Or to put it the other way, if the law can afford a religious exemption here, 
it is because a forbidden punishment is doing the child no real harm.  But in 
that event, the law has probably drawn the line at the wrong place for 
everybody. 

Quoting "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu>:

>                I stress again that I'm not sure where the law should 
> draw the line between permissible discipline and criminal battery.  
> It obviously must, even if all spankings were outlawed, unless it 
> becomes a crime even to pull a child to his room, or to forcibly 
> seize a toy from him; but where it should do so, I don't know.
>
>                But this strikes me as among the least appealing cases 
> for a religion-specific exemption:  If religious parents are entitled 
> to an exemption from battery law but secular parents are not, then 
> this means that a child of religious parents would have to suffer 
> something that the law plausibly treats as a battery, simply because 
> he is the child of religious parents.  That strikes me as a very hard 
> inequality to defend, which suggests that even if we're under a 
> strict scrutiny exemptions regime, the government should be able to 
> claim a compelling interest in giving all children equal protection 
> against something that the law sees as battery, whether or not 
> there's a compelling interest in preventing the battery in the first 
> place.
>
>                Eugene
>
> Vance Koven writes:
>
> While in principle Eugene is right that whether the state intervenes 
> shouldn't be determined by whether the parent is acting out of 
> religious or secular motives, it is only in the case of religiously 
> motivated parents that there is a legal hook on which to hang an 
> interest in parenting methodology that requires the state to justify 
> itself on the basis of compelling interest--unless you can engineer a 
> free speech interest, which seems to me a stretch. It would be ironic 
> indeed if the justification for parental authority is the concept of 
> privacy.
>

Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713
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