I much appreciate Alan's point, which further illustrates the pragmatic
and non-absolute nature of the inquiry. But I wonder whether the entry-level /
experienced distinction quite does all the work. In some situations (perhaps
including the one at NIH, though I should note that to my knowledge Collins
would be very much on the mainstream belief side of the line), someone who has
had a long career in implementation is being shifted for the first time to a
high-level position that has lots of policy discretion. (It's a bit like a
circuit judge being appointed to the Supreme Court: That the judge closely
followed precedent at the circuit level might often not tell you much about how
he or she will decide cases when the constraint of precedent is removed.)
Would you be troubled about giving such policy discretion to someone who makes
some very strange factual assertions about the world or the past of the world,
even if he may done a great job as a geneticist in the!
past?
Eugene
Alan Brownstein writes:
> I think Mark is clearly right when he talks about generally recognized
> religious
> doctrines in part because we know as an empirical matter that individuals who
> hold these beliefs are capable of engaging in first rate scientific work,
> practicing
> medicine with great skill, and doing all kinds of other work that requires
> scientific
> knowledge and expertise.
>
> Eugene's question focuses on less conventional and less common religious
> beliefs, however. One answer to the problem of the individual who holds
> uncommon religious beliefs who is nominated to a position of authority is
> that we
> can look at the individual's life and accomplishments as a check on our
> concern
> about his religious beliefs being inconsistent with the position to which he
> has
> been appointed. Typically leadership positions are offered to people with
> considerable experience and accomplishments in their field. If unconventional
> religious beliefs have not interfered with their professional
> responsibilities and
> accomplishments for 25 years or so, there seems little reason to believe that
> they
> would suddenly become inconsistent with their ability to preform their
> professional responsibilities when appointed to a leadership position.
>
> I think the harder question is whether unconventional religious beliefs should
> preclude an individual from entry level positions when the individual's
> beliefs (in
> the abstract) may seem inconsistent with the responsibilities they would
> assume
> in the position they are seeking and we have no track record to offset such
> concerns. The answer to that question may be contextual -- depending for
> example on the consequences of the individual's failure to perform his job in
> a
> competent way.
>
> Alan Brownstein
> ________________________________________
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
> On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark [mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:06 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law
> Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one
> am happy
> to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise would
> be
> -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us to be
> fools. If
> belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith in the US
> disqualifies
> one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow shows that the person
> cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, in Dickens' phrase
> "a ass
> -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking not of science but of the
> law.)
> There have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs,
> and I think it is bigotry to disqualify such persons from scientific
> positions. Or
> perhaps we now should discard the results of the human genome project,
> because Francis Collins led the effort, and of course the results cannot be
> reliable.
>
> A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would
> use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that
> Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for
> sloppy
> treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden
> biblical
> messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a method is
> far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require naturalism as a
> belief
> system is indeed to impose a religious test.
>
> Mark Scarberry
> Pepperdine
>
> ________________________________
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works. I
> take it that
> the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no elephant or
> turtle
> down there" would be the same as the response to "But all our experience with
> medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a resurrection" -
> "Well, this is
> a special miracle that can't be tested with your instruments / that doesn't
> fit with
> our experience." I'm not sure one can easily distinguish the two.
>
> But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the
> person
> says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest on a
> turtle.
> But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments can't perceive
> this
> now." Would our view of the person's general trustworthiness really change,
> on
> the grounds that now he's saying something that isn't currently testable with
> current observations?
>
> Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as
> working,
> either. If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves
> (perhaps
> with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the grounds that
> there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a
> werewolf, would
> you be satisfied about his qualities? What if you heard this from a doctor
> that you
> were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might be safer in someone
> else's hands?
>
> As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the
> time; I
> suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would be
> seen
> as a crank. But say that it was, and that therefore people who rejected the
> theory
> were wrongly condemned and discriminated against. That's surely bad. Yet
> does our uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition that time has
> upset
> many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a
> person's
> seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being considered for a high
> government post? Remember, the question isn't whether to throw someone in
> prison for his views about elephants and turtles (though in extreme cases, we
> do
> lock someone up as insane if we see his views as "delusions," for instance if
> the
> person really believes that he's Napoleon) - it's whether we should consider
> the
> views in deciding whether to trust the person with a great deal of
> discretionary
> authority.
>
> Eugene
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
>
> Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or
> not?
> We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests upon
> turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.
>
> Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't overly
> Newtonian in its assumptions. Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate the
> non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events we might otherwise
> hold
> to be outside the standard rules of nature.
>
> Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19th century to take
> pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether theory? For
> the
> government to impose legal detriments on that person?
>
>
>
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who
> recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate
> people's qualities for various purposes. Say someone sincerely tells us that
> he
> thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest on
> the
> back of a turtle. When told that this is inconsistent with various facts
> about the
> world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact of some
> special
> treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the
> universe. I take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty
> negative view of
> the person.
>
> And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our
> doubts, I think. Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly
> good
> geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a
> rather
> different job that involves a broad range of choices about health science
> funding.
> Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional obligation to set aside
> our
> worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that a person says are "outside
> the natural order" and those that he says relate to the natural order. But
> it seems
> to me that setting them aside at least runs against our first common-sense
> reactions, and might in fact not be sound.
>
> >From there we can shift the hypothetical. What if the person
> believes
> the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000 years,
> and
> that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test our faith?
> What if he doesn't take such a view, but believes that there have been several
> departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several thousand
> years,
> such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like?
>
> My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these
> examples. It
> is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and suitably
> scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I suspect)
> many
> fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are Young-Earthers or
> people
> who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths. But it's not easy for me
> to
> figure out how to translate that sort of sensible distinction into a legal or
> constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable principle of political
> ethics.
>
> Eugene
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> To be clear, I did not make that characterization. I was repeating Mr.
> Harris's
> argument. (My view would be different.)
>
> Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the
> point of
> this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different: Even if the virgin birth
> is outside
> the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is "how does Mr. Collins
> know that X event happened?" In other words, since Mr. Collins is claiming
> that
> the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a certain place, he is
> the
> one who should have to provide evidence for that assertion. I think that
> this the
> "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is referring to.... I refer you to his
> piece for his
> arguments instead of my clumsy paraphrasing.
>
>
> All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the
> values
> underlying science," not just characterize them that way. Assuming that they
> are,
> what result? Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious views
> undercut
> values that are needed in a job?
>
>
> I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have
> the full
> flavor of the argument. A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts conventional
> medicine. (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a part-time faith
> healer.
>
> The doctor-who-prays response is helpful. What about a doctor who was
> excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine off
> the job?
>
> A
> On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock
> <layco...@umich.edu<mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote:
>
> It is you who are begging the question. The question is whether religious
> faith
> and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent. You assumed the answer
> to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the
> values
> underlying science.
>
> The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order. Has any
> said or
> done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific work,
> when he is
> talking about things within the natural order? Has he said or done anything
> allegedly anithetical to science other than state and promote his religious
> beliefs?
>
> A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon General. An
> excellent physician who does everything medically indicated, and also prays
> for
> cures and believes that God sometimes answers those prayers, could be
> Surgeon General.
>
> _______________________________________________
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