I doubt that a typical six-year-old is going to much notice 
this (I say this as a father of a six-year-old and a seven-year-old) -- 
especially once he's told that everyone is allowed to access the school 
equally, and that what he sees at the school those days comes from the group, 
not from the school.  But if you think it necessary, you can add, "You might 
notice that some groups have decided to use the school more than others.  But 
that's their decision.  We at the school just decided to open it to anyone who 
wants to come."

                But if you think this isn't enough, and that some six-year-olds 
will be confused, wouldn't the "six-year-old might be confused" standard go 
rather too far?  I suppose a six-year-old who sees the principal going to 
church Sunday might think that the school is religious, and (to return to the 
religious garb case) a six-year-old seeing a teacher wearing a yarmulke might 
think that this was the school's choice and not the teacher's (even though 
other teachers don't wear yarmulkes).  It seems to me, though, that 
constitutionality should be determined by something other than the possibility 
that some six-year-olds, despite a disclaimer, won't fully grasp the 
distinction between private choice and public choice.

                Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2011 9:53 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Establishment Clause, equal access, and confusion

And how would the school explain to six-year-old students why the school is 
open to such uses only on Sundays; and why, just coincidently, the 
overwhelmingly predominant uses of the school are for Christian religious 
services?

Don't get me wrong -- this doesn't mean that I necessary think there would be 
an EC violation.  But I am inclined to think that, at a minimum, the school 
must (but cf. Braunfeld) expand its access policy beyond Sundays; provide very 
robust disclaimers (per the controlling opinions in Pinette) -- disclaimers 
explicable to young students (more of a challenge than Eugene suggests); and 
perhaps even make special efforts to ensure that an array of groups, religious 
and nonreligious, are encouraged to make use of the school.
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 12:40 PM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:
                I've never seen the force of concerns about confusion about 
government endorsement created by equal access proposals, especially when 
there's time to explain things to the confused people.  Schools' job is to 
dispel confusion among students about various things.  They have lots of 
opportunity to do it.  How hard is it to put up signs - and, if necessary, even 
make an announcement in class or in some handouts - that say something like:

Our school system opens up space after hours to any community group that wants 
to use it.  This is our way of helping people speak on whatever subjects they 
want to speak about.  All groups are equally entitled to use this space, even 
if they say things that other people might disagree with - that's what 
promoting free speech is all about.  So please keep in mind that the things you 
see said and displayed here after hours don't come from the school system or 
the government - they come from the private groups that are using this space.

Not a complicated message, and in fact a message that's worth teaching to the 
students generally.  (Of course, this is just what I cobbled together in a 
couple of minutes; naturally, this can be edited to be clearer.)  And if the 
constitutional norm is equal treatment, which I think it should be, then the 
answer to the argument that the government may reject the norm because of the 
risk of confusion is that there's a less restrictive means of avoiding the 
confusion: educating the public about the equal-access nature of the program.

                This problem, incidentally, likewise comes up with the statutes 
barring teachers from teaching in religious garb (which might be broad enough 
to cover yarmulkes and headscarves, though most clearly applies to nun's habits 
and the like).  The statutes were upheld by two lower courts a few decades ago, 
but a more recent lower court decision struck one down, I think, and rightly 
so.  Any concerns about confusion on the students' part can be easily 
dispelled, I think, by simply teaching students - and it shouldn't take long - 
that in our society different people have different beliefs, that some people 
believe that they need to wear particular religious clothing, and that these 
beliefs are the teachers' own, not the schools'.  Again, not a complicated 
message, and one that's worth teaching in any event.

                To be sure, some people might remain confused even after this, 
and might insist on believing that the government is endorsing religion even 
when the government accurately and clearly reports that it simply provides 
equal access.  But this possibility that a few people might be confused, even 
when the government makes clear that all it's offering is equal access - just 
like the equal access offered to religious groups in many contexts, such as tax 
exemptions, the use of GI Bill grants, and so on - doesn't strike me as reason 
enough to reject equal access.

                Eugene

Marci Hamilton writes:

Apologies to Marty for overreading his reference to Lukumi.  The facts of Bronx 
Household indicate that the entire school is transformed into a worship center 
every Sunday.  Students entering to get their homework or for any other reason 
would be confused regarding their school's support for the religious 
organization.  This moves the case away from the "club" cases.  For this 
reason, I do not share Marty's assumption about the Court's willingness to 
overrule and/or to even take the case.

If separation means anything historically or contemporaneously, surely it means 
that a public building can draw the line at being home to full-scale religious 
worship.  Is a courthouse that hosts bar association events required to permit 
its building to be transformed into a worship center on the relevant Sabbath?  
Part of the reason this is difficult is because Rosenberger was decided wrongly 
in my view, but the cases do not mandate a return to the days of establishment 
when public buildings were worship buildings and vice versa.


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