of all of you, I've spent the most time in Second Life--as author and > artist (publishing poetry under the name of my avatar and making machinima > attributed to "Hypatia Pickens."). This matter has been of great interest > to artists, writers and builders in "Second Life" as has content theft > (tremendous rage is generated when someone uses a "copy bot" to reproduce > items--artwork, clever and well-crafted clothing, furniture, trinkets--that > are scripted as non-copyable. Some people make their incomes in Second Life > selling things, Where the medical article Alicia pointed us to becomes > interesting is the "personhood" of a number of disabled people I've become > friends with. Eric has hit the right button: an avatar is useless unless > it operates in a social context. No sane person would attribute rights to a > Second Life avatar that is never used, or which never shows up in the > virtual world because its owner or driver or inventor or user or puppeteer > has lost interest in it. If you make a drawing of an invented person, it is > just that. A drawing. It is not an avatar. If you put it in motion, if > you turn it into an animation, it is still not an avatar. Avatar means "the > incarnation of a deity." It assumes, at least in Sanskrit, that a real mind > governs it and walks among us. > > I've taught "Robots and Representation" several times now over the past ten > years (maybe twenty... some version of it ever since I wrote "Hollow > Pursuits.") One of my favorite essays is that by Daniel Dennett called > "Conditions of Personhood" but since I've been teaching my Avatar class, > I've been closely following Mark Stephen Meadows' _I, Avatar_ in which he > addresses this very topic and then some. He's very interested in the > ambiguous separation/fusion of the avatar and its driver. The question seems > to rest upon two terms that become vague in meaning when we separate them > from physical human beings. We do talk about "Animal Right," something > hotly debated. And corporations are treated legally as "persons." So what > do these mean? Can rights and personhood pertain to non-human entities? > But where does the avatar begin and the driver end? In what instances are > the rights of an avatar to be separated from the rights of the human > operator? I can think of one example-- in another article, a man who did > business in a virtual world wanted to do so using his avatar name and not > his real name. It became a legal issue. Where money was concerned, an > avatar was a non-entity. Compare this way of thinking with Dennett's: > > Dennett sets out six conditions for "personhood." I note that he does not > include the human body: > > 1) Persons are rational beings. > 2) Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or > to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates are ascribed. > 3) Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude > taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it (this is important) > 4) The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of > reciprocating in some way. > 5) Persons must be capable of verbal communication. > 6) Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in > some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other > species is conscious. Sometimes this is identied as self-consciousness or > one sort or another. > > Take the case of my friend Piaget in Second Life. His human body is > severely disabled; he can't move and he directs his commands to Second Life > by means of "voice." He may well consider his avatar body to be more > significant to him, to be more HIM than his human body. Is Piaget, when I > interact with him, rational? Yes. Can I attribue a psychologica or mental > state to him? Yes. Do I treat him like a person even though I've never > seen his real body? Yes of course. Does he reciprocate? Indeed. He > communicates by type chat, and he is conscious. He prefers to be called > Piaget. Do I care what his real name is? No. His interaction with me in > the social world of Second Life is enough. The issue changes when he is > taken to the hospital. His real name, social security number, insurance, > credit cards, drivers license, and birth certificate certify him as a person > in the real world, but I can't be a part of that--only a listener if he > chooses to tell me, as he sometimes does. In a virtual world, we have > money, but it is not taxed, and it can't be used as currency when real world > business is involved. > > So a seventh condition of personhood that Dennett may need to add are all > the legal and financial interactions and documents that "certify" us as > persons in the world. Money talks. And we all know how it validates. > > If Piaget were to lose his Second Life account for some reason, or if some > griefer were to destroy it, would he have the right to press suit? Would > his personhood have been damaged? > > > Hypatia Pickens, sometimes known as "Sarah" ;) > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 12:34 PM, Eric Scoles <[email protected]>wrote: > >> "Rights" is a very slippery concept. There's certainly a sense in which we >> all have the "right" to do anything we can. I used to joust regularly with a >> guy on Plastic.com who had as a signature "the only thing a free man can be >> forced to do is die." In his mind, you always had a "right" to do anything >> at all, as long as it didn't impinge on the right of another person to >> control their personal property (e.g., their body); anything you did that >> was within you sphere of "rights" was a matter of choice. (He was a >> libertarian, of course.) But that's a pretty expansive use of the term >> "rights". >> >> I don't think "rights" make sense outside of a social context -- we're >> social animals, after all, even the act of using language requires the >> conceptualization of an "other" to take in what we say, and even if that >> 'other' is ourself -- and if that's true, we have rights to the extent that >> we are "granted" them -- though what it means to be "granted" rights, and >> who/what has authority to grant them, is still an open question. If we live >> according to laws, I'd argue we accept the ability of a law-enforcing entity >> to "grant" at least some rights; others we may hold as being above the law, >> but that's only because we have a moral/ethical rationale for them, and >> where does that rationale come from? It doesn't come from me as an atomic, >> disconnected individual -- no human who's capable of talking and acting in >> the world really is such a thing, even though they might think they are. >> That said, as an individual (though not disconnected), we do make decisions >> about who or what we hold to have the authority to grant or enforce rights. >> >> The kind of discussion the paper's trying to provoke happens in the >> context of the pre-supposition that rights do come from somewhere outside of >> the pure individual decision that you have right x or y. The idea is to >> stake ideological territory. So even if it seems redundant or absurd, >> there's still merit in doing it (the very fact that some can see it as >> redundant and some can see it as absurd to my mind means it's a discussion >> we ought to have). >> >> As far as property rights go, those are all interesting questions, and the >> 'using right now' rubric is particularly interesting. Reminds me of the line >> from *The Sound and the Fury*: "As soon as he [Chief Ikemotubbe] >> conceived of the idea that the land could be sold, it ceased to be his." >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Jason Olshefsky <google.jo@ >> jayceland.com> wrote: >> >>> On Oct 22, 2010, at 4:59 AM, Alicia Henn wrote: >>> > This is an interesting article on rights for avatars. It seems >>> reasonable and yet ludicrous at the same time. My officemate and I have had >>> a great time expanding on it. - Alicia >>> >>> First, <sarcasm>kudos</sarcasm> for calling it "Get Your Paws off of My >>> Pixels: Personal Identity and Avatars as Self". >>> >>> My initial reaction is, "videoconferencing and message boards" The end. >>> In other words, if our virtual representation in a videoconferencing >>> setting or on a message board can be considered a representation of self >>> (that is, an insult or attack on our representation is considered similar to >>> the same done to our individual self) then what difference is it if our >>> representation is an avatar in a virtual world? >>> >>> Upon reading further, I found it rather evocative: I could barely read a >>> few lines without my thoughts drifting. I kept analyzing what we consider >>> "rights" and "property". >>> >>> Americans have come to believe rights are given -- that government grants >>> rights. Yet isn't that foolish? Of course I can say what's on my mind; >>> stopping me from doing so is egregious. When rights are internalized, all >>> this legalese on when they are applicable goes away. >>> >>> Consider also an actor or performer. In that case, they often do the >>> reverse: permit their self to represent the non-self. If someone insulted >>> Steven Colbert in the context of his fictional self, would that have the >>> same impact as insulting Steven Colbert the real person? Should we really >>> think Steven Colbert the character is the same thing as Steven Colbert the >>> person? >>> >>> Then the whole talk about how virtual property is considered like real >>> property. All my thoughts drifted to how "real property" is just virtual >>> property unless you are in close physical proximity to it. Let's say you >>> bought a piece of land and never set foot on it or even visited anyone near >>> it. Then the courthouse burned down and all property records were lost. >>> What did you really own? As an aside, if Second Life went out of business >>> and shut off its servers, would people have the right to claim losses of >>> virtual property? >>> >>> Speaking of virtual property, isn't it funny that I could lose $50,000 in >>> a retirement account and that would be upsetting but perfectly acceptable, >>> yet if my bank statement comes up $1 short I'll call them to complain? I'm >>> heading down a path where I recognize property only as things I'm using >>> right now. I consider an alternate world where things like the contents of >>> my house are "things I left lying around the earth" so others are welcome to >>> them. Alas, we expend an lot of psychological effort worrying about stuff >>> we left lying around. >>> >>> ---Jason Olshefsky >>> http://JayceLand.com/ <http://jayceland.com/> >>> http://JayceLand.com/blog/ <http://jayceland.com/blog/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> -- >> eric scoles | [email protected] >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. > -- Janice -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. 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