How about a load/secure level ?
where level none just does not allow the usage of /pro or /command 
functions,
higher levels could prohibit more functions


USAGE:
    LOAD source /header /next /library /markup /all /secure level

DESCRIPTION:
     Loads a file, URL, or string. Binds words to global context.
     LOAD is a native value.

ARGUMENTS:
     source -- (Type: file url string any-block binary)

REFINEMENTS:
     /header -- Includes REBOL header object if present.
     /next -- Load the next value only. Return block with value and new 
position.
     /library -- Force file to be a dynamic library. (Command version)
     /markup -- Convert HTML and XML to a block of tags and strings.
     /all -- Load all values. Does not evaluate REBOL header.
     /secure -- prohibits  unsafe and not allowed  functions
          level  -- security level  (Type: none block)
 >>

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Ladislav:
>   
>> an interesting discussion
>>     
>
> Thanks. It is.
>
> I once toyed with the idea of allowing Library members to upload arbitrary 
> code that REBOL.org would execute on their behalf.
>
> The theory being that it would allow the ultimate level in customization of 
> the services the Library provides -- instead of being limited to the 
> preference 
> checkboxes on configuration panels, your arbitrary code could filter or 
> enhance the stuff the CGI scripts produce.
>
> The idea got put aside for two reasons.  One was the licensing -- which 
> appears now to be a resolved issue.
>
> The other was (as Carl exactly puts it in the dialog you've pointed us to) 
> "Ah... That's really dangerous."
>
> We would need to ensure that any arbitrary code had no access to all sorts of 
> things that a stand-alone REBOL script can do.  One worse-case scenario is 
> that a spammer writes a script that sends a bazillion emails and we run it 
> for 
> them.
>
> Running arbitrary code safely requires more than a sandbox: more of a 
> blast-proof bunker.
>
> Some parts of such a bunker can be constructed by unsetting or modifying 
> mezzanines (disabling send is an easy one).
>
> But other parts are not so easy -- how to stop a script overwriting part of 
> the system object, or running for more than 1 second, or writing more files 
> than we have a quota for?
>
> That level of security needs some support at the built-in / native level.
>
> Sunanda
>   

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