Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
Steven M. Bellovin writes: > So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco > endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers > the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it > ethical to refrain, lest it be done incompetently? If something evil is done poorly, is that more or less evil? Answer not obvious to me. In any case, a properly implemented end-to-end encrypted voice stream traveling over a data path with the CALEA bit set just allows the FBI easy access to strong crypto. -- -russ nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://russnelson.com Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | Government schools are so 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | bad that any rank amateur Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | can outdo them. Homeschool!
Re: crypto camouflage in software
"paul a. bauerschmidt" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > neat question: > > http://www.arcot.com/arcot_ieee.pdf > > a method of protecting private keys using camouflage, in software, to > prevent dictionary attacks. > > one password will decrypt correctly, many other passwords will produce > alternate, valid-looking keys to fool an attacker. > > is this an example of security through obscurity (a thought which many > frown upon, it seems)? > > > please feel free to mail me personally if you want to shred/shed light. > > .paul bauerschmidt The trade off here is that if the attacker can get it wrong 1/n times, so can the user (from miss-keying (i.e typing mistakes)). Depending on the application, a low n might be disastrous. -- Stefan Kahrs in [Kah96] discusses the notion of completeness--programs which never go wrong can be type-checked--which complements Milner's notion of soundness--type-checked programs never go wrong [Mil78].
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "P. J. Ponder" writes: > > Is it a given that IETF standard protocols will contain backdoors? I > support the idea of bringing the issue before the IETF. Surely the vast > majority will oppose weakening the protocols. > No, it is by no means a settled question. The IESG posted a note soliciting comments on a new mailing list; it will also be discussed during the regular plenary session. Here's the exact text of the announcement: The use of the Internet for services that replace or supplement traditional telephony is, predictably, causing discussions in many countries about the point at which special rules about telephony services begin to apply to Internet service providers. In many countries, these rules could impose new legal obligations on ISPs, particularly requirements to comply with requests from law enforcement agencies or regulators to intercept, or gather and report other information about, communications. For example many traditional telephony devices, especially central-office switches, sold in those countries are required to have built-in wiretapping capabilities to allow telephone carriers to fulfill these obligations. A number of IETF working groups are currently working on protocols to support telephony over IP networks. The wiretap question has come up in one of these working groups, but the IESG has concluded that the general questions should be discussed, and conclusions reached, by the entire IETF, not just one WG. The key questions are: "should the IETF develop new protocols or modify existing protocols to support mechanisms whose primary purpose is to support wiretapping or other law enforcement activities" and "what should the IETF's position be on informational documents that explain how to perform message or data-stream interception without protocol modifications". We would like to encourage discussion of these questions on the new [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list. Subscription requests should be mailed to [EMAIL PROTECTED] OR subscribe via the web at http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven Time will be allocated at the Plenary session at the November IETF to discuss this orally and try to draw a consensus together. (PLEASE DISCUSS THIS ON THE NEW MAILING LIST AND NOT ON THE GENERAL IETF LIST) In addition to the general questions identified above, we believe it would be helpful for mailing list comments to address the following more specific questions: Adding wiretap capability is by definition adding a security hole. Considering the IETF's commitment to secure protocols, is it a reasonable thing to open such a hole to meet these requirements? Should the IETF as an international standards organization shape its protocols to support country-specific legal requirements? If the companies who employ the IETF participants and deploy the IETF's technology feel that having wiretap capability is a business necessity due to the regulatory requirements in the countries where they want to sell their products, would that make a difference to the IETF position on this subject? What is the appropriateness or feasibility of standardizing mechanisms to conform to requirements that may change several times over the life cycle of equipment built to conform to those standards? When IPv6 was under development, the IETF decided to mandate an encryption capability for all devices that claim to adhere to those standards. This was done in spite of the fact that, at the time the decision was made, devices meeting the IPv6 standard could not then be exported from the U.S. nor could they be used in some countries. Is that a precedent for what to do in this case? Could the IETF just avoid specifying the part of the technology that supports wiretapping, presumably assuming that some industry consortium or other standards organization would do so? Would letting that responsibility fall to others weaken the IETF's control over its own standards and traditional areas? If these functions must be done, is it better for the IETF to do them so that we can ensure they are done in the most secure way and, where permitted by the regulations, to ensure a reliable audit capability? What would the image of the IETF be if we were to refuse to standardize any technology that supported wiretapping? In the Internet community? In the business community? To the national regulatory authorities? The goal of the mailing list and then plenary session is to address the broad policy and direction issue and not specific technical issues such as where exactly in an architecture it would be best to implement wiretapping if one needed to do so. Nor are they to address what specific functions might be needed to implement wiretapping under which countries' laws. The intent is basically to discuss the question of what stance the IETF should take on the general issue.
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco >endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers >the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it >ethical to refrain, lest it be done incompetently? Why not refrain in the *expectation* that it'll be done incompetently? If previous efforts along these lines (Clipper, TACDFIPSFKMI) are anything to go by then: - The design and planning process alone will cost enough that it'll be a severe problem. - It'll take years to complete. - It'll be unworkable when it's done. - Throughout the entire process, it'll be a magnet for criticism from privacy advocates, the IT industry, telco's, left-wingers, right_wingers, ... If they want to play big brother, why not give them more than enough rope, point at a conveniently-placed tree limb if necessary, and then stand back? (Since this is a mostly political debate, it's probably better to continue it on the Raven list, http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven). Peter.
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
On Wed, 13 Oct 1999, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: >< . . . . > > So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the > telco endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on > something that lowers the security of the system? Given that it's > going to be done anyway, is it ethical to refrain, lest it be done > incompetently? > >-- >Steve Bellovin > Is it a given that IETF standard protocols will contain backdoors? I support the idea of bringing the issue before the IETF. Surely the vast majority will oppose weakening the protocols. The IAB security position paper (RFC 2316) seemed to come down on the side of strengthening security in the Internet. It may be a given that certain types of _US_ communciations equipment will permit easy wire-tapping, in order to meet US federal requirements, but that is not the same thing as jeopardizing the strength of international communciations standards. The IETF needs to stand up and do what's right on this. Write the area directors, the IAB, and the ISOC members and tell them what you think. Attend a meeting and raise hell. Too bad the next meeting is in the FBI's backyard. We must look like arrogant fools to the rest of the world for thinking that the FBI is going to set global wiretapping standards. I vote to make security protocols as strong as we can make them, given the technology and the hassles over intellectual property, and bearing in mind that there will always be trade-offs between security and speed, security and ease-of-use, etc. These are engineering issues.
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
Another point to consider is that if the CALEA standards are arrived at in an open and public manner, it could be made easy to tell whether or not a given device is implementing them, and one could then use the CALEA status of a device as part of the purchasing decision. If the CALEA protocol is closed, it may be more difficult to tell whether or not a device implements it. Also, since CALEA is U.S., and IETF is international, presumably any standard the IETF comes up with would have to have the CALEA portion as an option, not a requirement, and would have to specify how devices that do not implement CALEA would operate. Remember how loudly we howled about the secret nature of the guts of the Clipper chip? We are now being hoisted by our own petard... :'/ _MelloN_
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Declan McCullagh wr ites: > > This followup might be relevant too. Has the FBI ever publicly weighed in > on an IETF debate before? Are there any implications here in other areas, > such as taxes, content, or encryption? There are clearly many aspects to this question. The particular IETF discussion was triggered by a move in a working group that was concerned with connectivity to the PSTN; they wanted to add CALEA support to their protocol. Should that be done in the IETF? It's clear that such capabilities lower the security of the system. (A fascinating Wall Street Journal story (Oct 1, front page) describes how a "data tap" was used to monitor some hackers. Among other things, assorted hackers found databases of phone numbers being monitored by the FBI. What will these folks do when they can get to CALEA ports?) But it's also clear that folks who manufacture this gear for sale in the U.S. market are going to have to support CALEA, which in turn means that someone is going to have to standardize the interface -- the FBI regulations at the least strongly urge that industry-standard protocols be used for such things. (And yes, it's quite clear that many uses of this particular working group's protocol would be within the scope of the law.) So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it ethical to refrain, lest it be done incompetently? --Steve Bellovin
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
At 00:03 10/13/1999 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >I thought this forward from "Interesting People" would be of interest Perry, This followup might be relevant too. Has the FBI ever publicly weighed in on an IETF debate before? Are there any implications here in other areas, such as taxes, content, or encryption? -Declan http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,31895,00.html Net Wiretapping: Yes or No? by Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) 10:30 a.m. 13.Oct.99.PDT The FBI says the Internet's standards body should craft technology to facilitate lawful government surveillance. A spokesman said Wednesday that the bureau supported the Internet Engineering Task Force's recent decision to debate whether the ability to wiretap should be part of future Internet standards. "We think it's a wise and prudent move," said Barry Smith, supervisory special agent in the FBI's Digital Telephony and Encryption policy unit. "If court-authorized wiretaps are frustrated, effective law enforcement is jeopardized, public safety is jeopardized, and policymakers are going to have to figure out how to rectify the problem." [...]
CQRE'99 - Call for Participation
Dear Listmembers! Sorry for crossposting. The Call for Participation below might be of interest for you. To register, please visit http://www.cqre.net . You might want to note that the early bird registration period already expires on Oct. 22, which is less than two weeks from now. I would be looking forward to seeing you at CQRE. Best regards Detlef Huehnlein *** Call for Participation CQRE [Secure] Congress & Exhibition Duesseldorf, Germany, Nov. 30 - Dec. 2 1999 --- provides a new international forum covering most aspects of information security with a special focus to the role of information security in the context of rapidly evolving economic processes. --- Part I covers stratecial issues of IT-Security while Part II will discuss more technical issues, like - SmartCard Technology / Security - Public Key Infrastructures - Network Security - Mobile Security - Intrusion Detection - Enterprise Security - Security Design - Electronic Payment - Electronic Commerce - Cryptography - Espionage - Interoperability - Biometrics - Risk Management - Signature Laws - Training / Awareness for example. CQRE-PROGRAM: Part I - Strategical Aspects Tuesday, November 30, 1999 09.30 Opening: Chairman Paul Arlman, Federation of European Stock Exchange 09.45 Keynote Dr.Hagen Hultzsch, Deutsche Telekom AG "A corporate group in transition - how Deutsche Telekom is preparing for the digital economy." 10.15 Keynote Jean-Paul Figer, Cap Gemini S.A "Brave Digital World? The balance between chances and risks for the information society." 10:45 Coffee 11:15 Five parallel Workshops: Workshop 1 - "Values & standards" (Prof.Dr. Gertrud Höhler) Workshop 2 - "Law & regulation" (Klaus-Dieter Scheurle) Workshop 3 - "Strategy & success" Workshop 4 - "Role of technology" (Karl-Heinz Streibich) Workshop 5 - "Monitoring & control" (Piet van Reenen) 12.45 Lunch 14.15 Keynote Dr.Ulrich Schumacher, CEO Infineon "Network Citizen - what does the networked citizen and consumer stand to gain and lose?" 15.15 Workshop results (Moderator Paul Arlman) 15.45 Coffee 16.00 Summary / 10-point-programme 17.00 Happy Hour 18.00 Platform debate (Moderator Klaus-Peter Siegloch, ZDF) Part II - Technical Aspects: Wednesday, December 1, 1999 09.00 R.Baumgart: Welcome 09.15 B.Schneier: "Attack trees - a novel methodology for risk management." 10.00 Refreshments 10.15 Four parallel tracks: I. Risk Management: D.Povey: "Developing Electronic Trust Policies Using a Risk Management Model" J.Hopkinson: "Guidelines for the Management of IT-Security" II. Security Design: L.Romano, A.Mazzeo and N.Mazzocca: "SECURE: a simulation tool for PKI design" D.Basin: "Lazy Infinite State Analysis of Security Protocols" III. Enterprise Security: P.Kunz: "The case for IT-Security" W.Wedl: "Integrated Enterprise Security - Examples conducted in large European Enterprises" B.Esslinger: "The PKI development of Deutsche Bank" IV. Tutorial: H.Handschuh: "Cryptographic SmartCards" 11.45 Lunch 13.15 S.Senda: "Electronic Cash in Japan" 14.00 M.Yung, Y.Tsiounis, M.Jakobsson, D.MRhaihi: "Panel: Electronic payments where do we go from here?" 15.00 Four parallel tracks: I. SmartCard Issues R.Kehr, J.Possega, H.Vogt: "PCA: Jini-based Personal Card Assistant" M.Nyström, J.Brainard: "An X.509-Compatible Syntax for Compact Certificates" II. Applications D.Hühnlein, J.Merkle: "Secure and cost efficent electronic stamps" K.Sako: "Implementation of a Digital Lottery Server on WWW" III. PKI-experiences J.Lopez, A.Mana, J.J.Ortega: "CerteM: Certification System Based on Electronic Mail Service Structure" K.Schmeh: "A method for developing PKI models" J.Hughes: "The Realities of PKI Inter-Operability IV. Tutorial S.Kent: "How many Certification Authorities are Enough?" 16.45 J.J.Quisquater: "Attacks on SmartCards and Countermeasures" 17.00 M.Kuhn: "How tamper-resistant are todays SmartCards?" 18.15 L. Martini,M. Kuhn, J.J.Quisquater, Hamann: "Secure SmartCards - Fact or Fiction" 19.00 Get-together with music (4 to the bar) and CQRE - Speakers corner - rump session Part II - Technica
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
The FCC issued yesterday its detailed definitions of what types of services are and are not subject to CALEA requirements: http://cryptome.org/fcc101299.txt This was issued in an attempt is to answer questions from respondents about what is a "telecommunications carrier." Excerpts: "5. CALEA also makes clear that its requirements do not apply to certain entities and services. Subsection 102(8)(C) of the definition specifically excludes information services, and the legislative history makes clear that CALEA does not apply to private network services: [T]elecommunications services that support the transport or switching of communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of interconnecting telecommunications carriers * * * need not meet any wiretap standards. PBXs are excluded. So are automated teller machine (ATM) networks and other closed networks. Also excluded from coverage are all information services, such as Internet service providers or services such as Prodigy and America-On-Line. All of these private network systems or information services can be wiretapped pursuant to court order, and their owners must cooperate when presented with a wiretap order, but these services and systems do not have to be designed so as to comply with the capability requirements. It is unnecessary to adopt the FBI's recommendation not to use the adverb ``indiscriminately'' in clarifying the definition of telecommunications carrier. The FBI is concerned that the inclusion of this term may allow companies that hold themselves out to serve only particular groups to undermine CALEA, intentionally or inadvertently, by creating a loophole that would permit criminals to use telecommunications providers that do not indiscriminately offer their services to the public." [End excerpts]
Re: "unbreakable code?" with cash prizes
Might be better off having another crack at the Beale Cipher instead: http://www.und.nodak.edu/org/crypto/crypto/resources.html Regards, Greg Reynolds Compucom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > I wrote the author of the challenge. He responded (quoted with > permission) > > > > If you had received my previous email, with accompnaying URL (below), > you would know how I encrypted this message and have my source code. > > > Will you provide source to the encryption code? > > Yes. See: > > http://www.well.com/user/abs/Crypto/ > > > Avoid software which uses secret algorithms. This is not considered a > > safe means of protecting data. If the vendor isn't confident that its > > encryption method can withstand scrutiny, then you should be wary of > > trusting it. > > I couldn't agree more. That's why I'm inviting attack. > > To be clear, the contents of message2.bin were created by xor-ing my > English plain text with a chunk of a jpg file which is NOT on the web. > It is a picture I took myself and scanned. I am interested to see if > anyone can use statistical techniques or special knowledge of jpg's to > crack this without the key. > > > -- > Mike Stay > Programmer / Crypto guy > AccessData Corp. > mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
