I think Mark's point is quite right, partly because it stresses "the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith" (which is quite relevant to scientists' "want[ing] public support") and partly because "there have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs" (including recently, and not just in the distant path). But I think both the merit and the limitation of this argument is that it is indeed so constrained, and does distinguish the religions of sensible mainstream people from the religions of zany fringe people. It works very well a prudential and pragmatic argument (albeit with some degree of moral consequences if the prudential and pragmatic predicates are fulfilled). But I suspect it doesn't work as a constitutional or quasi-constitutional argument, and I'm not sure that it even works as a rule of political morality, though it is a good guide to sensible behavior. Or am I not doing it enough justice?
Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:07 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort, and of course the results cannot be reliable. A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test. Mark Scarberry Pepperdine ________________________________ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works. I take it that the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as the response to "But all our experience with medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a resurrection" - "Well, this is a special miracle that can't be tested with your instruments / that doesn't fit with our experience." I'm not sure one can easily distinguish the two. But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the person says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest on a turtle. But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments can't perceive this now." Would our view of the person's general trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he's saying something that isn't currently testable with current observations? Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as working, either. If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves (perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities? What if you heard this from a doctor that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might be safer in someone else's hands? As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would be seen as a crank. But say that it was, and that therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against. That's surely bad. Yet does our uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition that time has upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being considered for a high government post? Remember, the question isn't whether to throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles (though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his views as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that he's Napoleon) - it's whether we should consider the views in deciding whether to trust the person with a great deal of discretionary authority. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or not? We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ. Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't overly Newtonian in its assumptions. Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate the non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events we might otherwise hold to be outside the standard rules of nature. Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19th century to take pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether theory? For the government to impose legal detriments on that person? From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate people's qualities for various purposes. Say someone sincerely tells us that he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest on the back of a turtle. When told that this is inconsistent with various facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the universe. I take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty negative view of the person. And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our doubts, I think. Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health science funding. Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional obligation to set aside our worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that a person says are "outside the natural order" and those that he says relate to the natural order. But it seems to me that setting them aside at least runs against our first common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound. >From there we can shift the hypothetical. What if the person believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000 years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test our faith? What if he doesn't take such a view, but believes that there have been several departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several thousand years, such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like? My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these examples. It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and suitably scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are Young-Earthers or people who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths. But it's not easy for me to figure out how to translate that sort of sensible distinction into a legal or constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable principle of political ethics. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms To be clear, I did not make that characterization. I was repeating Mr. Harris's argument. (My view would be different.) Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different: Even if the virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is "how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?" In other words, since Mr. Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence for that assertion. I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is referring to.... I refer you to his piece for his arguments instead of my clumsy paraphrasing. All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the values underlying science," not just characterize them that way. Assuming that they are, what result? Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious views undercut values that are needed in a job? I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have the full flavor of the argument. A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts conventional medicine. (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a part-time faith healer. The doctor-who-prays response is helpful. What about a doctor who was excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine off the job? A On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock <layco...@umich.edu<mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote: It is you who are begging the question. The question is whether religious faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent. You assumed the answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the values underlying science. The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order. Has any said or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific work, when he is talking about things within the natural order? Has he said or done anything allegedly anithetical to science other than state and promote his religious beliefs? A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon General. An excellent physician who does everything medically indicated, and also prays for cures and believes that God sometimes answers those prayers, could be Surgeon General.
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