One other variation: nuisance and related bodies of law generally hold landlords responsible for what tenants do on the property.
On Mon, 1 Oct 2012 12:55:45 -0700 "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu> wrote: > Let me add that American law has very different views of when > people are "responsible" for the acts of others, or when they can demand that > they not assist in the acts of others. For instance, > > 1. Zelman sets forth one rule when it comes to taxpayers' > right to object to the use of their money under the Establishment Clause. > > 2. Abood and Keller set forth a different rule when it comes > to fee payers' right to object to the use of their fees (as opposed to > general taxes) under the Free Speech Clause. > > 3. Criminal law in most jurisdictions holds people > responsible for aiding and abetting only when they have the purpose of aiding > conduct. > > 4. Criminal law in some jurisdictions, or as to some crimes, > holds people responsible for aiding and abetting when they have the knowledge > that they are aiding the conduct. > > 5. In some jurisdictions, e.g., in New York, the standard for > responsibility under special-purpose statutes is close to recklessness (e.g., > "believing it probable" under the New York statute). > > 6. Special purpose criminal laws (as opposed to general > aiding and abetting law) sometimes have special rules for holding people > responsible for doing things that assist certain kinds of misconduct based; > consider, for instance, the federal ban on providing material assistance to > designated terrorist organizations, or the laws in some states that > criminalize recklessly facilitate escape from criminal custody. > > 7. Tort law may in some situations hold people liable for > aiding and abetting others' misconduct so long as the person was negligent > about the possibility that the other person would use the person's help for > bad purposes. (Consider negligent entrustment claims, for instance, whether > as to cars, guns, or what have you.) > > I tend to agree with Chris and the others who take the view > that the RFRA substantial burden question ought not be influenced by this, > but rather by whether the claimant sincerely believes that he is asked to do > something that he sees as sinful. But the fact that our own legal system has > such a complex view of when assistance is enough to make the assister > responsible should further counsel in favor of focusing on the claimant's > beliefs about responsibility, rather than trying to impose some rule of its > own about responsibility. > > None of this, of course, deals with whether the law could > still be applied to objectors because (1) such an application passes strict > scrutiny, or (2) the legislature carves out the relevant statute from RFRA. > > Eugene > _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
