For purposes of a project I'm currently working on, I'm genuinely curious whether any readers on the list think that there was a substantial burden here. Paul Clement argued on behalf of the plaintiff's cause, and there were a slew of amicus briefs, so I assume there's a serious dispute out there. I'd like to understand it better, and to be able to put the burden question in the best possible light. (Please note that I am putting aside the question of whether the Air Force would still win on the back end of RFRA, which it likely would, if for no other reason than that offering a preference for religious workplace speech would violate the Free Speech Clause. I am only interested for now in the burden question.)
Assuming the following facts, as the court did: 1. Lance Corporal Sterling posted three identical signs in her workspace, each containing only the words “No weapon formed against me shall prosper,” on 8 1/2- x 11-inch paper in 28-point font or smaller. One was on the side of her computer tower, one above her computer screen, and one above her desk mailbox. The signs were large enough for those walking by her desk, and Marines seated at her workspace, to read. 2. Her superiors insisted that she take the signs down, on penalty of court-martial for insubordination (a pretty big deal in terms of sanction, as, presumably, would be her leaving the service). They were not motivated by the fact that the signs, or Sterling, was religious--they would have done the same no matter what the employees' motivation was. 3. Her posting of the signs was (let’s assume--as the court did) sincerely motivated by Sterling's religious beliefs, and the signs had religious significance to her. Yet she did not make any claim that posting them was religiously mandated, or that it was a tenet (central or otherwise) of her religion to do so. Has she met her burden of demonstrating a substantial burden on her religious exercise? If so, and if we can imagine there are other officers in her workplace who would be similarly (and just as intensely) motivated to post signs at their stations for *nonreligious *reasons, why should we assume Congress would want to provide rights to Sterling (even the right to put the government to its RFRA burden) that it is unwilling to give her similarly situated, secularly motivated colleagues? Thanks in advance for any responses. On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 9:52 AM, Friedman, Howard M. < howard.fried...@utoledo.edu> wrote: > The Armed Forces Court of Appeals handed down an interesting RFRA decision > yesterday-- with an extensive discussion of the "substantial burden" prong > as well as some other unique issues: > http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2016/08/armed- > forces-court-of-appeals.html > > Howard Friedman > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. >
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
