Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On 11/07/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I don't see that "relexive" adding anything here. It's just "existence" > simpliciter isn't it? Frankly, I'd be happy to concur. My account was to some extent a recapitulation of the intuitive process by which I reached a view of this entailment of 'existence'. So now (like the old story of the mathematical lecturer) I can say with relief: "Yes, I was right - it WAS obvious all along!" If this matches your own sense of it, that's obviously OK by me. My experience nonetheless is that it doesn't match everyone's, and that much confusion arises from this. > So something exists and then? part of it knows or learns about other > parts of it. Is that what you mean by epistemic? Ultimately, yes. The emergence of 'persons' and 'knowledge' I take to be a long way up a developmental process that renders the appearance of decomposing into structural or perceptual components subject to perspective (i.e. who's looking at what). You haven't been terribly much in sympathy with my previous expositions of this. But do recall that my approach has been to attempt to clarify (for myself at least) what the semantic implications of a particular 'theology' might be, not to promote a TOE (god forbid). > And this process of parts knowing about other parts follows some dynamical > rules? What does "know" mean in this context? Does it mean "contains a > representation of" or "has some information about"? Something along those lines. My aim was not to explicate how knowing comes about in detail, or how knowledge might be represented (either task being of course quite beyond me) but to try to understand how mental and physical descriptions might be correlated in a way that made sense in terms of either account. The correlation would I guess ultimately take the form of 'dynamical rules' for the domain in question. I feel I have a better intuition about this now, but even after my best efforts to share this I wouldn't expect everyone to agree or even follow my line of reasoning (which may be just wrong). > This process of "reflexive involution" is not at all clear. Can you give an > example of something emerging by reflexive involution? I used the term 'involution' on the model of 'evolution'. Since the theology of the One proposes that all process is a 'turning in' of the One, evolution becomes involution. The relevance of this is that the 'turning in', reflexivity, or self-relation is, as it were, the epistemic access of the One to itself: an access that manifests as our 1-personal experience, and - the communal extrapolation of this - the 'physical' world. ISTM that this isn't very far from what Bruno is proposing with comp (unsurprisingly as he takes Plotinus as a point of departure), but I'm less sure (i.e. a lot more confused) about how mental and physical aspects correlate. My working assumption has been that they follow an essentially isomorphic trajectory, and that from this we could recover mental and physical narratives that were each justifiable in (something like) their own terms. But I'm quite open to the possibility that this is terminally naive. You didn't seem to find my previous attempts to express this very satisfactory. > So in your conception there are things that exist, emerge from The One by > some process, and things that don't exist, Torgny's universe that he defines > by some specification. This seems close to Peter's position that existence > is a brute property As a matter of fact, I'd be reasonably content to go along with this. I did feel that Peter's bare substrate was a fairly good approximation to the One, and his insistence on 'real in the sense that I am real' I feel is an implicit appeal to what I've termed reflexivity. Also, Peter would from time to time try to get Bruno to concede that AR entailed just this brute property, but the debate always seemed to get bogged down. My own view is that any arithmetical realism postulated to give rise to 'reality in the sense that I am real' has this implication from the outset. But I don't want to start that argument again. > (quite contrary to the premise of the everything-list, but one that I'm glad > to entertain). For what it's worth, I really don't see that this is necessarily contrary to the premise of this list. The proposition is that all POSSIBLE worlds exist, not that anything describable in words (or for that matter mathematically) 'exists'. My analysis is an attempt to place a constraint on what can be said to exist in any sense strong enough to have any discernible consequences, either for us, or for any putative denizens of such 'worlds'. So I would argue that non-reflexive worlds are not possible in any consequential sense of the term. David > > David Nyman wrote: > > On 10/07/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >> I draw a complete blank when I read your use of the word "reflexive". > >> What exactly do you mean? How w
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
David Nyman wrote: > On 10/07/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> I draw a complete blank when I read your use of the word "reflexive". What >> exactly do you mean? How would you distinguish reflexive from non-reflexive >> existence? Do numbers exist reflexively? Do somethiings exist >> non-reflexively? What is "self-reflexion"? What's the operational >> definition of reflexive? > > Sorry, I'd hoped this might emerge more clearly from my dialogue with > Bruno, but I'm happy to clarify further. The notion arises from the > semantics of a particular 'theology', e.g. that of Plotinus' One. The > One represents uniqueness and independency: broadly, that which is not > subject to prior causation. This is 'existence' conceived as primary > presence-to-itself; it is consequently 'reflexive' in the sense of > turning in on itself. I don't see that "relexive" adding anything here. It's just "existence" simpliciter isn't it? > Here we are speaking of 'self' not of course in > the sense of a 'person', but in terms of primary 'self-relation'. The > 'many' are conceived as emerging from the One by a process of what > might then be termed involution (borrowing from evolution). The One > stands here as the sole fundamentally ontic category; all subsequent > involution is epistemic. More poetically, but rather accurately, this > is how the One 'gets to know itself'. So something exists and then? part of it knows or learns about other parts of it. Is that what you mean by epistemic? And this process of parts knowing about other parts follows some dynamical rules? What does "know" mean in this context? Does it mean "contains a representation of" or "has some information about"? > > In terms of these 'theological' premises, your questions might be > answered as follows: > > 1) How to distinguish reflexive from non-reflexive existence? > > Anything whatsoever, if it is to exist in any sense other than the > abstract, must emerge as a category by a process of reflexive > involution from the One. Consequently all 'existents' could be said > to 'exist reflexively'. Non-reflexive existence then equates to > non-existence. One might then wonder: what is the point of the > qualification 'reflexively'? The point is that it is an implicit > qualification, and consequently we may inadvertently delete it - by > abstraction - when we postulate what may 'exist', especially in the > 'all possible worlds' context of this list. > > For example, ISTM that as soon as one explicitly conceives a > 'B-Universe' - in contrast to Torgny's implicit assumption - as > having emerged by reflexive involution of the One, it becomes very > much harder to see how it could do so without 'getting to know itself' > in the process. This process of "reflexive involution" is not at all clear. Can you give an example of something emerging by reflexive involution? > IOW, the 'stuff' that seemed merely a peculiar > 'optional extra' in its implicitly non-reflexive (i.e. in a rather > literal sense, abstracted) conceptual form, can be seen to integrate > organically with the 'physical specification' through the epistemic > self-relation of the One. > > 2) Do numbers exist reflexively? > > An interesting question. Bruno, I think, might say that they do, or > at least that numbers and their relations can be used to mathematise > Plotinus' reflexive schema. I would say that to accept any such > mathematisation as a basis for our own existence, in some ineliminable > sense they must be held to exist reflexively. An intuitionist answer, > I guess, would be that they are abstractions of pre-mathematical > emergent categories of the One. > > 3) Do somethings exist non-reflexively? > > No, a something gets to be a something solely in virtue of being a > product of a process of reflexive involution of the One. > > 4) What is "self-reflexion"? > > Emphasis, I suppose. If reflexion is already self-relation, then > self-reflexion is merely an emphatic form of the same notion. > Redundant, perhaps. > > 5) What's the operational definition of reflexive? > > IOW what would one do to discover if something exists reflexively? I > suppose in the end this is empiricism. If it kicks back, it's > participating in the web of reflexive involution. If it never kicks > back, it may be just because it isn't. So I would say that the > B-Universe as conceived by Torgny isn't specified reflexively: i.e. > its putative properties are characteristic of situations imagined in a > form abstracted from reflexivity. For this reason I would claim that > it could never kick back: i.e. have any consequences, make its > presence felt, survive the cut of Occam's razor, etc. I could of > course be wrong. So in your conception there are things that exist, emerge from The One by some process, and things that don't exist, Torgny's universe that he defines by some specification. This seems close to Peter's position tha
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Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On 10/07/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I draw a complete blank when I read your use of the word "reflexive". What > exactly do you mean? How would you distinguish reflexive from non-reflexive > existence? Do numbers exist reflexively? Do somethiings exist > non-reflexively? What is "self-reflexion"? What's the operational > definition of reflexive? Sorry, I'd hoped this might emerge more clearly from my dialogue with Bruno, but I'm happy to clarify further. The notion arises from the semantics of a particular 'theology', e.g. that of Plotinus' One. The One represents uniqueness and independency: broadly, that which is not subject to prior causation. This is 'existence' conceived as primary presence-to-itself; it is consequently 'reflexive' in the sense of turning in on itself. Here we are speaking of 'self' not of course in the sense of a 'person', but in terms of primary 'self-relation'. The 'many' are conceived as emerging from the One by a process of what might then be termed involution (borrowing from evolution). The One stands here as the sole fundamentally ontic category; all subsequent involution is epistemic. More poetically, but rather accurately, this is how the One 'gets to know itself'. In terms of these 'theological' premises, your questions might be answered as follows: 1) How to distinguish reflexive from non-reflexive existence? Anything whatsoever, if it is to exist in any sense other than the abstract, must emerge as a category by a process of reflexive involution from the One. Consequently all 'existents' could be said to 'exist reflexively'. Non-reflexive existence then equates to non-existence. One might then wonder: what is the point of the qualification 'reflexively'? The point is that it is an implicit qualification, and consequently we may inadvertently delete it - by abstraction - when we postulate what may 'exist', especially in the 'all possible worlds' context of this list. For example, ISTM that as soon as one explicitly conceives a 'B-Universe' - in contrast to Torgny's implicit assumption - as having emerged by reflexive involution of the One, it becomes very much harder to see how it could do so without 'getting to know itself' in the process. IOW, the 'stuff' that seemed merely a peculiar 'optional extra' in its implicitly non-reflexive (i.e. in a rather literal sense, abstracted) conceptual form, can be seen to integrate organically with the 'physical specification' through the epistemic self-relation of the One. 2) Do numbers exist reflexively? An interesting question. Bruno, I think, might say that they do, or at least that numbers and their relations can be used to mathematise Plotinus' reflexive schema. I would say that to accept any such mathematisation as a basis for our own existence, in some ineliminable sense they must be held to exist reflexively. An intuitionist answer, I guess, would be that they are abstractions of pre-mathematical emergent categories of the One. 3) Do somethings exist non-reflexively? No, a something gets to be a something solely in virtue of being a product of a process of reflexive involution of the One. 4) What is "self-reflexion"? Emphasis, I suppose. If reflexion is already self-relation, then self-reflexion is merely an emphatic form of the same notion. Redundant, perhaps. 5) What's the operational definition of reflexive? IOW what would one do to discover if something exists reflexively? I suppose in the end this is empiricism. If it kicks back, it's participating in the web of reflexive involution. If it never kicks back, it may be just because it isn't. So I would say that the B-Universe as conceived by Torgny isn't specified reflexively: i.e. its putative properties are characteristic of situations imagined in a form abstracted from reflexivity. For this reason I would claim that it could never kick back: i.e. have any consequences, make its presence felt, survive the cut of Occam's razor, etc. I could of course be wrong. Does this help at all? David > > David Nyman wrote: > > On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >> It > >> is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > >> first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > >> some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. > > > > Doesn't this strike you as perhaps consistent with what I've been > > saying about self-relation, or reflexive existence? IOW, quanta - as > > they appear to *us* (how else?) - exist reflexively. Comp, like any > > 'TOE', is a "gods' eye view", and I've been trying to convince Torgny > > that we shouldn't fool ourselves into mistaking such conceptions for > > modes of existing. We may nonetheless ask - with great care - "what > > might the consequences be if our situation were - in some (tricky) > > sense - to look like this from a gods' eye view?" But this is a > > (tricky, tricky) mode of enquiry, not a mode of ex
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
David Nyman wrote: > On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> It >> is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable >> first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than >> some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. > > Doesn't this strike you as perhaps consistent with what I've been > saying about self-relation, or reflexive existence? IOW, quanta - as > they appear to *us* (how else?) - exist reflexively. Comp, like any > 'TOE', is a "gods' eye view", and I've been trying to convince Torgny > that we shouldn't fool ourselves into mistaking such conceptions for > modes of existing. We may nonetheless ask - with great care - "what > might the consequences be if our situation were - in some (tricky) > sense - to look like this from a gods' eye view?" But this is a > (tricky, tricky) mode of enquiry, not a mode of existing. > > 'The One' is also a mode of enquiry (no less tricky, of course): it > seems to suggest that the mode of existing of both the qualia and the > quanta may be ineliminably reflexive: the splintering of a singular > process of self-reflexion. Self: because there is no other; > reflexion: because there is no other relation. > > David I draw a complete blank when I read your use of the word "reflexive". What exactly do you mean? How would you distinguish reflexive from non-reflexive existence? Do numbers exist reflexively? Do somethiings exist non-reflexively? What is "self-reflexion"? What's the operational definition of reflexive? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. Doesn't this strike you as perhaps consistent with what I've been saying about self-relation, or reflexive existence? IOW, quanta - as they appear to *us* (how else?) - exist reflexively. Comp, like any 'TOE', is a "gods' eye view", and I've been trying to convince Torgny that we shouldn't fool ourselves into mistaking such conceptions for modes of existing. We may nonetheless ask - with great care - "what might the consequences be if our situation were - in some (tricky) sense - to look like this from a gods' eye view?" But this is a (tricky, tricky) mode of enquiry, not a mode of existing. 'The One' is also a mode of enquiry (no less tricky, of course): it seems to suggest that the mode of existing of both the qualia and the quanta may be ineliminably reflexive: the splintering of a singular process of self-reflexion. Self: because there is no other; reflexion: because there is no other relation. David PS - It occurs to me that 'tricky' - which just happens to be the way these things strike me - seems quite consonant with the sort of 'reality gambles' that you (and Fuchs) propose. > Le 05-juil.-07, à 17:31, David Nyman a écrit : > > > On 05/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > BM: OK. I would insist that the "comp project" (extract physics from > > comp) > > is really just a comp obligation. This is what is supposed to be shown > > by the UDA (+ MOVIE-GRAPH). Are you OK with this. It *is* > > counterintuitive. > > > DN: I believe so - it's what the reductio ad absurdum of the > > 'physical' computation in the 'grandma' post was meant to show. > > This was not so clear, but OK. > > > My version of the 'comp obligation' would then run as follows. > > Essentially, if comp and number relations are held to be 'real in the > > sense that I am real', > > I am not sure that numbers are real in the sense that "I am real", > unless you are talking of the third person "I". Then "you" are as real > as your (unknown) Godel-number. > In general, when people use the word "I" they refer to their first > person, or to first person plural feature of their "physical" body. It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. So that Fuch-Pauli could be > right ... (if you know the work of Fuchs). > > > then to use Plato's metaphor, it is numbers that represent the forms > > outside the cave. > > OK, but not only (there are also the relations between numbers, the > relation between the relations between the numbers, etc.) > > > If that's so, then physics is represented by the shadows the > > observers see on the wall of the cave. This is what I mean by > > 'independent' existence in my current dialogue with Torgny: i.e the > > 'arithmetical realism' of numbers and their relations in the comp > > frame equates to their 'independence' or self-relativity. And the > > existence of 'arithmetical observers' then derives from subsequent > > processes of 'individuation' intrinsic to such fundamental > > self-relation. Actually, I find the equation of existence with > > self-relativity highly intuitive. > > OK. (Technically it is not obvious how to define in arithmetic such > self-relation: the basic tool is given by the recursion or fixed point > theorems). > > > > > BM: Then, the interview of the universal machine is "just" a way to > > do the > > extraction of physics in a constructive way. It is really the > > subtleties of the incompleteness phenomena which makes this interview > > highly non trivial. > > > DN: This is the technical part. But at this stage grandma has some > > feeling for how both classical and QM narratives should be what we > > expect to emerge from constructing physics in this way. > > I am not sure how could grandma have a feeling about that, except if > grandma get Church Thesis and the UDA. > > > > > > > BM: There is no direct (still less one-one) correlation between the > > mental and the physical, > > that is the physical supervenience thesis is incompatible with the > > comp hyp. [A quale of a pain] felt at time t in place x, is not a > > product of the physical activity of a machine, at time t in place x. > > Rather, it is the whole quale of [a pain felt at time t in place x] > > which is associated > > with an (immaterial and necessarily unknown) computational state, > > itself related to its normal consistent computational continuations. > > > > > > Comp makes the "yes doctor" a gamble, necessarily. That is: assuming > > the "theory comp" you have to understand that, by saying yes to the > > doctor, you are gambling on a level of substitution. At the same time > > you make
Re: Asifism revisited.
On 10/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > But I am not bored I'm glad to hear you're not a zombie after all :) > If I look at our universe from the outside I'd like to know how you perform this feat. > I see that I will do something > tomorrow I don't doubt it. But this is my point: your ability to 'see' this depends on your being able to discriminate differences dynamically. You may nevertheless believe that, from a "gods' eye" perspective, the context which instantiates this is nonetheless 'static'. But this should surely be a sharp reminder that we aren't gods. We can't "look at our universe from the outside". We can only pose it questions 'from within', and both the manner of our enquiring, and the content of the answers we receive, are consequently constrained in highly specific ways. This, I think, is the point of Bruno's methodology. It's also the point of my insistence on 'reflexivity'. The "gods' eye view" is a just manner of speaking, not a manner of 'existing'. David > > David Nyman skrev: > On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always > static. > > Then you must get very bored ;) > > David > > But I am not bored, because I don't know what will happen tomorrow. If I > look at our universe from the outside, I see that I will do something > tomorrow, and I see what will happen in one million years. There will never > be any changes in the situations that will happen in the future. > > But it is impossible to know today what will happen in the future, because > we can not have total knowledge about how the universe looks like just now. > If we try to find the exact position and the exact speed of an electron, > then that electron will be disturbed by me looking at it. So it is > impossible for me to compute how our universe will look like tomorrow. But > the rules of our universe decide what our universe will look like tomorrow. > -- > Torgny Tholerus > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Information content of multiverse
On 7/9/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > On Jul 9, 1:39 am, "Mohsen Ravanbakhsh" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi everybody, > > > > While I was reading the previous discussion; "justifying theory of > > everything" , I thought of my recent problem with still imperfection of > our > > TOE. The problem is: > > Multiverse by itself is a choice, and every choice by it's nature has > some > > bias and information. > > I could just consider two mathematical universes without any bias; the > first > > is nothing or mathematical point. The second one is a whole, I mean a > full > > space in infinite dimensions(just extending the perfect circle of Plato > to > > remove it's bias in radius and dimension) > > Any other universe should contain a choice, including the collection of > all > > possible universes! Why? > > Consider ME! Why 'I' am in this special world and not the other one? You > > might claim that I'm in the other ones as well. But I would still > insist; > > 'Why 'I' am in this special universe and not the other?'. I hope you get > my > > point. > > Would you know the difference if you were in all other universes at > once? What about existing in every point of time that spans your > life, would you not still have the illusion of only existing in the > present? No, I wouldn't but that doesn't solve this problem! You may say, OK you are existing in all other universes, and I still would answer the same way: as far as 'I' am here, there has been a bias; I mean why 'I' am not the other one in the other universe. You see my point? > I wanted to conclude from this, even if there is a multiverse there's an > > information content for whole universe, and that might need another > cause. > > > > >From my understanding of Theory of Nothing, the set of all > descriptions for every possible universe requires zero bits of > information to describe when taken as a whole. However with observers > there is discrimination within this set of descriptions, observers > determine which are perceived as real and due to this discrimination > individual universes requiring massive amounts of information to > describe emerge from a set that takes nothing to describe. The large > amount of information required to describe what we observe is due to > fact that what is observed in any particular observer moment is > finite, therefore requiring some information to define its bounds. I believe this trick wont work neither. Because here I, as Tegmark puts it, can have the same argument from the BIRD(3rd person) view. I as the BIRD know that every observer has a distinct self, because he/she can ask why he/she is some where and not some other where, while some other copies of him/her really are in those other wheres! So still there's a discrimination. I hope I have understood that part correctly; if not Russell can > correct me. I guess my argument shows as far as there's consciousness zero information for the whole universe is impossible. Some one HELP! Jason > > > > > -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism revisited.
David Nyman skrev: On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always static. Then you must get very bored ;) David But I am not bored, because I don't know what will happen tomorrow. If I look at our universe from the outside, I see that I will do something tomorrow, and I see what will happen in one million years. There will never be any changes in the situations that will happen in the future. But it is impossible to know today what will happen in the future, because we can not have total knowledge about how the universe looks like just now. If we try to find the exact position and the exact speed of an electron, then that electron will be disturbed by me looking at it. So it is impossible for me to compute how our universe will look like tomorrow. But the rules of our universe decide what our universe will look like tomorrow. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
