Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Jason]

Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some
statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives.
Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than
others.  However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made
from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do.

An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is:  First, whatever measure an
experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being
experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in
the UD.  Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why
does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million?  How can an
experience be given more "weight" by being more common within the UD?
Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple
times?

A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set
containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more
would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit)
experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical
experiences.  Consider just visual experiences, there are many more
ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be
experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor
infront of you) to be experienced.

As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing
a rational universe and perspective.  Is your experience now a rare
abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there
something to be said for SSA's?  SSA's would suggest most experiences
are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life
to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences
highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial
conditions of a program in the UD).

Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
the order of your current observer moment?  Are self sampling
assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences?

Jason


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
>> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>>
>> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
>> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
> 
> 
> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. 

I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)  

Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, 
exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your 
UDA as compared to Peter's "some things exist and others don't".

>It is just 
> up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
> This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
> of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
> materialism and computationalism. 

When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from 
the conjunction of materialism and computationalism.  IIRC you said there was 
not a contradiction.

But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really 
see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it.

Brent Meeker

>The argument should make us more 
> modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
> 
> Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
> interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
> an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
> knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
> the (arithmetical hypostases):
> 
> p  (truth)
> Bp (provable)
> Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)
> 
> Bp & Dp (gamblings)
> Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)
> 
> And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
> hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
> what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
> explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
> multiverse.
> 
> It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
> theology) experimentally testable.
> 
> As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
> discovery:
> 
> The universal machine (talks bits)
> The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
> qubits).
> 
> The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
> to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
> both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
> 
> I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
> honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
> associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
> Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
> to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> > 
> 
> 


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Re: String theory and Cellular Automata

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> 
>  Hi,
> It was an interesting hypothesis,
> When we're talking black holes we should consider them as the sources of 
> reduction of entropy; since when something gets into a black hole we 
> have no more information about it and so the overall information of the 
> world decreases and the same happens to entropy.
> In your the world is moving toward black holes so the entropy of the 
> world should decrease! But that seems not to be the the case, it's 
> somehow inconvenient.

It's also wrong, according to our best theory of BHs, the entropy of a BH is 
proportional to it's surface area and the maximum entropy configuration of a 
given mass is for it to form a BH.  The information interpretation of this is 
that the information that seems to be "lost" by something falling into a black 
hole is encoded in correlations between what falls in and the black-body 
Hawking radiation from the surface.  So the entropy increases in that 
microscopically encoded information becomes unavailable to use macroscopic 
beings.  This is where all entropy comes from anyway - the dynamical evolution 
of QM is deterministic (at least in the MWI) and so information is never lost 
or gained.  

Brent Meeker

> 
> If we accept the idea of CA as the fundamental building blocks of the 
> nature we should explain: why some patterns and not the others. Some 
> that have lead to our physical laws and not the other possibilities?
> In this situation the idea of multiverse might help.
> 
> 
> On 3/15/07, *Colin Hales* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi,
> See previous posts here re EC - Entropy Calculus. This caught my eye,
> thought I'd throw in my $0.02 worth.
> 
> I have been working on this idea for a long while now. Am writing it
> up as
> part of my PhD process.
> 
> The EC is a lambda calculus formalism that depicts reality. It's actual
> instantation with one particular and unbelievable massive axiom set
> is the
> universe we are in. The instantation is literally the CA of the EC
> primitives.
> 
> As cognitive agents within it, made of the EC-CA, describing it, we can
> use abstracted simplified EC on a computational substrate (also made of
> the CA...a computer!) to explore/describe the universe. But the
> abstractions (like string theory) are not the universe - they are merely
> depictions at a certain spatiotemporal observer-scales.  Reality is a
> literal ongoing massively parallel theorem proving exercise in Entropy
> Calculus. The EC universe has literally computed you and me and my dogs.
> 
> Coherence/Bifurcation points in the CA correspond to new descriptive
> 'levels of underlying reality' - emergence. Atoms, Molecules,
> Crystalsetc...
> 
> One of the descriptive abstractions of the EC-CA is called
> 'Maxwells-Equations'. Another is the Navier-Stokes equations (different
> context), another is Quantum Mechanics, the standard particle model
> and so
> on. None of them are reality - merely depictions of a surface
> behaviour of
> it. In the model there is only one universe and only one justified or
> needed. Which is a bummer if you insist on talking about
> multiverses.they are not parsimonious or necessary to explain the
> universe. I can't help it if they are unnecessary!
> 
> You know , it's funny what EC makes the universe look like. the
> boundary of the universe is the collective event horizon of all black
> holes. On the other side is nothing. The endlessly increasing size of
> black holes is what corresponds to the endlessly increasing entropy
> (disorder - which is the dispersal of the deep universe back to
> nothing at
> the event horizons). The measure of the surface area of the black
> holes is
> the entropy of the whole universe.
> 
> The process of dispersal at the boundary makes it look like the universe
> is expanding - to us from the inside. The reality is actually the
> reverse
> - the spatiotemporal circumstances are of shrinkage  - due to the
> loss of
> the redundant fabric of the very deepest layers of reality being
> eaten by
> the black holes, dragging it inwhilst the organisation of
> collections
> of it at the uppermost layers is maintained (like space, atoms etc).
> (Imagine a jumper knitted of wool with a huge number of threads in the
> yarn - remove the redundant threads from the inside and the jumper
> shrinks, but is still a jumper, just getting smaller(everything else
> around looks like it's getting bigger from the point of view of
> being the
> jumper.) our future?...we'll all blink out of existence as the event
> horizons of black holes that grow and grow and grow and do it faster
> and
> faster and faster until. merging and merging until they all
> me

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John M]

I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A),  comp,  the P-words (Platonia, 
Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only 
for the adepts. Not in Mark's required "plain language". (English or what?) 
(I still stumble among them).  
My question now:
How do we distinguish "Everything" from "Almost Everything"? We are still 
'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it:  the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. 
How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real 
total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called 
(our?) "Everything"? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect 
may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense 
(happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). 
How are we better? 
We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the 
laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). 
Ad vocem 'smarter': 
I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be 
smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does 
that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia 
ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old 
Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality 
and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - 
i.e. better wisdom. 
So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now.

Regards

John M 
 

  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument




  Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

  > But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
  > universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
  > arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
  >
  > And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
  > logic, as well as epistemic ones?


  Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
  primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
  up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
  This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
  of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
  materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
  modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

  Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
  interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
  an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
  knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
  the (arithmetical hypostases):

  p  (truth)
  Bp (provable)
  Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

  Bp & Dp (gamblings)
  Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

  And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
  hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
  what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
  explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
  multiverse.

  It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
  theology) experimentally testable.

  As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
  discovery:

  The universal machine (talks bits)
  The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
  qubits).

  The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
  to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
  both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

  I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
  honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
  associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
  Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
  to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.

  Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  


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12:12 PM


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Re: JOINING post

[John M]

Dear Mindaugas.
you wrote:
 "Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular
automata ..."
I PRESUME THIS IS your STARTING POINT:  "if..." 
if not, if we find that our world is more(?) than a cellular automaton - which 
is in my word-use 'reductionist' - then the world is NOT governed by some 
simple rules. 
We don't set rules, we select models, count/identify in them the occurrences 
and deduct what happened most which then is called "law".  And the world is not 
GOVERNED. it is a process of them all. Nothing can be excluded from the 
interefficiency, because that would lead to separate worlds - which may well 
be, but we do not know about them. So your 'origination point' is causally 
connected (your word) to the rest of the totality and its process. A 'next 
step' segmentually observed. 
Initial state? I don't believe the narrative of the physical cosmology, because 
it has logical flaws even in human logic. I made another narrative, which may 
not be more 'true', but eliminates SOME flaws. You can make another one.
We "know" nothing about that 'origin', it was before the 'time' of Loebian 
machines (even before my time). 
We can speculate, it is cheap. 

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: 明迪 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 2:45 AM
  Subject: Re: JOINING post



  Dear John,

  I feel I understand your view and distinction of "origination point"
  and "origination".
  "Origination" is entailment of "origination point". "Origination
  point" is part of our world ("the item to be originated"). Is that
  correct?

  Now, my opinion is that there is no "origination" of the "origination
  point", because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be
  originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some
  relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually
  try to reduce it to some even simpler rule.

  It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are
  irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the
  patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that
  our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case,
  there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata
  rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we
  know :-).with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to
  find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually
  produces the initial state of our world.

  Mindaugas Indriunas

  On 3/8/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  >
  >
  > I feel a misunderstanding here:
  >
  > "origination point" IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent
  > 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from.
  > As I used 'origination" refers to the entailment producing such "point" - if
  > we use a 'point' to start with.
  > Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing
  > circumstgances we have no access to.
  > I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred
  > one. Hence the misunderstandability.  Sorry.
  >
  > John Mikes
  >
  >
  > - Original Message -
  > From: 明迪
  > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  > Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM
  > Subject: Re: JOINING post
  >
  > Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the
  > same as the word 'origination-point'.
  >
  > You said: (1)
  >
  > > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
  > >
  >
  > And you also said: (2)
  >
  > > we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it
  > may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).
  > >
  >
  > From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items later
  > or equal to origination-point."
  >
  > I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.
  >
  >
  > Mindaugas Indriunas
  >
  >
  > On 3/5/07, John M < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > >
  > >
  > > Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
  > > what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use
  > >
  > > in our speculations only our present cognitive
  > > inventory of our existing mind.
  > > No information from super(extra)natural sources
  > > included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
  > > items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
  > > of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
  > > precisely).
  > > Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
  > > cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
  > > topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence
  > > items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion.
  > > What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
  > > conventionally outlined "scientific method".
  > >
  > > John M
  > >
  > >
  > >
  > > --- 明迪 < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > >
  > > > Dear John Mikes.
  > > >
  > > > I am sorry for the late response. I will rep

Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Brent:
"...No parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their 
children - as perfectly well explained by Darwin.  And how dare you assert that 
money I sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back.  
There are many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but 
apparently you haven't bothered to find them..."

What is this? a mental blockage?
How could you forget (disregard) your 1st sentence in the 2nd? Are you a 
formalistical materialist to expect ONLY monetary rewards for money (or 
anything else) spent? S a t i s f a c t i o n  is not a reward? Feeling good 
about something? Besides such feelings - indeed - might have developed from 
'real' return: raising young means having a community-protection when getting 
old (as the most primitive idea). As complexity grew such ideas get also more 
complex. Luv is a composition. Not a primitive

John M


  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 12:03 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  Tom Caylor wrote:
  > On Mar 6, 5:19 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  >> Tom Caylor wrote:
   A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the
   sister's of mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can
   agree on what it provides.
  >>> I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree
  >>> on what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate
  >>> meaning,
  >> I was referring to the "sufficient source of *morality*".  Such a
  >> source should be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so
  >> clear everyone agrees - if it existed.
  >> 
  >>> is not true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency,
  >>> across all kinds of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly
  >>> normative morality, evidence for their being a source which
  >>> cannot be explained through closed science alone.
  >> Why not?  Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a
  >> *possible* explanation. And how is "God did it" an explanation of
  >> anything?  It's just a form of words so ambiguous as to be
  >> virtually empty.  "God" meant different things to the crusaders and
  >> the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and the Conquistadores, to the
  >> Nazi's and the Jews.  So just because they use the same word
  >> doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing.
  >> 
  > 
  > We've talked about this before.  Darwin cannot explain giving without
  >  expecting to receive.

  Where do you get this nonsense??  Do you just make it up as you need it?  No 
parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their children 
- as perfectly well explained by Darwin.  And how dare you assert that money I 
sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back.  There are 
many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but apparently 
you haven't bothered to find them.
  ...skipped the rest...
  Brent Meeker


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Re: String theory and Cellular Automata

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

 Hi,
It was an interesting hypothesis,
When we're talking black holes we should consider them as the sources of
reduction of entropy; since when something gets into a black hole we have no
more information about it and so the overall information of the world
decreases and the same happens to entropy.
In your the world is moving toward black holes so the entropy of the world
should decrease! But that seems not to be the the case, it's somehow
inconvenient.

If we accept the idea of CA as the fundamental building blocks of the nature
we should explain: why some patterns and not the others. Some that have lead
to our physical laws and not the other possibilities?
In this situation the idea of multiverse might help.


On 3/15/07, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Hi,
> See previous posts here re EC - Entropy Calculus. This caught my eye,
> thought I'd throw in my $0.02 worth.
>
> I have been working on this idea for a long while now. Am writing it up as
> part of my PhD process.
>
> The EC is a lambda calculus formalism that depicts reality. It's actual
> instantation with one particular and unbelievable massive axiom set is the
> universe we are in. The instantation is literally the CA of the EC
> primitives.
>
> As cognitive agents within it, made of the EC-CA, describing it, we can
> use abstracted simplified EC on a computational substrate (also made of
> the CA...a computer!) to explore/describe the universe. But the
> abstractions (like string theory) are not the universe - they are merely
> depictions at a certain spatiotemporal observer-scales.  Reality is a
> literal ongoing massively parallel theorem proving exercise in Entropy
> Calculus. The EC universe has literally computed you and me and my dogs.
>
> Coherence/Bifurcation points in the CA correspond to new descriptive
> 'levels of underlying reality' - emergence. Atoms, Molecules,
> Crystalsetc...
>
> One of the descriptive abstractions of the EC-CA is called
> 'Maxwells-Equations'. Another is the Navier-Stokes equations (different
> context), another is Quantum Mechanics, the standard particle model and so
> on. None of them are reality - merely depictions of a surface behaviour of
> it. In the model there is only one universe and only one justified or
> needed. Which is a bummer if you insist on talking about
> multiverses.they are not parsimonious or necessary to explain the
> universe. I can't help it if they are unnecessary!
>
> You know , it's funny what EC makes the universe look like. the
> boundary of the universe is the collective event horizon of all black
> holes. On the other side is nothing. The endlessly increasing size of
> black holes is what corresponds to the endlessly increasing entropy
> (disorder - which is the dispersal of the deep universe back to nothing at
> the event horizons). The measure of the surface area of the black holes is
> the entropy of the whole universe.
>
> The process of dispersal at the boundary makes it look like the universe
> is expanding - to us from the inside. The reality is actually the reverse
> - the spatiotemporal circumstances are of shrinkage  - due to the loss of
> the redundant fabric of the very deepest layers of reality being eaten by
> the black holes, dragging it inwhilst the organisation of collections
> of it at the uppermost layers is maintained (like space, atoms etc).
> (Imagine a jumper knitted of wool with a huge number of threads in the
> yarn - remove the redundant threads from the inside and the jumper
> shrinks, but is still a jumper, just getting smaller(everything else
> around looks like it's getting bigger from the point of view of being the
> jumper.) our future?...we'll all blink out of existence as the event
> horizons of black holes that grow and grow and grow and do it faster and
> faster and faster until. merging and merging until they all merge and
> then PFT! NOTHING. and the whole process starts again with a new
> axiom setround and round and roundwe go...
>
> Weird huh?
>
> So I reckon you're on the right track. You don't have to believe me about
> any of it... but I can guarantee you'll get answers if you keep looking at
> it. The trick is to let go of the idea that 'fundamental building blocks'
> of nature are a meaningful concept (we are tricked into the belief be our
> perceptual/epistemological goals) ...
>
> cheers,
> colin hales
>
>
>
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> > I'm thinking there's some kind of similarity between string theory and
> depicting the world as a big CA. In String theory we have some vibrating
> strings which have some kind of influence on each other and can for
> different matters and fields. CA can play such role of changing patterns
> and of course the influence is evident. Different rules in CA might
> correspond to various basic shapes of vibration in strings...
> > I don't know much about S.T. but the idea of such mapping seems very
> interesting.
> >
> > --
> > Mohsen Ravan

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>
> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?


Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
the (arithmetical hypostases):

p  (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
multiverse.

It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
theology) experimentally testable.

As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
discovery:

The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
qubits).

The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>>  But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> >>  universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> >>  arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
> >
> >
> > And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures?
>
> I guess that depends on what you mean by "mathematical structures".  I
> would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical
> structure.  I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory
> "structures".  If you regard "mathematics" as a game of propositions it just
> means every wff is a theorem.  But if you regard "mathematics" as existing
> (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss.


What I meant was the naive interpretation of "everything exists": cartoon
characters in cartoon worlds *just there* rather than generated by some
computer simulation or set of physical laws, as our universe seems to be. If
you look at only computations in Platonia, you could argue that such
structures (which as a matter of fact could be generated computationally, so
perhaps non-mathematical was a poor choice of words) would be of low
measure. However, what of the ones "outside" the computer? It seems to me
they should have the same ontological status as the abstract computer, but
it is then impossible to assign them a measure which makes the weirder ones
less likely, as has been done with computation.

Stathis Papaioannou

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