If the Court upholds a ministerial exception, it is only fair for the  
federal government and the states to amend their anti-discrimination laws to  
require employers otherwise covered to disclose to their religious employees  
that they will not have the protection of the anti-discrimination laws if 
they  accept the employment of this religious organization.  
 
We live in a culture where there is a basic assumption that it is wrong to  
discriminate.  Employees in these cases are typically in shock that the  
religious organization could have a First Amendment or any other defense to  
otherwise illegal discrimination.  I have never spoken to Ms. Perich, but I  
can imagine that it came as a surprise to her that her employer (1) would 
engage  in disability discrimination against her, and (2) then raise the First 
 Amendment to permit such discrimination.  The same is true in the cases  
involving gender and race discrimination (especially where the original  
appointment had no gender/race requirement).  (If anyone thinks that  religious 
organizations do not engage in invidious gender or race discrimination  not 
motivated by their religious beliefs, I would be happy to put you in touch  
with various victims who would say otherwise.)
 
A disclosure requirement would be the least that would need to be done to  
level the playing field between religious organizations and their  employees.
 
 
Marci 
 
 
 
 
In a message dated 8/16/2011 4:28:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
howard.fried...@utoledo.edu writes:

As for  the reasons for the ministerial exception, part of it is surely
about  erroneous determination of motive.  And part is about  reinstatement.
But I think there's something else too.  Religion is  supposed to be this
voluntary thing.  We can all think of how this is  true for religious
beliefs and practices-we see it everywhere from Torcaso  v. Watkins to
Santa Fe v. Doe.  But it's true too for religious  associations, which
should be chosen by people and not imposed by the  state.   The ministerial
exception is part of that voluntary  principle.  By creating a kind of
constitutionalized at-will  employment, it guarantees that when
congregations and clergy stay together,  it's because they choose to do so.
Now I don't know if it will survive, but  I think that's a big part of why
the ministerial exception has persisted  all these  years.



Best,

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