I didn't intend to suggest anything otherwise -- I believe we're in agreement, and apologize for any confusion.  Where we might disagree is on the question of whether "strict" scrutiny was ever all-that-strict in Free Exercise/RFRA/RLUIPA law.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:08 PM
Subject: RE: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

I agree that the true test on the meaning of strict scrutiny under RLUIPA or RFRA will come with the UDV case next term.
 
But I'd add that I don't see a meaningful dilution of "strict scrutiny" in this decision.  Instead, the Court just reaffirmed two unremarkable propositions:  (1) that prison security is a compelling state interest, and (2) that prison officials are entitled to some deference in their assessment whether a particular accommodation threatens that interest.
 
Is this anything new?  Is it fair to say that the opinion says anything stronger than that? 
 
Prison officials still bear the burden of proof and persuasion to show that this interest is actually present in the particular context, and that they have chosen the "least restrictive means" of serving that interest, also in context.
 
Incidentally, I could find no suggestion at all that "least restrictive means" is somehow eliminated from that burden.  In fact, I did see a favorable citation to two district court opinions (fn11) where "least restrictive means" was an important part of the analysis under RFRA.
 
 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman
Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:47 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

Well, this has been the paradox in Free Exercise Clause law all along, hasn't it?:  That the Court articulated a strict scrutiny test in Sherbert/Yoder, but never came anywhere close to applying such a test in the free-exercise context:  The government virtually always won, by hook or by crook (no substantial burden; compelling interest; carve-outs for prisons/military/government "property," etc.).  (That's one primary explanation for Smith itself -- the Court no doubt wished to call a halt to its own charade.)  Congress adopted the Court's own strict-scrutiny rhetoric, while signaling fairly clearly that courts should be just about as deferential to the state as the SCOTUS itself had been in pre-Smith Free Exercise cases.  The strict scrutiny standard thus has the (intended) deterrence/in terrorem effect at the administrative level -- at the very least deterring states from denying exemptions where the harm is speculative, or where there really would be very little cost involved, such as where the state makes analogous no-religious exemptions.  But if the state has a good reason for denying the exemption, it likely will win in litigation.  That's what has happened at the federal level, with modest results that all parties appear to approve.
 
The real test of how effective RFRA and RLUIPA will be will come in next Term's UDV case involving the application of that statutory test to the prohibition on use of hoasca tea.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:20 AM
Subject: Re: RLUIPA Unanimously Upheld in Cutter

One might also note we now have another area of law (in addition to affirmative action) where compelling interest seems no longer shorthand for the individual rights claim (almost) always wins.
 
MAG


>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/31/05 11:16AM >>>
 
What a fascinating opinion.  J. Ginsburg upholds strict scrutiny with respect to prison regulations, but at the same time demands deference to prison authorities, as does RLUIPA.  At the very end, she seems to caution all lower courts to be very careful before they find for the prisoner.  Seems to me the prisons now have a Turner v. Safley rule in fact, even if it is an RLUIPA federal claim in theory. 
 
One interesting aspect of the opinions is J. Thomas's reservation of the issue of Congress's power under either the Spending or Commerce Clauses.  He seems to withdraw any concerns about spending at the end of his concurrence, though, which leaves the question whether RLUIPA is valid under the Commerce Clause up front and center for RLUIPA in both the prison and land use contexts.  Obviously, further litigation to come.
 
Marci
 
 
 
 


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