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On Wednesday 24 April 2002 06:43 pm, daniel wrote:
> > BIND named running as a non-root user should be secure enough for
> > any use as long as you are careful to disable remote access via rndc,
> > deny updates from all but trusted networks yada yada.
>
> how exactly do you prevent a single program like rndc from being run
> from a remote machine while allowing a remote login like ssh?
I was about to answer with something along the lines of "If a user
logging in via ssh can get root access, you have bigger things to worry
about." Then I thought better of it and decided to test this.
I'm a little worried about the results:
[mfratoni@paradox updates-7.2] $ ssh tuxfan
[mfratoni@tuxfan mfratoni]$ id
uid=500(mfratoni) gid=500(mfratoni) groups=500(mfratoni)
[mfratoni@tuxfan mfratoni]$ /usr/sbin/rndc reload
rndc: reload command successful
Hrmm, said I. Any user can reload zones? Surely that shouldn't be.
[mfratoni@tuxfan mfratoni]$ /usr/sbin/rndc halt
rndc: halt command successful
Non privileged uses can halt named as well? I wouldn't consider that a
desirable feature.
The man page seems to imply that only root _should_ be allowed to do this:
DESCRIPTION
This command allows the system administrator to control the
operation of a name server.
Very odd. Hopefully, I've just missed something in the config files?
- --
- -Michael
pgp key: http://www.tuxfan.homeip.net:8080/gpgkey.txt
Red Hat Linux 7.2 in 8M of RAM: http://www.rule-project.org/
- --
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