Hi Stephen, I don't think I belong in the dog house with gunnar on this one (though if I have to share the dog house gunnar would be a decent compatriot). Please re-read my post and you will see that I "gave up" on the Dinis quest though I have lots of respect for what Dinis wants to accomplish.
That said, I do believe in educating and training developers about software security. I also strongly agree with you that a software security initiative must involve management and technology leaders and not degenerate into "secure coding." These days my writings are aimed at leadership...see http://www.cigital.com/~gem/writings/ Just at the moment I am working hard on a maturity model for software security based on 9 top initiatives. Sammy Migues, Brian Chess, and I have uncovered some very amazing things in our "anthropology experiment" so far. We'll probably be set to share them by the end of the year. Anyway, sorry not to propagate the flame war without even donning an asbestos suit, but what can I say? gem company www.cigital.com podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague book www.swsec.com On 11/25/08 12:28 PM, "Stephen Craig Evans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: It's a real cop-out for you guys, as titans in the industry, to go after developers. I'm disappointed in both of you. And Gary, you said "One of the main challenges is that developers have a hard time thinking about the principle of least privilege ". Developers are NEVER asked to think about the principle of least privilege. Or your world of software security must be very very very different from mine (and I think my world at least equals yours but by about 2 billion people more, which might be irrelevant now but a little more relevant in the future :-) With the greatest, deepest respect to both of you, Stephen On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 1:01 AM, Stephen Craig Evans <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Gunnar, > > Developers have no power. You should be talking to the decision makers. > > As an example, to instill the importance of software security, I talk > to decision makers: project managers, architects, CTOs (admittedly, > this is a blurred line - lots of folks call themselves architects). If > I go to talk about software security to developers, I know from > experience that I am probably wasting my time. Even if they do care, > they have no effect overall. > > Your target and blame is wrong; that's all that I am saying. > > Stephen > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 12:48 AM, Gunnar Peterson > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Sorry I didn't realize "developers" is an offensive ivory tower in other >> parts of the world, in my world its a compliment. >> >> -gunnar >> >> On Nov 25, 2008, at 10:30 AM, Stephen Craig Evans wrote: >> >>> HI, >>> >>> "maybe the problem with least privilege is that it requires that >>> developers:..." >>> >>> IMHO, your US/UK ivory towers don't exist in other parts of the world. >>> Developers have no say in what they do. Nor, do they care about >>> software security and why should they care? >>> >>> So, at least, change your nomenclature and not say "developers". It >>> offends me because you are putting the onus of knowing about software >>> security on the wrong people. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Stephen >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 10:18 PM, Gunnar Peterson >>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>> >>>> maybe the problem with least privilege is that it requires that >>>> developers: >>>> >>>> 1. define the entire universe of subjects and objects >>>> 2. define all possible access rights >>>> 3. define all possible relationships >>>> 4. apply all settings >>>> 5. figure out how to keep 1-4 in synch all the time >>>> >>>> do all of this before you start writing code and oh and there are >>>> basically no tools that smooth the adoption of the above. >>>> >>>> i don't think us software security people are helping anybody out in >>>> 2008 by doing ritual incantations of a paper from the mid 70s that may >>>> or may not apply to modern computing and anyhow is riddled with ideas >>>> that have never been implemented in any large scale systems >>>> >>>> compare these two statements >>>> >>>> Statement 1. Saltzer and Schroeder: >>>> "f) Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should >>>> operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the >>>> job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from >>>> an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential >>>> interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for correct >>>> operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of >>>> privilege are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related >>>> to misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited >>>> is minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide "firewalls," >>>> the principle of least privilege provides a rationale for where to >>>> install the firewalls. The military security rule of "need-to-know" is >>>> an example of this principle." >>>> >>>> Statement 2. David Gelernter's Manifesto: >>>> "28. Metaphors have a profound effect on computing: the file-cabinet >>>> metaphor traps us in a "passive" instead of "active" view of >>>> information management that is fundamentally wrong for computers. >>>> >>>> 29. The rigid file and directory system you are stuck with on your Mac >>>> or PC was designed by programmers for programmers - and is still a >>>> good system for programmers. It is no good for non-programmers. It >>>> never was, and was never intended to be. >>>> >>>> 30. If you have three pet dogs, give them names. If you have 10,000 >>>> head of cattle, don't bother. Nowadays the idea of giving a name to >>>> every file on your computer is ridiculous." >>>> >>>> Conclusion(gp): Least Privilege is the point where the practical >>>> matter of applying Saltzer and Schroeder's principles breaks down in >>>> modern systems. Its a deployment issue, and a matter of insufficient >>>> models and modes. >>>> >>>> http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/06/mashup-of-the-titans.html >>>> >>>> Remember the 1990s when there were all these search engines that >>>> required you tag up all the content and put it in hierarchical >>>> directories and so on? Well what happened? Google came along and ate >>>> their lunch. When the problem is information overload, telling >>>> everyone to go out and label everything is not gonna work. >>>> >>>> -gunnar >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2008, at 4:34 PM, Gary McGraw wrote: >>>> >>>>> Sadly this non-adoption of privileged/managed code (filled with >>>>> blank stares) has been the case ever since the Java security days a >>>>> decade ago. One of the main challenges is that developers have a >>>>> hard time thinking about the principle of least privilege and its >>>>> implications regarding the capabilities they should request. Dinis >>>>> is brave to set such thinking as a target. I've settled (after ten >>>>> years) with getting developers just to utter the word "security." >>>>> >>>>> All together now..."security". >>>>> >>>>> gem >>>>> >>>>> company www.cigital.com >>>>> podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet >>>>> blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague >>>>> book www.swsec.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 11/24/08 12:31 PM, "Mike Lyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dinis Cruz wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Don't get me wrong, this is a great document if one is interested in >>>>>> writing applications that use CAS (Code Access Security), I would >>>>>> love >>>>>> for this to be widely used. >>>>> >>>>> When we recommended recommending CAS during a review of the U.S. >>>>> Defense >>>>> Information System Agency's new Application Security and Development >>>>> Security Technical Implementation Guide earlier this year we were met >>>>> with what amounted to blank stares. (At least it seemed like that >>>>> since >>>>> it was a phone conference.) Some on the call understood it and agreed >>>>> with the recommendation but those hosting the call and doing the >>>>> writing >>>>> didn't seem to grasp it. It may be a while before we see too many >>>>> adopting this or requiring it for a while. >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Mike Lyman >>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org >>>>> List information, subscriptions, etc - >>>>> http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l >>>>> List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php >>>>> SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC >>>>> (http://www.KRvW.com >>>>> ) >>>>> as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org >>>>> List information, subscriptions, etc - >>>>> http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l >>>>> List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php >>>>> SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC >>>>> (http://www.KRvW.com >>>>> ) >>>>> as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org >>>> List information, subscriptions, etc - >>>> http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l >>>> List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php >>>> SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC >>>> (http://www.KRvW.com) >>>> as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>> >> >> > _______________________________________________ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com) as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community. _______________________________________________
