Au trecut 16 ani peste noi si nu am invata nimic cum se duce politica externa. Exista o lucrare remarcabila si se numeste " Fundatia" e un roman SF dar e plina de invataminte. Oare cati au citit acesata carte.
--- Ioan Pop <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Summitul celor doi giganti, SUA si RUSIA, priveste > direct ROMANIA. Va prezentam mai jos doua analize > informative americane proaspete, publicate azi, in > contextul SUMIT-ului marilor puteri militare si > economice ale lumii, ce va avea loc saptamina > aceasta la Sankt Petersburg (Leningrad). > > Dipl. Ioan Pop > > More Conflict than Camaraderie Between Moscow and > Washington > > Report Drafted By: Jephraim P. Gundzik - PINR, > Chicago, IL, USA > 11 July 2006, http://www.pinr.com - email: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Phone: +1 (312) 242-1874 > Today's analyst, Jephraim Gundzik, is also the CEO > of Condor Advisers, a company that provides > independent analysis on emerging markets and country > risks. Condor Advisers can be accessed at > http://www.condoradvisers.com. > The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an > independent organization that utilizes open source > intelligence to provide conflict analysis services > in the context of international relations. > > The upcoming July 15 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg > will inevitably showcase Moscow's strong foreign > relations with the world's most powerful countries - > especially Russia's amiable dealings with the United > States. > Beneath the surface, however, a deeply adversarial > relationship between Moscow and Washington boils, > highlighted by Russia's well orchestrated foreign > and economic policy assaults on the United States. > These assaults are undermining Washington's global > might. Buttressed by an immense supply of natural > resources and strong relations with other natural > resource rich countries, Russia may begin to rival > U.S. power within the next 10 years - a process > which the Bush administration is unwittingly aiding. > > Foreign Policy Assault on the United States > > Russia's foreign policy has increasingly diverged > from U.S. foreign policy in the past several years. > During the past 18 months, conflict has replaced > divergence. Moscow has assertively pursued stronger > military, political and economic relations with > countries whose governments have been targeted for > regime change by Washington. These include Iran, > Syria, Venezuela and the Palestinian leadership. > > Washington is struggling to isolate Tehran in order > to force it to abdicate its right, as a signatory > country to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty > (N.P.T.), to uranium enrichment. In stark contrast, > Russia has steadfastly supported Tehran and its > right to uranium enrichment. Moscow's support for > Tehran led directly to the collapse of U.S. efforts > to impose U.N.-backed sanctions on Iran in April > 2006. It also produced skin-deep changes in the > direction of U.S. diplomacy. > > Although hailed as a diplomatic leap forward, U.S. > Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer to > engage Iran in multilateral talks was bereft of > security guarantees. This indicates that Washington > continues to place regime change at the top of its > Iran policy priorities. It also suggests that this > diplomatic leap forward will fail. > While Moscow has supported incentives encouraging > Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment, the Putin > government does not back any form of sanctions. > Ultimately, Washington will be forced to impose > sanctions on Iran outside of the U.N., with the help > of a small number of countries. See: "Intelligence > Brief: Iran and the U.S. Maneuver Carefully Toward > Confrontation" > > In addition to its direct involvement in the > development of Iran's civil nuclear power program - > the very program condemned by Washington - Moscow is > Tehran's most important military equipment supplier. > Moscow and Tehran inked the first of many military > equipment deals in 1989. These deals have supplied > Iran with a wide variety of Russian military > equipment including tanks, fighter aircraft, naval > ships and missile systems. > > In February 2006, Moscow agreed to supply Iran with > a very sophisticated missile defense system known as > the Tor-M1. This deal was heavily criticized by > Washington. Speculation abounds that Iran has also > acquired the S-300 missile system from Russia. The > Tor-M1 and the S-300 systems are designed to work in > unison, with the Tor-M1 protecting the S-300 > launchers. By selling increasingly advanced weapons > to Tehran, Russia is helping Iran prepare to defend > itself against a possible U.S. military strike. > > Russia is also bolstering the defense capabilities > of Syria and Venezuela. These two countries are > regularly criticized by the Bush administration, > currently subject to U.S. sanctions and are also > targeted for regime change. In early 2005, President > Putin and Syria's President Bashar al-Assad signed > several far reaching deals covering energy, debt > forgiveness and military equipment supplies. > > Moscow agreed to help develop Syria's gas and oil > resources with substantial investments. At the same > time, Moscow forgave nearly 75 percent of Syria's > US$13 billion in debt owed to Russia. Moscow also > agreed to upgrade Syria's already formidable Russian > surface-to-air missile systems with the addition of > the Strelets weapon system. This vehicle-mounted > missile system has a range of just six kilometers > (3.7 miles) but is highly effective against aircraft > and cruise missiles. > > Moscow also proved to be a strong ally of Damascus > in the fall of 2005 when international pressure on > the Bashar government over the Hariri assassination > mounted. Moscow's efforts on behalf of Damascus > prevented the U.N. Security Council from imposing a > range of new sanctions on Syria. In June 2006, > reports in Russian media indicated that Moscow > planned to establish two new naval bases in Syria. > See: "Intelligence Brief: Russia's Moves in Syria" > > While Iran and Syria fall within Russia's historic > sphere of influence in the Middle East, such is not > the case with Venezuela, which was a firm U.S. ally > until 1999. In 2005, Moscow and Caracas agreed on an > unprecedented military equipment supply deal, which > provided Venezuela with 15 Russian military > transport helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov > rifles. Heavily criticized by Washington, this deal > provoked the Bush administration to ban the sale of > U.S. military equipment to Venezuela in September > 2005. > > A further ban of commercial arms sales to Venezuela > was announced by Washington in May 2006. Soon after, > Caracas announced its intention to purchase new > fighter jets from Russia. In early June, Moscow > revealed that it was working with Caracas to build > two factories in Venezuela for domestic production > of Kalashnikov rifles. In addition to the military > equipment trade, Russia has also begun to invest in > Venezuela's energy sector. > > Unlike Iran, Syria and Venezuela, Moscow's support > for the new Hamas-led government in the Palestinian > Territories does not include the supply of military > equipment, yet. However, links between Hamas and the > Putin government are no less of a face slap to > Washington. Just as the Bush administration thought > it had succeeded in isolating the Hamas government > in the Palestinian Territories, President Putin > invited Hamas leaders to Moscow in February 2006. In > addition to engaging an entity deemed as a > "terrorist organization" by the United States, > President Putin offered substantial financial > assistance to Hamas officials. This represented a > dramatic change in Russia's historical backseat > approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. See: > "Intelligence Brief: Recognizing Hamas" > > In addition to its rapidly growing support for > Washington's favorite rogue regimes, Russia has > increasingly opposed U.S.-led efforts to expand > N.A.T.O. eastward. Most recently, Moscow has charged > that N.A.T.O. membership for Ukraine and Georgia > would produce a "colossal, geopolitical shift." Such > a shift would force Moscow to respond in order to > safeguard its security and national interests. > > Moscow's growing military, economic and political > support for Washington's enemies speaks much louder > than glib statements asserting the strength of > Russia-U.S. relations. From its actions, it is > exceedingly apparent that Moscow views U.S. foreign > policy directed not at promoting democracy but at > overthrowing rogue regimes in order to install > U.S.-friendly governments. In essence, the primary > goal of Russia's foreign policy has become thwarting > U.S. regime change efforts. Russia has a strong > weapon, however, with which to fight the United > States - control over vast energy supplies. > > Economic Assault on the United States > > Although the foreign policies of Russia and the > United States directly conflict with one another, > the Russian economy has benefited greatly from > Washington's policy of regime change in unfriendly > countries. This obsession is directly responsible > for the steep rise in international energy prices > during the past three years. Higher energy prices > have been a boon for Russia, which accounts for > about 15 percent of the world's oil exports and 25 > percent of the world's natural gas exports. > > The Bush administration's fixation on regime change > has also benefited Russia's defense industry, which > has profited from booming arms sales to countries > targeted for regime change by Washington. Russia has > also seen a surge in arms sales to China in the past > four years. Overall, U.S. foreign policy has given > Russia's economy several hundred billion dollars > since 2001. It is for this reason that Russian > officials periodically croon about the strength in > relations between Moscow and Washington. Without > Washington's foreign policy initiatives, Russia > would be in no position to stage an economic assault > on the United States - an assault that is now > unfolding. > > During his annual State of the Nation speech to > Russia's Duma on May 10, 2006, President Putin > announced that Russia would make the ruble fully > convertible for international transactions on July > 1, 2006. According to Putin, the new fully > convertible ruble would be used as the currency for > Russia's massive energy exports. To facilitate the > ruble's use in energy trade, President Putin also > revealed that a ruble-denominated commodity exchange > would soon begin operating. > > On June 8, 2006, Moscow's leading stock exchange, > the Russian Trading System (RTS), began trading > cash-settled futures and options on Urals oil and > refined fuels. Exchange-based energy trading in > Russia may take some time to get off the ground. > Eventually, however, almost all of Russia's energy > trade will be routed through ruble-denominated oil > and gas exchanges. The government's tight grip on > Russia's energy sector ensures that oil and gas > producers will be increasingly compelled to direct > domestic and foreign energy trading toward the new > ruble-denominated energy exchange. Importers of > Russian energy products will have little choice but > to direct their purchases toward Russia's > ruble-denominated energy market. > > About two-thirds of Russia's crude oil exports are > bound for Eastern and Central Europe via pipelines. > The remaining one-third is exported via ship and > rail. Most of these exports are bound for Western > Europe. Almost all of Russia's natural gas exports > are also bound for Eastern, Central and Western > Europe. Russian imports fill more than 40 percent of > both oil and natural gas demand in Europe. Europe's > dependency on Russian energy has become a heated > topic recently. > > Europe has tried unsuccessfully to use its power as > Russia's primary energy buyer to force changes in > Russian energy trading and pricing practices. As > Europe's primary energy supplier, however, Russia > has all the leverage. Europe cannot turn to other > producers to make up any shortfall in Russian energy > exports. Because it is Europe's key energy supplier, > European countries have little choice but to follow > Russia's energy trading demands. In other words, if > Moscow tells its European customers that they must > buy their energy products via Russia's > ruble-denominated energy exchange, these countries > will have to comply or face energy shortages. > > By actively seeking alternate oil export markets in > Asia, Russia is increasing its energy leverage over > Europe much to the chagrin of European leaders and > Washington. In 2005, about seven percent of Russia's > oil exports were bound for China. Another two > percent of oil exports were bound for other Asian > countries. Although Russia's oil export pipeline > system is operating at full capacity, current > pipeline expansion plans are focused exclusively on > routing oil east to Asia rather than to Europe. > > Undoubtedly, most of Russia's crude oil exports to > Asia will go to China. Relations between Russia and > China are at their strongest ever. In addition to > unified foreign policy positions against > Washington's regime change goals, Moscow and Beijing > have cultivated close military and energy trade > relations. China has also strengthened its energy > relations with Iran and Venezuela, inking > multibillion dollar energy investment deals with > both countries in the past two years. > > Interestingly, Iran and Venezuela are O.P.E.C.'s > most vociferous supporters of non-dollar oil trade. > Iran is expected to launch its own euro-denominated > oil futures exchange in 2006. Both Iran and > Venezuela intend to increase China's share of their > crude oil exports above 40 percent by about 2010. > China has already supplied Iran with very large > tankers for oil shipment and agreed to supply > similar tankers to Venezuela in May 2006. > > Russia, Iran and Venezuela, which combined control > 25 percent of the world's oil exports, could easily > forge an agreement to direct new oil trade with > China to Moscow's ruble-denominated energy exchange. > By 2008, as much as 10 percent of the world's crude > oil trade could be conducted in rubles. By 2012, 20 > percent of this trade could be ruble-denominated. > The shift toward ruble-denominated oil trade will > strengthen the ruble's exchange rate over the > long-term as foreign central banks add rubles to > their reserves to cover payments for oil imports. > > The ruble's gain will be the dollar's loss as > central banks jettison dollars from their reserves > in the process. Moscow's increasingly strong stance > against Washington's global foreign and economic > policy dominance will lead to a further reduction in > global oil supplies, forcing international oil > prices ever higher. High energy prices could > eventually trigger a U.S. economic recession forcing > oil prices lower. However, declining global oil > supplies and tight production control in Russia, > Iran and Venezuela will create strong support for > oil prices, preventing a price collapse. > > Russia's sway over international energy prices will > ultimately control the energy dependent U.S. > economy. Simultaneously, Moscow's multilateral > foreign policy might increasingly isolate the United > States, greatly weakening Washington's influence > over other countries. Within 10 years, Russia could > rival the United States as the world's dominant > economic and foreign policy power. > > Report Drafted By, > Jephraim P. Gundzik > ------------------------------------------------ > U.S.A. Politics Of the Pipelines (in Europe) > > U.S.A. Seeks Ways to Route Natural Gas Around > Russia > > By Steven Mufson - Washington Post Staff Writer > Tuesday, July 11, 2006; D01 > > > > Russian President Vladimir Putin said last year > that energy would be the "key topic" of this year's > Group of Eight meeting, which opens Saturday in St. > Petersburg. (By Mikhail Metzel - Associated Press) > > Graphic Proposed Pipelines > > > > For a low-profile State Department official, > Matthew J. Bryza gets around. A member of the bureau > of European and Eurasian affairs, he frequents > places such as Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This > year, he's also popped in on people in Brussels, > Rome and Berlin. One key item on his agenda: > persuading governments and energy companies to build > natural gas pipelines that skirt Russia. > New routes that avoid Russia would "make the > market function better" and enhance energy security, > a senior State Department official said. "We're > sharing information and a vision." > > Russia doesn't share that vision. The Kremlin has > been conducting its own campaign to lock producing > countries in Central Asia and consumer countries in > Europe more tightly into Russia's pipeline network. > > The politics of gas pipelines has added friction > to the preparations for the Saturday to Monday > meeting of the Group of Eight industrial nations, to > be hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. > Petersburg. A year ago, Putin said this meeting's > "key topic" would be energy. > "The country which is definitely a leader in the > world market is ordained by God to deal with this > issue," he said after last July's G-8 summit. > > Despite Putin's boast, the summit's focus on > energy will only highlight why Russia remains a > troublesome issue for the West. The oil and gas > industry reflects Russia's autocratic nature, > diplomats and energy experts say; it is controlled > by the state, opaque to Western investors and > difficult for foreign firms to enter. > > Although the United States and Russia may strike a > deal on reprocessing waste from nuclear power > plants, the pipeline politics has highlighted the > mutual mistrust between Russia and the West, > especially after Russia briefly cut gas supplies to > its neighbor Ukraine in January. While Russia said > it wanted to end subsidies on natural gas sold to > Ukraine since Soviet days, squeezing supplies in > winter shortly after the ouster of a pro-Russian > president smacked of a crass political maneuver. > > "No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas > become tools of intimidation or blackmail," Vice > President Cheney said in a May 4 speech in Vilnius, > Lithuania, angering Russians. > Because much of the Russian gas bound for Europe > flowed through the Ukraine route, people in European > capitals took notice. > "This sharpened the attitudes of Europeans even > more than the Americans," said a senior European > diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity because > talks are ongoing. "This was very much an important > thing for us." > > Europe relies on Russia for about a third of its > natural gas supplies. Those supplies arrive via two > major pipeline routes constructed in the 1980s over > the objections of the Reagan administration. Today > the United States realizes that Russian gas will > remain vital to Europe, but it is pushing nations to > diversify supplies so that Russia cannot exploit > Europe's energy dependence for political purposes. > "What does it mean to achieve energy security when > you're reliant on one country?" Karen Harbert, > assistant secretary for policy and international > affairs at the Energy Department, asked at a meeting > at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. > > At the same time, however, Russia sells 80 percent > of its natural gas to Europe and is worried about > European plans to increase gas purchases from > Algeria and Libya, as well as about liquefied > natural gas from Qatar, which plans to triple its > exports. > > Bryza and more senior U.S. officials have been > promoting pipeline routes that would bring gas from > fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan > near the Caspian Sea through Turkey to Europe. One > such pipeline, from Azerbaijan through Georgia to > Turkey, opens Oct. 1. U.S. officials have been > saying that reserves in Azerbaijan alone could > justify bigger pipelines even if territorial > disputes over the Caspian Sea are not resolved. > (Missing from the U.S. vision: supplies from Iran, > whose natural gas reserves are second to only > Russia's.) > > Former Soviet Bloc countries are enthusiastic, > especially since Russia has boosted prices on gas > sold to Moldova and Belarus. > Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili said during > a recent visit here that he supports a pipeline that > would bring gas from the Caspian Sea basin through > Azerbaijan and Georgia, then under the Black Sea (to > avoid Russia) to Romania and then north to Poland. > Building that line would take at least five years. > > Meanwhile, Moscow isn't idle. It has dangled > higher prices in front of producers including > Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It has held talks with > other gas-exporting nations, such as Algeria and > Iran, about coordinating policies so they don't > undercut one another. And it has deployed former > German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to promote a new > direct pipeline link between Russia and Germany. > (Schroeder now works for the Swiss-based pipeline > venture controlled by Russia's state-controlled OAO > Gazprom.) > > Poles and Poland fear that a Russian-German > pipeline under the Baltic Sea would enable Russia to > pressure Poland, which would no longer be a transit > route for Russian gas destined for Germany. In late > April, Poland's defense minister, Radek Sikorski, > said that the deal to build the $5 billion, 750-mile > pipeline was in "the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition," > a reference to the pact between Hitler's and > Stalin's foreign ministers that led to the partition > of Poland in World War II. > "We want . . . no monopolies or blackmails, > price-fixing or the use of energy as a tool of > politics, or geopolitics," Sikorski said in an > interview with the BBC. > > Not everyone buys the U.S. vision. "It's very > simple to make lines on a map," said a European > energy company executive who had met with Bryza and > spoke on condition of anonymity to protect his U.S. > relationships. "It costs $2 billion, if not more, to > build a pipeline from Turkey." > > Many European companies have interests in Russian > gas projects. German energy giant E.On Ruhrgas AG > and chemical giant BASF AG own minority stakes in > Gazprom's Northern European Gas Pipeline under the > Baltic. > The Italian state oil company, Eni SpA, is > Gazprom's partner in the Blue Stream pipeline that > carries gas from Russia to Turkey under the Black > Sea. > > But Russia is still worried. Eni is also building > a pipeline from Libya to Italy. And Qatar says a > third of its exports will go to Europe. > As part of its strategy to hang onto European > markets and expand its reach, Russia wants cash-rich > Gazprom to invest in European gas distribution > systems in Britain, Germany and Italy. Russian > officials say that if Western firms want to invest > in exploration and production in Russia, Gazprom > should have similar access to Western investment > opportunities. > > Europe is reluctant, though. In a subtle yet clear > message, two European Union ministers wrote in May > to the Russian government, saying the competition > "rules applied to Gazprom will be no different to > those applied to . . . other companies." They noted > that "the fact that Gazprom is the exclusive > exporter of gas from Russia to the EU, when other > Russian companies and foreign joint ventures with > gas reserves would otherwise be in a position to > supply the EU market, will be a significant fact > that will necessarily be taken into account." > "Reciprocity is something we're looking for," said > the senior State Department official, who spoke on > condition of anonymity because the talks are > ongoing. He urged Russia to let foreign oil or gas > firms explore and use Russia's pipelines. > > Yet foreign investors still find Russia > challenging territory. Russia has announced new > limits on foreign ownership of key energy resources. > TNK-BP, a joint venture involving BP PLC, has had > trouble getting access to export pipelines; delays > have been seen as an effort to force it to sell a > stake in its fields. > Last week, Russia's parliament reaffirmed > Gazprom's monopoly over the nation's gas pipelines. > And 10 months after releasing a short list of five > foreign firms, including U.S.-based Chevron Inc. and > Conoco Phillips, Russia has still not said which > ones will share with Gazprom the rights to explore > the big Shtokman natural gas field. > > Russia has avoided a new conflict over Ukraine on > the eve of the G-8 summit. In January, Russia and > Ukraine reached a temporary accord, which expired > July 1. A decision on new terms has been delayed > until Ukraine forms a new government. That will be, > conveniently for Russia, after the G-8 meeting. > > Meanwhile, Moscow has been wooing foreign gas > producers. Shortly after Cheney visited Kazakhstan > and won a pledge from that country's president to > export Kazakh gas through a trans-Caspian pipeline, > Russian officials visited Kazakhstan and reportedly > reached a deal for Gazprom to transport Kazakh gas. > > Turkmenistan is also negotiating with Russia, > seeking to raise the price it is paid by two-thirds. > It may accept less, but there is still no pipeline > across the Caspian, and Turkmen relations with > Azerbaijan aren't great. "Turkmenistan doesn't have > much of an option," said Hossein Ebneyousef, > president of International Petroleum Enterprises, a > consulting firm. > But if Russian concerns about competition from > other nations helped raise the price paid to > Turkmenistan, that is a sign that the U.S. strategy > is working, U.S. officials say. > And if European nations buy more supplies from > Libya, Algeria and Qatar, that's as helpful as > buying more from Azerbaijan. > "That's the name of the game: Get more coming in > from every possible direction - except Iran, of > course," the U.S. State Department official said. > > > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR2006071001218_pf.html > > > > > --------------------------------- > Why keep checking for Mail? The all-new Yahoo! Mail > Beta shows you when there are new messages. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! 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