Thanks Michael. I obviously have not read the opinion. But if the employee has a claim for the employer's refusal to accomodate her, why doesn't she have a retaliation claim for opposing its refusal to accommodate her?
On Mon, 20 Dec 2010 13:34:16 -0500 Michael Masinter <masin...@nova.edu> wrote: >The Eleventh Circuit's recent religious discrimination, religious >accommodation, and retaliation decision, Dixon v. The Hallmark Services, >http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201010047.pdf does not foreclose a >reasonable accommodation claim or a disparate treatment claim by an employee >forced to remove religious objects from her workspace; to the contrary, it >held that the statement allegedly made in conjunction with her discharge that >she was too religious was direct evidence of discriminatory intent, and that >because management was on notice of the conflict between her religious belief >that she must display religious objects in her workspace and its contrary >policy, it was obliged to consider a reasonable accommodation unless granting >one would cause undue hardship. The court reversed summary judgment for the >employer on both grounds, reasoning that the former turned on the contested >question of whether the statement that the employee was too religious was >actually made, and the latter on the case by case and as yet undeveloped >factual specifics of what is a reasonable accommodation or an undue hardship. > >Dixon did hold that neither Title VII nor the Fair Housing Act forbids a >private employer from establishing a "no religious symbols" policy, and that >an objection to such a policy therefore could not support an opposition >clause claim even though its application to an individual employee with >contrary religiously motivated practices could support a reasonable >accommodation claim. > > >Michael R. Masinter 3305 College Avenue >Professor of Law Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314 >Nova Southeastern University 954.262.6151 (voice) >masin...@nova.edu 954.262.3835 (fax) > > > >Quoting Douglas Laycock <dlayc...@virginia.edu>: > >> It doesn't make sense to call religious truth claims offensive (although >> that is common parlance), but it does make sense to say that an employee >> who doesn't believe such a claim should not have to display the claim or >> its symbols. The employee has a legitimate interest in not appearing to >> promote what he considers to be a false belief. And this interest should >> be well within the religious accommodation protections of Title VII. >> >> Except, apparently, in the Eleventh Circuit. >> >> On Mon, 20 Dec 2010 11:47:20 -0500 >> Eric Rassbach <erassb...@becketfund.org> wrote: >>> >>> I took Alan's example re re Confederate flags etc. to be raising the >>> issue of hostile work environment discrimination claims. Of course for >>> such a claim to be successful, a lone requirement that employees display >>> something offensive would not be enough; you'd have to show some other >>> pattern of discrimination on the basis of the protected class at issue. >>> (Wrt the Confederate flag example, it is certainly the case that a lot of >>> businesses in the South display Confederate battle flags and require >>> their employees to do so; though it is probably bars more than banks.) >>> >>> I think a religious discrimination hostile work environment claim would >>> be really hard to make out based on the display of one religion's symbol. >>> Competing truth claims are a feature, not a bug, of religious life, so it >>> doesn't make sense to call one group's truth claims or the symbols >>> representing those truth claims "offensive" or discriminatory per se. >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >>> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene >>> [vol...@law.ucla.edu] >>> Sent: Monday, December 20, 2010 10:33 AM >>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >>> Subject: RE: Federal regulators apparently force bank to take down >>> religioussymbols >>> >>> Alan: Can you flesh out the discrimination theory more? I >>> take it that the claim is that requiring everyone to display something >>> would constitute discrimination (not just failure to accommodate religious >>> beliefs, or creation of an allegedly hostile environment), and that this >>> would trigger a requirement of exemption even outside the context of >>> religious discrimination, where such exemption is statutorily required >>> is that right? It seems like an odd sort of discrimination claim, but Id >>> like to hear more about it. (I take it that this would practically be of >>> some more importance because some companies include in their corporate >>> symbols items that some people may find offensive based on membership in >>> various groups, whether the symbols are religious, allegedly racially >>> offensive, and so on consider the litigation over Sambos Restaurants, >>> or the use of American Indian symbols, or other things that might well be >>> a part of company logos, di splayed > on compa >> ny >>> vehicles, and so on.) >>> >>> By the way, some jurisdictions ban discrimination based on >>> political affiliation, and of course government entities are generally >>> barred by the First Amendment from certain kinds of discrimination based >>> on political affiliation. Would requiring all employees to display >>> company symbols that are opposed by one or another political party >>> constitute forbidden political affiliation discrimination? >>> >>> Eugene >>> >>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >>> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan >>> Sent: Friday, December 17, 2010 4:36 PM >>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >>> Subject: RE: Federal regulators apparently force bank to take down >>> religioussymbols >>> >>> Do you think there is a discrimination issue as well as an accommodation >>> issue in cases like this, Eugene. Suppose a bank in a southern state >>> insists that all employees have confederate flags on their desks or work >>> stations? Does an African-American employee have a claim under Title VII? >>> What about displays that proclaim the superiority or virtue of the white >>> race? >>> >>> Alan >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >>> >>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as >>> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are >>> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly >>> or wrongly) forward the messages to others. >> >> Douglas Laycock >> Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law >> University of Virginia Law School >> 580 Massie Road >> Charlottesville, VA 22903 >> 434-243-8546 >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as >> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are >> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or >> wrongly) forward the messages to others. >> > > > >_______________________________________________ >To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > >Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. > Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people >can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward >the messages to others. Douglas Laycock Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
