Eugene:  I mentioned the "reasonable observer" question only to anticipate
the argument that Davis might make that she wants her name removed from the
form so that she is not *misperceived* to have endorsed the marriage.  As I
wrote, however, her actual argument, thus far, has been that if her name
appears on the form, she will be "authorizing" the marriage, and thereby
complicit in.  And that's simply mistaken as a matter of fact (and of
Kentucky law).

On Sat, Sep 5, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu> wrote:

>                Sandy:  Why would the standards be the same for the
> Establishment Clause endorsement test and the religious exemption
> substantial burden test?  The endorsement test is supposed to be
> “objective” in the sense of asking how a reasonable observer would perceive
> an action.  The substantial burden test is supposed to be subjective in the
> sense of what the religious adherent sincerely believes is religiously
> forbidden (among other things) to her.  How a “reasonable observer” would
> perceive things seems to me as irrelevant as whether a “reasonable
> observer” would read the Torah as forbidding the eating of chicken with
> cream sauce.
>
>
>
>                Indeed, let’s work with the religious symbolism cases.  A
> government employer puts up a Christmas tree – no Establishment Clause
> violation, says the majority in *Allegheny* (and correctly so, I think,
> since a reasonable observer wouldn’t perceive the Christmas tree as having
> a religious message.  But now the employer asks the employees to decorate
> the tree, and one of them objects, saying that she perceives the Christmas
> tree as a religious symbol of a religion to which she doesn’t subscribe,
> and the decoration ritual as conveying her endorsement of the symbol, which
> she believes to be religiously forbidden to her.  Would there be any basis
> for rejecting her Title VII reasonable accommodation claim on the grounds
> that a * reasonable* person wouldn’t view the decoration of a Christmas
> tree that way?  I would think not, right?  (I say this as a non-Christian
> of Jewish ancestry who loves to have a Christmas tree.)
>
>
>
>                Eugene
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Levinson, Sanford V
> *Sent:* Saturday, September 05, 2015 8:02 AM
> *To:* Marty Lederman
> *Cc:* Cohen, David; Law & Religion issues for Law Academics;
> conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
> *Subject:* Re: What's happening in KY?
>
>
>
> Marty's Balkanization post is, as usual, remarkably illuminating on the
> legal issues under Kentucky law. As I read it, I found myself thinking of
> the statues on public property cases, where the claim, as in the Texas Ten
> Commandments case is that the observer will attribute to the state the
> speech of the private parties who put it up. (There's also the Texas
> license plate case, of course.). Davis' argument is that here name (which
> is different from her physical signature) constitutes her personal
> endorsement of same-sex marriage. But all reasonable observers who find
> O'Connor's arguments remotely plausible know that is a mistake. To have her
> name on the license is simply and exclusively stating a fact:  she is the
> clerk. It's like having a sign saying Rowan County Courthouse and Grounds
> and then seeing an Eagles Ten Commandments statue.
>
>
>
> Sandy
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On Sep 5, 2015, at 7:52 AM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> FWIW, my effort to make sense (?) of the mess; please let me know if I've
> gotten anything wrong (or if anyone has a transcript of the contempt
> hearing on Thursday, which might help explain things).  Thanks
>
>
>
> http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/09/does-anyone-have-any-idea-whats.html
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> The reports I've seen (e.g.,
> http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html) do
> not make clear exactly what's happening, other than that Davis is
> incarcerated.
>
>
>
> 1.  Is the County Executive Judge now issuing certificates and licenses
> (which might ironically eliminate the grounds for Davis's contempt
> incarceration . . . until she refuses to allow the documents to be issued
> to the next couple that appears)?
>
>
>
> 2.  What was the deal the judge offered her, regarding her deputies
> issuing the documents?  Did she refuse it because her name would continue
> to appear on the two lines?  Or did the judge say that she could omit her
> name and she still refused?
>
>
>
> Thanks in advance for any info, or, better yet, links to actual documents.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Cohen,David <ds...@drexel.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi all - a mootness question for you.  In the case of the KY clerk who was
> jailed today for refusing to comply with a district court order that
> required her to issue a marriage license to a gay couple (and stay denied
> from the 6th Circuit or Supremes), according to some news reports, now that
> she is in jail and not able to serve, state law allows a county’s executive
> judge to now issue licenses.  So, presumably that will happen relatively
> quickly, and the plaintiffs will get their licenses.
>
>
>
> Is the case now moot and the clerk can get out of jail because she’d no
> longer be in contempt of a court order, since the case is vacated as moot?
> And the issue isn’t capable of repetition at this point for the plaintiffs,
> as they now have a license and can’t get another (until divorced, which may
> never happen).  It certainly is capable of repetition for other people, but
> not these plaintiffs (and they haven’t filed a class action, to the best of
> my knowledge).  We’ve been around this issue before, and to the best of my
> recollection, most people believe the cases say that the “capable of
> repetition” part has to be for the particular plaintiffs, not for someone
> else.
>
>
>
> In other words, is she in jail for an hour, maybe a day, and then back at
> it shortly to deny someone else a license (when that eventually happens)
> only to repeat the whole thing again?
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
> *David S. Cohen*
>
> *Professor of Law*
>
>
> Thomas R. Kline School of Law
>
> *Drexel University *
>
> 3320 Market St.
>
> Philadelphia, PA 19104
>
> Tel: 215.571.4714
>
> drexel.edu <http://drexel.edu/law/faculty/fulltime_fac/David%20Cohen/> |
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> <https://twitter.com/dsc250>
>
> Available NOW <http://www.livinginthecrosshairs.com/>: *Living in the
> Crosshairs: The Untold Stories of Anti-Abortion Terrorism *(Oxford)
>
>
>
>
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