I dunno. No such allegation in the complaint. Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2014, at 2:40 PM, "Scarberry, Mark" <mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote: > But are they the beneficial owners of the shares as beneficiaries of the > trust? > > Sent from my iPad > > On Jun 10, 2014, at 11:32 AM, "Marty Lederman" <lederman.ma...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I didn't say that the Greens are not potentially burden as company directors >> -- indeed, that's exactly what I've argued the case is about, rather than >> being about corporate free exercise or shareholder rights: >> >> http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/hobby-lobby-part-v-whose-religious.html >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Scarberry, Mark >> <mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote: >>> The "just like wages" characterization is highly contested and, at least if >>> pushed to its logical conclusion, unsustainable. As to the shareholder >>> issue, almost everyone these days owns property through trusts; anyone who >>> has substantial assets and wants to avoid probate will do so. So it's not >>> surprising that the Greens are not personally shareholders but rather >>> trustees of the trusts that hold the shares (if I understand the facts >>> correctly). Their rights are implicated as beneficial owners and as >>> controlling persons, by way of their being trustees of their family trust >>> and also officers and directors who personally take actions on behalf of >>> the corporation. As for them not being required to provide the coverage >>> they object to, because they can just leave their employees out in the >>> Obamacare cold, and pay a fine, there is a strong argument that the law >>> still creates a substantial burden. I think we've discussed that issue at >>> length. >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> Mark S. Scarberry >>> Pepperdine University School of Law >>> >>> >>> Sent from my iPad >>> >>> On Jun 10, 2014, at 10:09 AM, "Marty Lederman" <lederman.ma...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I agree with Mark's correction that the complaint of the Greens is not >>>> that their employees' use of contraceptive burdens their religion. >>>> >>>> But it's also not that they have to "buy insurance that specifically >>>> covers the drugs." For thing, the law doesn't require HL to offer an >>>> employee health insurance plan at all. For another, the Greens aren't >>>> shareholders, and therefore aren't "buying" anything. Hobby Lobby, Inc. >>>> --as opposed to the Greens-- is contracting for an insurance plan -- but >>>> of course that plan is not made available to their employees gratis; it is >>>> a part of their compensation package, provided in exchange for their >>>> labor, just like wages. >>>> >>>> The nature of the way in which the Greens are alleged to be required to >>>> act in violation of any religious obligations, therefore, is not at all >>>> obvious. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 12:55 PM, Scarberry, Mark >>>> <mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote: >>>>> Jon, >>>>> >>>>> I think you don't understand, or are ignoring, the point of view of the >>>>> Hobby Lobby parties. They don't object to employees buying what the Hobby >>>>> Lobby parties consider to be abortifacient drugs. I don't think they >>>>> monitor what their employees do with wages or would take any action >>>>> against employees who buy or use such drugs. They object to being >>>>> required themselves to take an action specifically related to abortion -- >>>>> buying insurance that specifically covers the drugs. You might object to >>>>> buying a gun for an employee, even though the recipient would be the one >>>>> who uses it. You might, if you were a pacifist, object to being drafted >>>>> to serve as an army medic or supply clerk, even though you would not be >>>>> killing anyone but merely be advancing the army's operations. >>>>> >>>>> I understand that some people object to this characterization, but it >>>>> doesn't move the discussion forward to just assume that it isn't the >>>>> position taken by the objectors in Hobby Lobby. >>>>> >>>>> Mark >>>>> >>>>> Mark S. Scarberry >>>>> Pepperdine University School of Law >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPad >>>>> >>>>> > On Jun 9, 2014, at 2:35 PM, "mallamud" <malla...@camden.rutgers.edu> >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > There is some authority for not preferring religion over non-religion. >>>>> > I do not think religious people should get exemptions reasons not >>>>> > connected to the practice of their religion (church services, prayer, >>>>> > lighting candles, sacrificing chickens etc.) To me many requests sound >>>>> > like "I think it is wrong for religious reasons" and therefore other >>>>> > people should not engage in that behavior. E.g. I will not pay my taxes >>>>> > because taxes pay for killing people. No one is asking the owners of >>>>> > Hobby Lobby to engage in activities that they believe offend their >>>>> > religion; they are seeking not to pay employees in such a way that >>>>> > certain contraceptives would be covered. The decision to use or not use >>>>> > the contraceptives is the employees'. One difficulty is that the courts >>>>> > are loath to inquire into to the closeness of the connection of the >>>>> > claim to the religious belief. But without limits exemptions will >>>>> > become legion. >>>>> > >>>>> > Exemptions usually involve some unfairness. That would be mitigated if >>>>> > religious exemptions were limited to the actual practice of religion >>>>> > rather than attempts to impose beliefs on others through refusing to >>>>> > comply with general laws. Smith is a good example and, as we know, does >>>>> > not stop you from sacrificing chickens because people in the community >>>>> > are offended. Take it outside the church or home and give exemptions to >>>>> > general laws and that will create problems if the exemptions become wide >>>>> > enough to make it seem that religious folks have general privileges in >>>>> > society that secular folks do not. Cf. Affirmative action. >>>>> > >>>>> > I noted previously Scalia's citation (in during oral argument) of the >>>>> > overwhelming majority extending the VRA as evidence that the law was not >>>>> > carefully considered. During RFRA's passage and thereafter I focused on >>>>> > conservatives articulating the issue as one in which the Supreme Court >>>>> > disrespected religion, and those on the other side of the spectrum >>>>> > articulated the Smith decision as having disrespected constitutional >>>>> > rights. From discussion about Scalia with lawyers and non-lawyers, I >>>>> > cannot help thinking that a dislike of Scalia contributed to one side's >>>>> > support of RFRA. >>>>> > >>>>> > Jon >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> >> On 2014-06-09 17:00, Steven Jamar wrote: >>>>> >> “nones”? >>>>> >> Huh. I knew that was a thing, but didn’t really expect to see it >>>>> >> here. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Steve >>>>> >> >>>>> >> On Jun 9, 2014, at 4:49 PM, mallamud <malla...@camden.rutgers.edu> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >> >>>>> >>> I agree with Alan's statement below, stated better than I did. I >>>>> >>> would add that we now do/should include the nones within the system. >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> Jon >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>>> On 2014-06-08 22:36, Alan Brownstein wrote: >>>>> >>>> If divisive means that people will be upset by a substantive >>>>> >>>> decision >>>>> >>>> than Eugene is clearly correct. I have always thought the issue was >>>>> >>>> whether a decision was one that provoked political divisions along >>>>> >>>> religious lines in the sense that if government could promote >>>>> >>>> religion >>>>> >>>> (or interfere with religion) religious groups would have an >>>>> >>>> additional >>>>> >>>> incentive to organize and mobilize as religious groups in order to >>>>> >>>> make sure that it was their faith that the government promoted and >>>>> >>>> that it was not their faith that was subject to government >>>>> >>>> interference. Placing a church-state issue beyond the scope of >>>>> >>>> political decision-making by subjecting it to constitutional >>>>> >>>> constraints avoided (or at least mitigated) these kinds of >>>>> >>>> political/religious divisions. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> There is probably a better term for this concern than divisiveness. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Alan Brownstein >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> >>>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >>>>> >>>> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene >>>>> >>>> [vol...@law.ucla.edu] >>>>> >>>> Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2014 4:54 PM >>>>> >>>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >>>>> >>>> Subject: "Divisiveness" >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I agree very much with Tom on this point. In most >>>>> >>>> controversies, both sides are acting in ways that could plausibly >>>>> >>>> be >>>>> >>>> labeled as "divisive." Government religious speech may be seen as >>>>> >>>> "divisive," because it may alienate members of other religious >>>>> >>>> groups; >>>>> >>>> but prohibitions on such speech, or litigation seeking such >>>>> >>>> prohibition, may be as divisive or more so. A pro-Hobby-Lobby >>>>> >>>> decision might be divisive, but an anti-Hobby-Lobby decision might >>>>> >>>> be >>>>> >>>> divisive. Indeed, academic criticism of a pro-Hobby-Lobby decision >>>>> >>>> (or an anti-Hobby-Lobby decision) might be divisive -- and so was >>>>> >>>> the >>>>> >>>> implementation of the mandate without a broad religious exemption, >>>>> >>>> as >>>>> >>>> Tom points out. > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others.
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
