Bobby's post is not just an argument against Intelligent Design theory, but against the truth of any religion that posits the existence of a good and omnipotent God (which I will call "traditional theistic religion"). I certainly understand that ID should not be taught in science classes if there is little or no scientific evidence in support of it. But Bobby's argument from evil or suffering cannot by itself preclude the teaching of ID (in science classes or elsewhere in the curriculum) unless the state is permitted to conclude that traditional theistic religion is false. For the courts to so conclude (and to act on that conclusion by prohibiting for that reason the teaching of ID) would violate the Establishment Clause.

 

Individuals are permitted to reach that conclusion, of course, and to take part in the democratic process in reliance on that conclusion. Thus Bobby is free to argue against inclusion of ID in the curriculum on the basis that traditional theistic religion is false-that there can be no good and intelligent designer. But the courts cannot guarantee his success, at least not on the basis of any conclusion by a court that Bobby's argument from evil or suffering is convincing.

 

Mark S. Scarberry

Pepperdine University School of Law

 

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2004 8:05 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: NRO Article

 

        As a former philosophy professor I can't resist making two points: First, as Hume insists, any world at all must reveal some structure however chaotic.  Thus the ID position seems to be clearly unfalsifiable.  What empirical facts could exist convincing IDists that there exists a world without an intelligent designer. (I could surely imagine circumstances in which skeptics might cease denying the existence of an ID; for example, the most elementary proof would be if he or she made one's acquaintance.) Second, much more important, in my view, is that if there exists an intelligent designer I'm afraid that he or she is not very intelligent, or if intelligent, then he or she is likely to be morally perverse. The argument from evil or suffering has convinced me (at least) that given their existence (and abundance), an intelligent designer is not someone I could admire.  Failure to relieve our suffering while capable of doing so, in my book disqualifies an ID as a candidate for admiration let alone reverence. Please understand, I am terribly familiar with the attempts to rationalize the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and moral just (and perfect) designer. Some familiar rationalizations are freewill, developing character, Leibniz' best of all possible worlds, possible world semantics, knowing good requires knowledge of evil (indeed, the existence of good requires the existence of evil), and a host of other rationalizations. So, whether right or wrong, my argument, I hope it would be granted, is not naive. These rationalizations are just that rationalizations.

 

        I continue to marvel at the irony in the instinct to rationalize.  If any human being, for example, permitted certain kinds of evil and suffering, while having the power to intervene, we would castigate her or him severely.  But somehow certain conceptions of an IDer give the designer a pass at his or her (or its) indifference to human suffering.  I am confused when natural disasters strike and those who survive often praise an intelligent designer for saving their lives.  I don't understand why they don't blame their intelligent designer for the deaths of their neighbors.

 

        I know different conceptions of the existence of an IDer attempt to explain suffering in ways that to them appear reasonable even sacred. But I think most often one has to first accept the existence of that particular IDer for these explanations to be plausible.

 

        Although I believe that the above remarks are relevant to constitutional law and theory, I also realize that others might disagree, and so with this post I'll return to my usual responsibilities. 


Bobby


Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of Law
Delaware

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