I had a bit role at the margins of the Skokie litigation. Teh Holocaust survivors in Skokie surely took the march in Skokie as being aimed at them personally and sought to ban it for just that reason. As a result, though lots of other towns simply ignored the Nazi request to march, Skokie felt obligated to formally reject the Nazi's desire to march-a decision that spurred litigation-though the silence of the others towns elicited no response. How, without engaging in very subjective decision-making to we decide that some events are entitled to protection from free speech and others are not. IS funeral protected but not a bar mitzvah? What about weekly mass? Marc stern
-----Original Message----- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 2:14 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Cert. granted in Snyder v. Phelps. The more I think about twos the less I am inclined to agree with Eugene on this one I don't think Skokie is an apt analogy because the speech there was not directed at any one person or persons. Nor was it intended to disrupt or impact one of life's most sacred and solemn events. The speakers have chosen funerals as their targets to improve tje effectiveness of their essay This is more like defamation or perhaps rock against racism. You have a right to speak but no right to optimal delivery or harming others intentionally. Marci Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry -----Original Message----- From: "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu> Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 10:57:22 To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> Subject: RE: Cert. granted in Snyder v. Phelps. I take it that the analogy would have been disruption by sound: The government is certainly entitled to restrict speech that interferes with others' speech (or other matters) because of the noise that it creates, and many such restrictions are content-neutral. The disruption there is unrelated to the content of the speech, and consists simply of the distraction created by the sound, and in extreme cases the inability to hear the other sounds. But I agree that in the absence of loud noise (Eric asked whether there was such noise that could be heard from the funeral, but I think there wasn't), there is no analogy: The alleged disruption did not involve the content-neutral distraction caused by the sound, but rather the offense caused by the content of the speech. That makes the restriction unconstitutional, though punishment of people ("constituents of an institution" or otherwise) for shouting down a speaker generally would be constitutional. Eugene > -----Original Message----- > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- > boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders > Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 12:45 PM > To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' > Subject: RE: Cert. granted in Snyder v. Phelps. > > I'm scratching my head at Eric's analogy; perhaps he could elaborate? > On the one hand, we have constituents of an institution disrupting > (however > inappropriately) an institutional ceremony to protest an institutional > policy. On the other hand, we have outsiders directing a crude and > emotionally disturbing message toward a private religious service. > The two situations are analogous how....? > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric > > Rassbach > > Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 10:01 AM > > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > > Subject: RE: Cert. granted in Snyder v. Phelps. > > > > > > I am sorry if this fact has already been circulated on the list, but > > was the protest at issue loud enough to be heard at the location of, > > and during, the funeral ceremony? If so, would this fact pattern be > > analogous to disruption of a public university graduation ceremony > > by students protesting tuition hikes? > > > > > > > > PLEASE NOTE NEW ADDRESS > > > > Eric Rassbach > > National Litigation Director > > The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 3000 K St. NW, Suite 220 > > Washington, DC 20007 USA > > +1.202.349.7214 (tel.) > > +1.202.955.0090 (fax) > > www.becketfund.org > > > > NOTICE: This e-mail is from a law firm, The Becket Fund for > > Religious Liberty, and is intended solely for the use of the > > person(s) to whom it is addressed. If you believe you received this > > e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately, delete the > > e-mail from your computer and do not copy or disclose it to anyone > > else. If you are not an existing client of The Becket Fund, do not > > construe anything in this e-mail to make you a client unless it > > contains a specific statement to that effect and do not disclose > > anything to The Becket Fund in reply that you expect or want it to > > hold in confidence. If you properly received this e-mail as a > > client, co-counsel or retained expert of The Becket Fund, you should > > maintain its contents in confidence in order to preserve the > > attorney-client or work product privilege that may be available to > > protect confidentiality. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, > > Eugene > > Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 12:25 PM > > To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' > > Subject: RE: Cert. granted in Snyder v. Phelps. > > > > I appreciate Alan's points (though I probably disagree with him > > on the bottom line), and they might have been relevant to picketing > > in front of the funeral. But here, as Alan's first sentence > > acknowledges, liability was based partly on the Web site and partly > > on speech a thousand feet from the funeral. I take it that Alan > > agrees that the first class of speech wouldn't be covered by his > > theory. > > > > But beyond this, let me ask: I take it that some of the > > attendees at the funeral -- for instance, the decedent's comrades in > > arms -- might indeed be open to the proposition that God disapproves > > of America's tolerance for homosexuality, and that God rightly > > retaliates against America because of that. Those are certainly not > > my views, but I can certainly imagine a considerable number of > > people, including fellow soldiers, having them (though only a tiny > > fraction would actually express them on the occasion of the > > funeral). Presumably some of those fellow soldiers, even if upset > > by the speech, might thus be "potentially willing" to hear it > > (especially since a funeral tends to draw many attendees, and not > > just a very small circle), just as some of the residents of Skokie > > might have been anti-Semites even while many others were Jews. To > > what extent should that be relevant under Alan's analysis? > > > > Eugene > > > > Alan Brownstein writes: > > > > > > Although there are important limiting facts in this > > > > case that distinguish it from a clearer "picketing > > > > at a funeral case," at its core this case raises > > > > the question of whether speakers can choose a > > > > location for their offensive speech that targets > > > > their victims in an egregiously hurtful way when > > > > alternative sites for communicating their message to > > > > the public are equally accessible and at least as > > > > likely to be heard by potentially willing listeners. > > > > I'm still thinking about the answer to that > > > > question. > >_______________________________________________ > > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, > >unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > >http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed > > as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that > > are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can > > (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. > > > >_______________________________________________ > > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, > >unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > >http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed > > as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that > > are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can > > (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. > > > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, >unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. > Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
