Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Paul Vixie
note, i have removed the leading tab character from this author's paragraphs,
since i find it very distracting.  (a cautionary note to marka and bmanning.)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Phil Regnauld) writes:

 Question: How do existing implementations react to the presence of a
 single, terminal dot ?  What if an A record is published for '.' ?  I
 know it probably won't happen. but I'm also curious to know, and I think
 the document should specify this: what is the impact of this on existing
 implementations ?

i'm afraid that this will just result in a lot of QTYPE A messages sent to
the authority servers for . asking about ., and a lot of new useless RCODE 3
responses therefrom.

 Question:
   
 In some cases it can be useful to be able to identify the real master
 anyway.  But MNAME was never a reliable way of ascertaining which server
 in an NS set was the source of data, if such a source existed at all.

during the preparation of RFC 2136 we knew that SOA.MNAME was often
meaningless, and so the rule is, if it's the same as an NS.NSDNAME, then
it's the best target for an update.  the purpose of this was to avoid
having to forward updates from secondaries toward the master.  but as it
happened, noone read RFC 2136 carefully.  every second of every day, the
SOA.MNAME for 10.in-addr.arpa receives update requests from all over the
world, even though it is not also an NS.NSDNAME.

those update requests are all coming from a single vendor's implementation.

 Do people on this list think that we are losing any valuable information
 by using the convention suggested by Joe, or was it already too
 uncertain, and that no usefull debugging/troubleshooting information is
 being lost by implementing the suggested approach ?

i think it will not be correctly implemented, just as RFC 2136 was not
correctly implemented, and if people start putting SOA.MNAME=. then it
will just lead to a lot more QTYPE A queries for ..
-- 
Paul Vixie
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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Brian Dickson

Paul Vixie wrote:

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Phil Regnauld) writes:
  

Question: How do existing implementations react to the presence of a
single, terminal dot ?  What if an A record is published for '.' ?  I
know it probably won't happen. but I'm also curious to know, and I think
the document should specify this: what is the impact of this on existing
implementations ?



i'm afraid that this will just result in a lot of QTYPE A messages sent to
the authority servers for . asking about ., and a lot of new useless RCODE 3
responses therefrom.

  


Are you certain? (And does RCODE 3 mean, as I understand it, NXDOMAIN?)

I tried doing just such a query using dig, and got:

;  DiG 9.3.2  @f.root-servers.net A . +norec
; (2 servers found)
;; global options:  printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; -HEADER- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 47975
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;.  IN  A

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
.   86400   IN  SOA A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. 
NSTLD.VERISIGN-GRS.COM. 2008062800 1800 900 604800 86400


;; Query time: 3 msec
;; SERVER: 192.5.5.241#53(192.5.5.241)
;; WHEN: Sat Jun 28 16:11:59 2008
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 92



i think it will not be correctly implemented, just as RFC 2136 was not
correctly implemented, and if people start putting SOA.MNAME=. then it
will just lead to a lot more QTYPE A queries for ..
  


Hypothetically speaking, if an actual answer for such a query were 
returned, would anything actually *use* the answer?


Again, hypothetically speaking, if an A RR were added for . , with a 
very long TTL, such as 8640, that would be cached ubiquitously, and 
reduce these queries at the root servers, right?


Again, hypothetically, what values for such an A RR would cause benign 
behaviour? E.g. 127.0.0.1?


Just thinking *way* outside the box

Brian
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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Paul Vixie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Brian Dickson) writes:

 Are you certain? (And does RCODE 3 mean, as I understand it, NXDOMAIN?)

i mean of course ANCOUNT=0 RCODE=0, thank you for your correction.

 Again, hypothetically, what values for such an A RR would cause benign 
 behaviour? E.g. 127.0.0.1?
 
 Just thinking *way* outside the box

i think that if LOCALHOST. could be made to return A 127.0.0.1 and  ::1
then we could use LOCALHOST. as a meaningless value for SOA.MNAME, but that
would just be there to handle the case where RFC 2136 initiators were talking
to an SOA.MNAME that did not match any NS.NSDNAME, in which case they are
already out of spec and it's difficult to say how much effort should be spent
changing the spec further.
-- 
Paul Vixie
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Re: [DNSOP] draft-jabley-dnsop-missing-mname-00

2008-06-28 Thread Phil Regnauld
(updated subject to reflect draft being discussed)

Paul Vixie (vixie) writes:
 i think that if LOCALHOST. could be made to return A 127.0.0.1 and  ::1
 then we could use LOCALHOST. as a meaningless value for SOA.MNAME,

I actually considered that option for a moment.

 but that
 would just be there to handle the case where RFC 2136 initiators were talking
 to an SOA.MNAME that did not match any NS.NSDNAME, in which case they are
 already out of spec and it's difficult to say how much effort should be spent
 changing the spec further.

Is it then out of spec if we're working with a hidden/unreachable master
server, and even though it is disclosed in SOA.MNAME, it is not listed
in NS.NSDNAME ?  What should one put in the SOA.MNAME in that case ?
Any one of the slaves ?

Phil
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Re: [DNSOP] I-D ACTION:draft-licanhuang-dnsop-distributeddns-04.txt

2008-06-28 Thread Dean Anderson
A number of the points you raise have already been addressed.

The IPV6 Reverse resolution question has been discussed at length in
DNSEXT previously. In fact, it was proposed to remove reverse resolution
entirely from IPV6 for just the reason Dr. Huang notes.  A 128 bit IPV6
address is 16 octets. To perform reverse resolution requires traversing
16 levels of DNS tree. Even the delegations impose significantly larger
trees on the registries. It is recognized that this isn't going to be
very scalable, or even possible.  IPV6 proposes to use ICMP Node
Identification query instead.  At present, there is an IPV6 reverse
tree, but it is not guarenteed it will stay. It is for transition--so
that gethostbyaddr() still works on IPv6 during transition.

See for example the discussions here:

http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg00931.html
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg01828.html

--Dean

On Sat, 28 Jun 2008, Phil Regnauld wrote:
   
 2.3 Reverse Resolution
  
 Reverse Resolution uses .IN-ADDR.ARPA domain today. In IPv6,
 .IP6.ARPA was defined by [RFC3152], and more detail information can
 be found in [RFC3596]. Because IPv6 has a huge Name Space, it is
 difficult to keep reverse RRs in today's architecture.
 
   Question: Why ?
 
   Yes, IPv6 space is immense, but for the foreseeable future, only a
   very small part of it will be populated.  Same goes for IP6.ARPA.
   But there are no data, either by you or others, supporting the
   claim that it will be more difficult to accomodate reverse
   information as IP6.ARPA grows.
 
   Do you have some simulation, model or other data-based prediction
   that can be used to illustrate this problem ?


-- 
Av8 Internet   Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
www.av8.net faster, more reliable, better service
617 344 9000   



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Re: [DNSOP] I-D ACTION:draft-licanhuang-dnsop-distributeddns-04.txt

2008-06-28 Thread Phil Regnauld
Dean Anderson (dean) writes:
 A number of the points you raise have already been addressed.

Hi Dean,

Where ?

 The IPV6 Reverse resolution question has been discussed at length in
 DNSEXT previously. In fact, it was proposed to remove reverse resolution
 entirely from IPV6 for just the reason Dr. Huang notes.

Which one ?  There's still nothing showing that there effectively
is going to be a bottleneck of traffic to the root.  Some curve,
some data points, anything, we could use to extrapolate future
problems from current trends, or even a *simulation* of load
based on guesstimages/projections of network host population would
come in handy.

 A 128 bit IPV6
 address is 16 octets. To perform reverse resolution requires traversing
 16 levels of DNS tree.

How is that better than 32 steps for the proposed implementation ?

(from the draft, §2.3)

  The Total address space of IPv6 is huge. But, only the Reserve Domain Name
 Servers managing used IP addresses will join the Virtual Hierarchical
 Overlay Network for DNS. And the worst maxium query steps are 32.
 With route cache the query steps will be less than 32. Therefore,
 this strategy for Reverse Resolution is feasible.

Note: I may very well have gotten lost in the logic, and if
there's something I missed, please point it out...

 Even the delegations impose significantly larger
 trees on the registries. It is recognized that this isn't going to be
 very scalable, or even possible.

Again, where ?  The references you point to below are somewhat old,
and of course it doesn't make them any less relevant (after all,
IPv6 is only going to be get used more and more), but still, I fail
to see any kind of model that really does show that it will be a 
problem.

C. Huitema's argument that the ... operational implications are 
daunting,
I can easily identify with -- autoconfiguration, if it does get used,
will mean that everything has to be automatized and most likely dynamic.

Alain Durand does point out that due to the size of ipv6 space,
reverse information for large ranges of IP addresses will have to be
dynamically generated, use wildcard, only record some, or drop.

But it still doesn't say how this is going to be a problem, that
Mr. (not a Dr. it seems) is arguing his draft is the solution to.

 IPV6 proposes to use ICMP Node Identification query instead.

You mean ICMP Node Information ? (RFC4620)

Yes, it definitely looks like an interesting solution.  It has issues,
though, for example, the fact that it assumes that every node on
the internet will be reachable so that they can be queries:

(from RFC4620, §8. Security Considerations)

   This protocol has the potential of revealing information useful to a
   would-be attacker.  An implementation of this protocol MUST have a
   default configuration that refuses to answer queries from global-
   scope [3] addresses.

... and the protocol doesn't propose implementing a collector/
local aggregator which could handle/reverse proxy such queries at the
edge router or firewall level, so I guess if you've got a firewall,
you haven't got reverse anyway.

 At present, there is an IPV6 reverse
 tree, but it is not guarenteed it will stay. It is for transition--so
 that gethostbyaddr() still works on IPv6 during transition.

That's not the impression I got.  Decisions to phase out ip6.int and
use ip6.arpa look to me like ip6.arpa is here to stay.  HOW we populate
it -- or rather: how do we make that namespace return something useful,
using gethostbyaddr(), is part of the challenge -- for the reasons
stated by the sources you site.

But I don't see either of these issues in anyway related to the
the overload of traffic in tree structure that Mr. Huang says
should be avoided.

 See for example the discussions here:
 
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg00931.html
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg01828.html

Cheers,
Phil
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Re: [DNSOP] I-D ACTION:draft-licanhuang-dnsop-distributeddns-04.txt

2008-06-28 Thread 黄理灿

I have just kicked off the open source project VIRGO-DNS. I will lead my 
students and other colleagues to implement the draft. I got my Ph.d from 2003, 
and was senior research assocate in Cardiff University.  

The cache route information by applying Zipf's law will make average hops much 
less than worst hops.

By theretical calculation, in the case of  total numbers of DNS servers with 1 
million, alpha parameter 0.91  cache size is 1000, L is 32, then p is  0.537; 
and average hops is less than 3.

 
From: Phil Regnauld [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: 
To: Dean Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] I-D ACTION:draft-licanhuang-dnsop-distributeddns-04.txt
Date:Sun, 29 Jun 2008 00:27:11 +0200

Dean Anderson (dean) writes:
 A number of the points you raise have already been addressed.

   Hi Dean,

   Where ?

 The IPV6 Reverse resolution question has been discussed at length in
 DNSEXT previously. In fact, it was proposed to remove reverse resolution
 entirely from IPV6 for just the reason Dr. Huang notes.

   Which one ?  There's still nothing showing that there effectively
   is going to be a bottleneck of traffic to the root.  Some curve,
   some data points, anything, we could use to extrapolate future
   problems from current trends, or even a *simulation* of load
   based on guesstimages/projections of network host population would
   come in handy.

 A 128 bit IPV6
 address is 16 octets. To perform reverse resolution requires traversing
 16 levels of DNS tree.

   How is that better than 32 steps for the proposed implementation ?

(from the draft, ?.3)

  The Total address space of IPv6 is huge. But, only the Reserve Domain Name
 Servers managing used IP addresses will join the Virtual Hierarchical
 Overlay Network for DNS. And the worst maxium query steps are 32.
 With route cache the query steps will be less than 32. Therefore,
 this strategy for Reverse Resolution is feasible.

   Note: I may very well have gotten lost in the logic, and if
   there's something I missed, please point it out...

 Even the delegations impose significantly larger
 trees on the registries. It is recognized that this isn't going to be
 very scalable, or even possible.

   Again, where ?  The references you point to below are somewhat old,
   and of course it doesn't make them any less relevant (after all,
   IPv6 is only going to be get used more and more), but still, I fail
   to see any kind of model that really does show that it will be a 
 problem.

   C. Huitema's argument that the ... operational implications are 
 daunting,
   I can easily identify with -- autoconfiguration, if it does get used,
   will mean that everything has to be automatized and most likely dynamic.

   Alain Durand does point out that due to the size of ipv6 space,
   reverse information for large ranges of IP addresses will have to be
   dynamically generated, use wildcard, only record some, or drop.

   But it still doesn't say how this is going to be a problem, that
   Mr. (not a Dr. it seems) is arguing his draft is the solution to.

 IPV6 proposes to use ICMP Node Identification query instead.

   You mean ICMP Node Information ? (RFC4620)

   Yes, it definitely looks like an interesting solution.  It has issues,
   though, for example, the fact that it assumes that every node on
   the internet will be reachable so that they can be queries:

(from RFC4620, ?. Security Considerations)

   This protocol has the potential of revealing information useful to a
   would-be attacker.  An implementation of this protocol MUST have a
   default configuration that refuses to answer queries from global-
   scope [3] addresses.

   ... and the protocol doesn't propose implementing a collector/
   local aggregator which could handle/reverse proxy such queries at the
   edge router or firewall level, so I guess if you've got a firewall,
   you haven't got reverse anyway.

 At present, there is an IPV6 reverse
 tree, but it is not guarenteed it will stay. It is for transition--so
 that gethostbyaddr() still works on IPv6 during transition.

   That's not the impression I got.  Decisions to phase out ip6.int and
   use ip6.arpa look to me like ip6.arpa is here to stay.  HOW we populate
   it -- or rather: how do we make that namespace return something useful,
   using gethostbyaddr(), is part of the challenge -- for the reasons
   stated by the sources you site.

   But I don't see either of these issues in anyway related to the
   the overload of traffic in tree structure that Mr. Huang says
   should be avoided.

 See for example the discussions here:
 
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg00931.html
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg01828.html

   Cheers,
   Phil
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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Joe Abley


On 28 Jun 2008, at 11:29, Paul Vixie wrote:


[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Phil Regnauld) writes:


Question: How do existing implementations react to the presence of a
single, terminal dot ?  What if an A record is published for '.' ?  I
know it probably won't happen. but I'm also curious to know, and I  
think
the document should specify this: what is the impact of this on  
existing

implementations ?


i'm afraid that this will just result in a lot of QTYPE A messages  
sent to
the authority servers for . asking about ., and a lot of new useless  
RCODE 3

responses therefrom.


Is it not the case that ANCOUNT=0 RCODE=0 responses could be cached,  
whilst failures to send DNS UPDATE messages to root servers would not  
be cached?



Joe
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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Paul Vixie
 Is it not the case that ANCOUNT=0 RCODE=0 responses could be cached, whilst
 failures to send DNS UPDATE messages to root servers would not be cached?

the data at hand tells me that lots of people don't cache, and those who
do only cache positives.  but in principle, yes, if the hosts who aren't
following the spec regarding using SOA.MNAME as a selection criteria among
{NS.NSDNAME} happen not to be the same hosts who aren't caching negative
or empty results, then some good could come of this.
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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification

2008-06-28 Thread Brian Dickson

Paul Vixie wrote:

Is it not the case that ANCOUNT=0 RCODE=0 responses could be cached, whilst
failures to send DNS UPDATE messages to root servers would not be cached?



the data at hand tells me that lots of people don't cache, and those who
do only cache positives.  but in principle, yes, if the hosts who aren't
following the spec regarding using SOA.MNAME as a selection criteria among
{NS.NSDNAME} happen not to be the same hosts who aren't caching negative
or empty results, then some good could come of this.


What about the behavior of (modern) caching resolvers, at start-up time, 
when they prime themselves based on the root hints file?


What do they query for, i.e. . with query type of any?

If that's the case, then such resolvers will already have the answer 
(empty though it may be), and no new traffic should be seen.


If I understand things correctly, that is, and some quick local tests I 
did seem to point to this behavior.


(Even trying to do dig +trace on the A of . seems to short-circuit 
locally, without querying any root servers.)


Brian
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