Cathy Kaveny asked me to send along this reaction to some of the issues we've been discussing:
Hi all, This is a fascinating discussion. I'm sorry I can't participate more because I have to get ready for a couple of talks. So I'll limit myself to three quick points. 1. Is the cooperation permissible according to Catholic teaching? This seems to me to be, at the very least, a question Catholics can publicly raise and discuss. In my view, the insurance issue is remote mediate material cooperation with evil--the sort of thing that is justifiable with "proportionate" reason. The type of arrangement has been signed off on by moral theologians many times before. Much closer cooperation with graver evils has been justified --for example, the manualists have said that it is permissible for a nurse to hand the instruments to a doctor whom she knows is performing an abortion. What's the difference here? I think the key issue isn't the cooperation itself, but the scandal--the current bishops discern a need to take a stand against the "culture of death." 2. Some have argued that the cooperation with evil is "formal"--i.e., intentionally furthering the wrongdoing because it is under a contractual arrangement. You're buying the insurance policy, it has contraception in it. You're intending to buy contraception. In my view, that's a mistake. The cooperation is intentional, but the contribution to the evil is praeter intentionem--"beside the intention" of the person contracting for the policy. 3. The more vexing question for me is the relationship between the ad intra discussion and the legal analysis. On the one hand, I don't think it's a good idea for courts to go mucking around in religious traditions, turning themselves into theologians of various faiths. On the other hand, I am leery of reading the notion of "substantial" out of the jurisprudence, so that any burden is substantial if any religious believer claims it is. Take care, and special thanks to Marty for organizing such a wonderful conversation! Best, Cathleen On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 11:31 AM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>wrote: > Mark: My point is that, as far as I know, "for centuries" *neither *case > has been considered impermissible cooperation with evil under the mode of > moral analysis you invoke (which I agree is "respectable," indeed). Of > course if the employer affirmatively *chose* to cover contraception, or > had a legal choice whether to accept a plan with it or without it, and > chose the former, that would be a form of *formal *cooperation with evil, > which is proscribed (assuming, as I am here for sake of argument, that > contraception is in fact "evil" from the employer's perspective). But > absent such consent or choice, as here, the question is whether the > "material" cooperation is sufficiently proximate -- and my understanding is > that the proximity in these cases would be the same, and *not *sufficient > to raise the prospect of impermissible cooperation. > > FWIW, Cathy Kaveny (copied here) offered a really fantastic summary of the > Catholic doctrine on this at the beginning of our second panel: > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1J4rCsq732c >
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
