As I read Jim's post, he is not denying what Bobby says, that there is a
difference between objectively teaching about religion on the one hand, and
trying to persuade on the other. In fact, Jim's post says that he accepts
that distinction. Jim's point is that persuasion with which one agrees is
typically not labeled "proselytizing". Rather, that term is reserved for
persuasion which is thought to be improper--and such impropriety is usually
in the eye of the beholder. Where the main use of a term is pejorative, it
may not be a very helpful term.
Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 12/16/2004 7:22 PM
Subject: Re: Steven Williams Case - more factual information
In a message dated 12/16/2004 9:55:49 PM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If you think that experience requires a different conclusion, then you
simply have not read the opposing briefs of a variety of groups on the
opposite side from me in numerous constitutional cases.
I think briefs are one of the worst examples of testing the
importance of the distinction between teaching and proselytizing. Briefs
are advocacy pieces, usually (in my experience a long time ago as a
federal appellate clerk) poorly done. Impartiality, if it exists at
all, is not likely to be found in briefs. Indeed, it might be oxymoronic
to contend that impartiality is or should be a goal of brief writing.
The distinction between impartiality and advocacy, of course,
itself is one of those troubling distinctions (or perhaps dichotomies)
whose use might be counterproductive generally. Still shouldn't we
exhibit patience when hearing someone using this distinction to see if
that particular person is sensitive to its importance and is also
sensitive to the ease of abusing it. Only a few people, Stanley Fish
comes to mind if his work is not completely based in irony, sincerely
believe that these distinctions are meaningless, incoherent or
necessarily subject to abuse. Finally, distinctions such as "teaching
and "proselytizing" and "impartiality" and "advocacy" as well as a host
of others are currently defining characteristics of our conceptual
discourse. Abandoning these distinctions, while not impossible I
suppose, requires a revolution in conceptual discourse similar to the
types of revolutions in science Kuhn wrote about. Rejecting our current
conceptual discourse is not impossible, but the cost is enormous and
should not be borne without an extraordinary justification.
Bobby
Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of Law
Delaware
<<ATT1541434.txt>>
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