Hi everyone,

Great that this request sparked a good discussion on the merits of a 
measurement, as well as its potential impact on servers around the world. Good 
to see this!

So I’m going to do a quick recap here, hoping that I capture the intent and the 
concerns correctly. Please correct me if I err.

The intent of the measurement would be to validate whether an SMTP server is:
reachable
responsive
capable of secured transmissions

The concern is that such a check would trigger one of a variety of anti spam 
measures in place around the world, and/or cause undue traffic to SMTP server 
operators.

With this in mind, I am wondering: 
Are we monitoring the Internet or monitoring a service using the proposed SMTP 
measurement? 
Can we achieve the first 2 items of this measurement by doing a TCP traceroute 
on port 25?
Does the SSL measurement cover the intended use cases?
 Is it worth exploring STARTTLS support as an extension and what would the 
implications be?

Have a good weekend!

Best regards,

Michel

> On 21 Sep 2022, at 00:11, Avamander <avaman...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > Making arguments based upon extreme cases, assumptions, or 
> > potential-for-collateral-damage is not scientific. "I know one that even 
> > [...]" Anecdotal  evidence isn't scientific.
> 
> From the perspective of your previous sentences that's kinda humorous. "To 
> avoid unnecessary costs incurred from disruption of service, excessive 
> traffic, annoyances using up *my* time, and countless other reasonable 
> rationale from *my* point of view." Because sure, a few (hypothetical RIPE 
> probe) connections are exactly that, zero exaggeration, right?
> 
> In the end such fail2ban-fueled (or similar) behaviour I initially addressed, 
> is exactly a non-scientific extreme-case assumption-based approach. There are 
> better and even more standard ways. 
> 
> Crutch solutions out in the wild shouldn't be a showstopper for measuring the 
> ecosystem. (That is already quite neglected)
> 
> > What _objective_ risk/benefit analysis are you basing your opinions upon?
> 
> And you? What's the implication here about systems being as trigger-happy as 
> previously described?
> 
> Because sure, at some point rate limits make total sense, but certainly not 
> at the point where it would ban any potential RIPE probes.
> 
> >  Are you a systems administrator?
> 
> Let's not get into such measuring contests, even if it is the RIPE Atlas 
> mailing list.
> 
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2022 at 11:42 PM Paul Theodoropoulos via ripe-atlas 
> <ripe-atlas@ripe.net <mailto:ripe-atlas@ripe.net>> wrote:
> On 9/20/2022 10:45 AM, Avamander wrote:
>> Great to hear it works for you, but the potential unfortunate collateral 
>> from such a blanket action is not really RIPE Atlas' problem. There are more 
>> fine-grained methods against bruteforce attempts and open relay probes, than 
>> triggering on a few connections.
> What _objective_ risk/benefit analysis are you basing your opinions upon? Are 
> you a systems administrator? My responsibility is to avoid unnecessary costs 
> incurred from disruption of service, excessive traffic, annoyances using up 
> *my* time, and countless other reasonable rationale from *my* point of view.  
> 
> You suggest that it is "not really RIPE Atlas' problem". That's very true. 
> And it is not really my problem if I bounce yoinky, pointless probes of my 
> server, and ruthlessly block them from contacting my server ever again. My 
> server, my choice, my wallet, nobody's business but my own.
>> Some webmasters ban IP's for simply visiting a domain, I know one that even 
>> dispatches an email to your ISP's abuse@ address upon visit. Should RIPE 
>> Atlas probes then not probe any HTTP servers? The answer is obviously no, 
>> they shouldn't care.
> Making arguments based upon extreme cases, assumptions, or 
> potential-for-collateral-damage is not scientific. "I know one that even 
> [...]" Anecdotal  evidence isn't scientific.
> 
> Note, I run a probe myself. I don't block any RIPE Atlas traffic on my 
> separate servers hosted on AWS, Oracle, and GCE. 
> 
> -- 
> Paul Theodoropoulos
> anastrophe.com <https://www.anastrophe.com/>-- 
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> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ripe-atlas 
> <https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ripe-atlas>
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