Yeah... didn't see this remark of yours. It's absurd to claim that the avatar apart from its driver is a "person." I see it as a puppet, a prosthesis. Damage my puppet and I'll come after you with a jig saw. ;) But can Pinocchio be paid a check if he wins the poetry prize? Or do I get it? What if I don't want to be revealed? Can Sally Caves open a bank account? How do I ensure absolute privacy?
On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 9:32 AM, Eric Scoles <[email protected]> wrote: > I misunderstood what this was about when we were talking about it the other > night. This seems to be about the avatar being an extension of your person, > not the avatar being a person in its own right. It's arguing that damage to > the avatar is at least analogous to damaging your body. That's at least a > little less absurd than arguing that the avatar is a person. > > So "Avatars *as self*" (from the title) is really a mis-statement of what > the paper's about -- it's really about avatars as an *extension* or * > manifestation* of self. By definition, an *avatar* can never be *identical > * with the self. If they want to claim the avatar is a self, they need to > find some word other than "avatar" to describe it. > > > On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 7:01 AM, Charlene Brusso <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Thanks for posting this, Alicia. The topic itself is provocative, but even >> better are the journal links at the end: 'Games & Culture" & 'Journal of >> Virtual Worlds Research' definitely go into my tickler file! >> >> -Charlene >> >> >> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 4:59 AM, Alicia Henn <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> http://www.jmir.org/2010/3/e28/ >>> This is an interesting article on rights for avatars. It seems reasonable >>> and yet ludicrous at the same time. My officemate and I have had a great >>> time expanding on it. - Alicia >>> >>> Get Your Paws off of My Pixels: Personal Identity and Avatars as Self >>> >>> Mark Alan Graber1,2, MD; Abraham David Graber3, BA >>> ABSTRACT >>> >>> There is an astounding silence in the peer-reviewed literature regarding >>> what rights a person ought to expect to retain when being represented by an >>> avatar rather than a biological body. Before one can have meaningful ethical >>> discussions about informed consent in virtual worlds, avatar bodily >>> integrity, and so on, the status of avatars vis-à-vis the self must first be >>> decided. We argue that as another manifestation of the individual, an >>> individual’s avatar should have rights analogous to those of a biological >>> body. Our strategy will be to show that (1) possessing a physical body is >>> not a necessary condition for possessing rights; (2) rights are already >>> extended to representations of a person to which no biological consciousness >>> is attached; and (3) when imbued with intentionality, some prostheses become >>> “self.” We will then argue that avatars meet all of the conditions necessary >>> to be protected by rights similar to those enjoyed by a biological body. The >>> structure of our argument will take the form of a conditional. We will argue >>> that *if* a user considers an avatar an extension of the self, *then*the >>> avatar has rights analogous to the rights of the user. Finally, we will >>> discuss and resolve some of the objections to our position including >>> conflicts that may arise when more than one individual considers an avatar >>> to be part of the self. >>> >>> *(J Med Internet Res 2010;12(3):e28)* >>> doi:10.2196/jmir.1299 >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Charlene Brusso >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > -- > eric scoles | [email protected] > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en.
