Why doesn't 1 USC sec. 1 resolve the first-stage question in Hobby Lobby (whether RFRA applies to corporations)? "[T]he words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."
Are the two sides really just arguing about whether [RFRA's] "context indicates otherwise" (1 USC 1) sufficiently to overcome this strong definitional statement? If so, much as I'd personally like for Hobby Lobby to lose this case, I'd think that the on this question at least, the plaintiffs have to win. After all, we have a strong statutory definition, with at best equivocal contextual evidence to the contrary. What am I missing? Are there cases dealing with the "context" language in 1 USC 1?
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