I don't think it's any our job to figure out the inappropriate use of the Deli's sandwiches than it is to figure out what's "inappropriate" about eating chicken with cream sauce. The Deli owners thought it was religiously wrong for them to let any of their products be used by anyone working at a company that, in the owners' views, was committing mass murder. Likewise, I imagine there are religious pacifists who for religious reasons won't sell any product (even food) to the military or military contractors, or people who wouldn't sell any products to South African companies (or to companies that do business with South Africa), and so on. That we don't see anything inappropriate about either the companies or the use to which the products are put is irrelevant. If they believe it is religiously wrong for them to sell anything to a company, that's enough to get in the door under a religious exemption regime - not just my view, of course, but also that of the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Now whether these religious exemption claims should be trumped by some government interest, such as the interest in preventing discrimination based on race, or religion, or political affiliation, or business practices, is a separate matter - that goes to whether denying the exemption is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. But, as I said, I would have thought that my view was entirely orthodox. "[I]t is not for us to say that the line [religious objectors draw between what they view as religiously permissible or religiously impermissible] was an unreasonable one." If devout Jews interpret the Torah as barring not just the seething of a kid in its mother's milk, but also mixing chicken meat with cow milk, it's not for us to parse their reasoning, or to suggest that their thinking is inconsistent with what we think sound thinking would be (or for that matter with their own thinking in other areas). Likewise if someone feels that it's inappropriate for him to provide any support, however indirect, for abortion providers or for the military or for killers of animals or for the South African regime. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Finkelman, Paul Sent: Friday, August 14, 2015 10:32 AM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Colorado Cakeshop decision Eugene: I am trying to figure out what would be the "inappropriate" use of the Deli's sandwiches? Is it feeding doctors who perform abortion? Are you arguing that the pillow case maker can refuse to sell pillow cases to members of the KKK who use them for pillows? That is, can your refuse to do business with people if you don't like them or like what they do for a living? So, if the product -- a sandwich -- is being used properly -- that is it is being eaten, then how could it possibly be used inappropriately? Or, are you that the Deli owner can refuse to sell to the clinic because the clinic does things the owner does not like? So, he won't sell to the clinic because he does not think doctors who work there should eat food? And the KKK owner of a clothing store will not sell to blacks or Jews or Catholics (and many more groups) because he does not think those people should ever be seen in public so they don't need clothing? Your widget maker simply would not compete for the military contract. No one forces him to do so. At the end of this post you migrate from illegitimate use, to illegitimate user. That is, you don't want your product being sold in a South Africa because you are opposed to the regime. So you won't sell to a 2nd party, who sells it to 3rd party, who sells it to South Africa? Assuming this is a retail business, then I am guessing you would say that a racist who believes that blacks are inferior and made to be slaves of whites, it would be ok for that person to refuse to sell retain good to blacks? It is worth noting that most southern ministers believed that in the 19th century and I have had some students tell me they have heard similar things i their churches. So, we have a "racist" church. Are you arguing the member of that church can refuse to seat a black at his restaurant, refuse to serve and interracial couple, or refuse to rent a room to a black? ************************************************* Paul Finkelman Senior Fellow Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism University of Pennsylvania and Scholar-in-Residence National Constitution Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 518-439-7296 (p) 518-605-0296 (c) paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu<mailto:paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu> www.paulfinkelman.com<http://www.paulfinkelman.com/> ************************************************* ________________________________ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> <religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>> on behalf of Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2015 7:51 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Colorado Cakeshop decision Sure, why not? Say a grape grower refuses to sell to winemakers, or a pacifist widget maker refuses to sell to military contractors, or a restaurant refuses to deliver to abortion clinics? See Rasmussen v. Glass (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=648897692635049631, which holds that, even if a city ordinance banning discrimination based on "creed" required restaurants to deliver to abortion clinics, there had to be a religious exemption from such an ordinance. "Under the provisions of the Minneapolis ordinance, relator Glass [owner of the Beach Club Deli] has two choices. He can either associate with an entity that engages in conduct which he finds to be morally offensive [delivering to abortion clinics], thus compromising his conscience, or he can refuse and be found guilty of discrimination and fined." Now these have to do with objections to sales to businesses, not sales to individuals - but I can't see why they would be different for RFRA / state Free Exercise Clause purposes. As to how the information would be obtained, I take it that many a business wouldn't work very hard to investigate the matter, but when it learned that its products were used by a customer in ways it disapproved of, might stop selling them to that customer. Isn't that how many of us would act if we were businesspeople, and we learned that some of our customers were using our products in ways we strongly disapproved of? Want to buy our pillowcases? Go right ahead. Oh, wait, you're the KKK and you want to use them for your hoods; sorry, your business isn't welcome here. Same if you learn your customers are using your products to kill animals (if you object to that), resell them to South Africa (if you objected to that back in the 1980s), and so on. Some people take a "Hey, the product is out of our hands, none of our business" attitude, which I think is just fine. But other people care more about the behavior of their customers (and for that matter of their suppliers) - indeed, many who praise "corporate social responsibility" support that general approach. And when the business feels a religious objection in such a situation, any existing religious exemption regime would be implicated, wouldn't it be? Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Levinson, Sanford V Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2015 7:20 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Colorado Cakeshop decision A non-rhetorical question: is there any model that would justify refusing to sell an in embellished product--say a cupcake--to someone whose potential use--at a same sex wedding, at a tryst with one's heterosexual lover, or whatever--you disapproved of on religious grounds? An obvious question, of course, is how such information would be obtained. Could a sign indicate the exclusive list of cupcake-eligible customers and include, in addition to payment and appropriate demeanor, "adherence to the baker's views of sexual propriety"? Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Aug 13, 2015, at 4:27 PM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: I should add that it also concludes that the Colorado Constitution's religious freedom guarantee follows the Smith model rather than the Sherbert/Yoder model, something that was less clear before. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2015 5:06 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Colorado Cakeshop decision https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opinion/2015/14CA1351-PD.pdf Fairly straightforward. Rejects free speech and free exercise claims. (The case does not involve a refusal to bake a cake displaying any particular "content" -- the bakery refused to bake any cake for a same-sex wedding.) _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.