Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 8, 2022 at 2:24 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 5/7/2022 8:56 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> I think this boils down to the first person:third person confusion that
> Bruno often refers to.
> From the third person perspective, the outcome is certain. But from the
> first person perspective of each of the copies, the outcome is not certain.
>
> Consider the following simple situation. You have a bag containing ten
> balls, nine of which are red and one is black. If there are ten copies of
> Bob, for example, and each copy draws a ball from the bag, without
> replacement. Then it is certain (100% probability) that the black ball will
> be drawn. But the probability that any particular copy of Bob drew the
> black ball is only 10%. (They draw the balls without knowing the results of
> other draws). The probability that 'Bob' (including all copies, presumed
> identical) will have the black ball is still 100%. That is the 3p
> perspective. For each copy, however, their 1p perspective is that the
> probability that their ball is black is only 10%. The problem arises if you
> attempt to impose the 1p perspective on the 3p view. It cannot be the case
> that a particular copy of Bob is both certain to draw black and has only a
> 10% chance of drawing black. To consider all copies as equally identified
> as 'Bob' is the 3p view, and that is the view that is relevant for the
> Everett interpretation of an experiment -- there is nothing in the SE that
> identifies one particular observer (there is no 1p view), so Everett is
> incompatible with the Born rule (which is a 1p view).
>
>
> I don't think I agree that there is any such 3p view.  There's a 3p
> calculation, using MWI, in which ten different "Bob" are predicted.  But no
> third party ever sees these ten Bobs.
>

OK, no 'person' sees ten copies of Bob or ten outcomes. But it is common to
use a 'super-observer' notion for this. -- the 3p calculation. The 3p view
is then the objective 'view from outside'.

When you start to rely on subjective perspectives I think you've already
> violated the spirit of MWI which was proposed to apply to simple instrument
> records as well as consciousness.  Decoherence is such an instrument that
> is implicit in the environment.
>

I think that is exactly right. I introduced 1p and 3p views in an attempt
to come to terms with Saibal's presentation, but strictly everything should
be done by instruments -- no persons involved.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Brent Meeker]

On 5/7/2022 8:56 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sun, May 8, 2022 at 11:40 AM smitra  wrote:

On 05-05-2022 01:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM smitra  wrote:
>>
>> Of course you can. The lottery example shows that even in classical
>> physics you can imagine this happening. If  a million copies of
you are
>> made and one will win a lottery whole the rest won't then you
have one
>> in a million chance of experiencing winning the lottery, even
though
>> both outcomes of winning and losing will occur with certainty.
>
> The trouble is that classically, a million copies of you cannot be
> made.

Then assume that I'm Mr. Data and just copy the software running Mr.
Data a million times. So, this is not a findamtnel problem with the
argument.


That technology does not currently exist. And one might reasonably 
doubt that it will ever exist



> The issue was that if the probability of an outcome is 10%, then
> it does not make sense to say that that outcome will certainly
happen.

It does make sense in a scenario where there are multiple copies
if the
same observer. If Alice makes 10 copies of Bob, and one copy of
Bob is
going to experience outcome A and the rest will experience outcome B,
then from Alice will see all the possible states for Bob. But from
Bob's
point of view, things are different. After Bob is exposed to the
result
(A or B) there are two versions of Bob, BobI think this boils down to the first person:third person confusion 
that Bruno often refers to.
From the third person perspective, the outcome is certain. But from 
the first person perspective of each of the copies, the outcome is not 
certain.


Consider the following simple situation. You have a bag containing ten 
balls, nine of which are red and one is black. If there are ten copies 
of Bob, for example, and each copy draws a ball from the bag, without 
replacement. Then it is certain (100% probability) that the black ball 
will be drawn. But the probability that any particular copy of Bob 
drew the black ball is only 10%. (They draw the balls without knowing 
the results of other draws). The probability that 'Bob' (including all 
copies, presumed identical) will have the black ball is still 100%. 
That is the 3p perspective. For each copy, however, their 1p 
perspective is that the probability that their ball is black is only 
10%. The problem arises if you attempt to impose the 1p perspective on 
the 3p view. It cannot be the case that a particular copy of Bob is 
both certain to draw black and has only a 10% chance of drawing black. 
To consider all copies as equally identified as 'Bob' is the 3p view, 
and that is the view that is relevant for the Everett interpretation 
of an experiment -- there is nothing in the SE that identifies one 
particular observer (there is no 1p view), so Everett is incompatible 
with the Born rule (which is a 1p view).


I don't think I agree that there is any such 3p view.  There's a 3p 
calculation, using MWI, in which ten different "Bob" are predicted. But 
no third party ever sees these ten Bobs.


When you start to rely on subjective perspectives I think you've already 
violated the spirit of MWI which was proposed to apply to simple 
instrument records as well as consciousness.  Decoherence is such an 
instrument that is implicit in the environment.


Brent

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 8, 2022 at 11:21 AM smitra  wrote:

>
> The issues with branches etc. are likely just artifacts with making
> hidden assumptions about branches. At the end of the day there are only
> a finite number of states an observer can be in. If an observer is
> modeled as an algorithm, take e.g. Star Trek's Mr. Data then it's clear
> that there are only a finite number of bitstrings that can correspond to
> the set of all possible things Mr. Data can be aware of.
>

Everett is supposed to be QM without observers. So the number of things
that Mr Data can possibly be aware of is irrelevant. According to the SE,
all branches are equivalent. All else flows from this -- there are no
further "hidden assumptions about branches".

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Brent Meeker]

On 5/7/2022 6:21 PM, smitra wrote:

On 05-05-2022 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 5/4/2022 12:27 PM, smitra wrote:


In
fact, that idea introduces a raft of problems of its own -- what
is
the measure over this infinity of branches? What does it mean to
partition infinity in the ratio of 0.9:0.1? What is the mechanism
(necessarily outside the Schrodinger equation) that achieves this?


That simply means that there is as of yet no good model for QM
without the Born rule.


But there is no mechanism for the Born rule.  It is inconsistent with
pure Schroedinger evolution of the wave function.  I think the problem
of measures on infinity is overcome if you simply postulate a very
large but finite number of branches to split.  Or why not not an
continuum probability and just measure by the density around the
eigenvalue...the measured values are never exact anyway.  I don't
these things are wrong or show MWI is inconsistent, but I think they
show it has just moved the problems it purported to solve off to some
unobservable worlds, which is no better than CI.



Born rule is not inconsistent with the Schrödinger equation, it just 
tells you that the wavefunction gives you the probability amplitudes. 
This is better than the CI, because the CI is inconsistent with the 
Schrödinger equation.


Because??  It takes one more step and says "probability means something 
happens and other things don't."  It's not called the "Copenhagen 
Equation".  It's called the "Copenhagen Interpretation", i.e. how to 
*/interpret/* the Schroedinger equation and so it is consistent with it.




The issues with branches etc. are likely just artifacts with making 
hidden assumptions about branches. At the end of the day there are 
only a finite number of states an observer can be in. If an observer 
is modeled as an algorithm, take e.g. Star Trek's Mr. Data then it's 
clear that there are only a finite number of bitstrings that can 
correspond to the set of all possible things Mr. Data can be aware of.


But different Mr. Data's and different instruments can have different 
number of states.  So what you're suggesting is QBism.


Brent

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 8, 2022 at 11:32 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 05-05-2022 01:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 04-05-2022 01:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I have not introduced any concept of probability. The 2^N branches
> >>> that are constructed when both outcomes are realized on each of N
> >>> Bernoulli trials are all on the same basis.
> >>
> >> If you ignore the amplitudes in the states, and that means modifying
> >> QM into something else.
> >
> > QM does not assume that all branches exist equally. In Everett you
> > have already modified QM into something else.
> >
> > The Schrodinger equation is insensitive to the amplitudes. You get the
> > same set of 2^N branches from the Schrodinger equation, whatever
> > amplitudes you have. The weights of these branches certainly depend on
> > the amplitudes: if there are n zeros in the set of N trials, there are
> > N-n ones. The weight of the corresponding binary string is a^n
> > b^(N-n), but without further assumption, this plays no role in the
> > future development of the state or in the interpretation of the binary
> > string. If you interpret it as the probability of the string, you
> > again have a conflict, since all binary strings are constructed on an
> > equal basis, the natural probability for each is 2^{-N}.
>
> There is no conflict whatsoever with assuming the Born rule and the
> Schrodinger equation. The "construction on an equal basis" is not at all
> implied by the Schrödinger equation.
>

It is when you take the SE to imply that all possible outcomes exist on
each trial. That gives all outcomes equal status.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 8, 2022 at 11:40 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 05-05-2022 01:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM smitra  wrote:
> >>
> >> Of course you can. The lottery example shows that even in classical
> >> physics you can imagine this happening. If  a million copies of you are
> >> made and one will win a lottery whole the rest won't then you have one
> >> in a million chance of experiencing winning the lottery, even though
> >> both outcomes of winning and losing will occur with certainty.
> >
> > The trouble is that classically, a million copies of you cannot be
> > made.
>
> Then assume that I'm Mr. Data and just copy the software running Mr.
> Data a million times. So, this is not a findamtnel problem with the
> argument.
>

That technology does not currently exist. And one might reasonably doubt
that it will ever exist


> The issue was that if the probability of an outcome is 10%, then
> > it does not make sense to say that that outcome will certainly happen.
>
> It does make sense in a scenario where there are multiple copies if the
> same observer. If Alice makes 10 copies of Bob, and one copy of Bob is
> going to experience outcome A and the rest will experience outcome B,
> then from Alice will see all the possible states for Bob. But from Bob's
> point of view, things are different. After Bob is exposed to the result
> (A or B) there are two versions of Bob, Bob knows beforehand how the experiment s set up, he'll assign a probability
> of 10% of going to find himself in state Bob_B after the experiment.
>

I think this boils down to the first person:third person confusion that
Bruno often refers to.
>From the third person perspective, the outcome is certain. But from the
first person perspective of each of the copies, the outcome is not certain.

Consider the following simple situation. You have a bag containing ten
balls, nine of which are red and one is black. If there are ten copies of
Bob, for example, and each copy draws a ball from the bag, without
replacement. Then it is certain (100% probability) that the black ball will
be drawn. But the probability that any particular copy of Bob drew the
black ball is only 10%. (They draw the balls without knowing the results of
other draws). The probability that 'Bob' (including all copies, presumed
identical) will have the black ball is still 100%. That is the 3p
perspective. For each copy, however, their 1p perspective is that the
probability that their ball is black is only 10%. The problem arises if you
attempt to impose the 1p perspective on the 3p view. It cannot be the case
that a particular copy of Bob is both certain to draw black and has only a
10% chance of drawing black. To consider all copies as equally identified
as 'Bob' is the 3p view, and that is the view that is relevant for the
Everett interpretation of an experiment -- there is nothing in the SE that
identifies one particular observer (there is no 1p view), so Everett is
incompatible with the Born rule (which is a 1p view).

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[smitra]

On 05-05-2022 01:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM smitra  wrote:


On 04-05-2022 01:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 10:11 PM smitra  wrote:


What you are constructing is not the result of QM.


I think you are being confused by the presence of coefficients in

the

expansion of the original state: the a and b in

|psi> = a|0> + b|1>

The linearity of the Schrodinger equation means that the

coefficients,

a and b, play no part in the construction of the 2^N possible
branches; you get the same set of 2^N branches whatever the values

of

a and b. Think of it this way. If a = sqrt(0.9) and b = sqrt(0.1),

the

Born rule probability for |0> is 90%, and the Born rule

probability

for |1> is 10%. But, by hypothesis, both outcomes occur with

certainty

on each trial. There is a conflict here. You cannot rationally

have a

10% probability for something that is certain to happen.


Of course you can. The lottery example shows that even in classical
physics you can imagine this happening. If  a million copies of you
are
made and one will win a lottery whole the rest won't then you have
one
in a million chance of experiencing winning the lottery, even though

both outcomes of winning and losing will occur with certainty.


The trouble is that classically, a million copies of you cannot be
made.


Then assume that I'm Mr. Data and just copy the software running Mr. 
Data a million times. So, this is not a findamtnel problem with the 
argument.



The issue was that if the probability of an outcome is 10%, then
it does not make sense to say that that outcome will certainly happen.


It does make sense in a scenario where there are multiple copies if the 
same observer. If Alice makes 10 copies of Bob, and one copy of Bob is 
going to experience outcome A and the rest will experience outcome B, 
then from Alice will see all the possible states for Bob. But from Bob's 
point of view, things are different. After Bob is exposed to the result 
(A or B) there are two versions of Bob, Bobknows beforehand how the experiment s set up, he'll assign a probability 
of 10% of going to find himself in state Bob_B after the experiment.




Putting things off into other worlds does not make the logic work. If
there is a copy of you for every ticket in the lottery, then you can
say with certainty that one copy of you will have the winning ticket.
But what sense does it make to say that your chance of winning is then
one in a million? You can't have it both ways. If winning and not
winning are both regarded as legitimate outcomes, then you are not
certain to win, although you are certain to have an outcome. Whatever
way you spin it, the same thing cannot both be certain and have a
probability of 10% (or one in a million).



See above explanation.

Saibal


Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[smitra]

On 05-05-2022 01:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM smitra  wrote:


On 04-05-2022 01:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:


I have not introduced any concept of probability. The 2^N branches
that are constructed when both outcomes are realized on each of N
Bernoulli trials are all on the same basis.


If you ignore the amplitudes in the states, and that means modifying
QM
into something else.


QM does not assume that all branches exist equally. In Everett you
have already modified QM into something else.

The Schrodinger equation is insensitive to the amplitudes. You get the
same set of 2^N branches from the Schrodinger equation, whatever
amplitudes you have. The weights of these branches certainly depend on
the amplitudes: if there are n zeros in the set of N trials, there are
N-n ones. The weight of the corresponding binary string is a^n
b^(N-n), but without further assumption, this plays no role in the
future development of the state or in the interpretation of the binary
string. If you interpret it as the probability of the string, you
again have a conflict, since all binary strings are constructed on an
equal basis, the natural probability for each is 2^{-N}.


There is no conflict whatsoever with assuming the Born rule and the 
Schrodinger equation. The "construction on an equal basis" is not at all 
implied by the Schrödinger equation.



Because of
these obvious problems, most writers on MWI interpret the coefficients
as weights, and are careful to avoid calling the amplitudes
probabilities. The Born rule is taken to sit alongside the theory, but
it is not part of the theory because there are no probabilities in the
Schrodinger equation itself.



There are no forces in Maxwell equations either, that's given by the 
Lorentz force equation. I sits alongside the Maxwell equations.


Saibal


Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[smitra]

On 05-05-2022 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 5/4/2022 12:27 PM, smitra wrote:


In
fact, that idea introduces a raft of problems of its own -- what
is
the measure over this infinity of branches? What does it mean to
partition infinity in the ratio of 0.9:0.1? What is the mechanism
(necessarily outside the Schrodinger equation) that achieves this?


That simply means that there is as of yet no good model for QM
without the Born rule.


But there is no mechanism for the Born rule.  It is inconsistent with
pure Schroedinger evolution of the wave function.  I think the problem
of measures on infinity is overcome if you simply postulate a very
large but finite number of branches to split.  Or why not not an
continuum probability and just measure by the density around the
eigenvalue...the measured values are never exact anyway.  I don't
these things are wrong or show MWI is inconsistent, but I think they
show it has just moved the problems it purported to solve off to some
unobservable worlds, which is no better than CI.



Born rule is not inconsistent with the Schrödinger equation, it just 
tells you that the wavefunction gives you the probability amplitudes. 
This is better than the CI, because the CI is inconsistent with the 
Schrödinger equation.


The issues with branches etc. are likely just artifacts with making 
hidden assumptions about branches. At the end of the day there are only 
a finite number of states an observer can be in. If an observer is 
modeled as an algorithm, take e.g. Star Trek's Mr. Data then it's clear 
that there are only a finite number of bitstrings that can correspond to 
the set of all possible things Mr. Data can be aware of.


Saibal



Brent

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Re: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Look, if a convinced Christian like Frank Tipler, or Don Page, have little 
trouble with machinery achieving mind at some point in the future, then you 
should have no problem with postulating that machinery can do the trick, If it 
emulates, what it takes, say, spindle cells, then why not? I am not saying it 
has to, being no scientist at all, but philosophically it may work. Your views 
on life may hold for a long while as well, since Urey-Miller may be more 
profound, since who has throw carbon and water together (sulphur too I read) 
and a plant, or an original cell. I am not saying this cannot have happened, 
just that it has not. For a hypothesis on mind, I lean towards Penrose- 
Hameroff, unless you have something better?


-Original Message-
From: Philip Benjamin 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Sat, May 7, 2022 4:53 pm
Subject: FW: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?

 Saturday, May 7, 2022 3:53 PM 
'general_the...@googlegroups.com'general_theory@googlegroups.comSubject: RE: 
[Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?    [Rosemary Rock 
Evans] “And although I do not disagree with your idea of the immortal soul 
being dark energy, …. The brain alone does nothing. The emotion is by far the 
most important factor and all of it is metaphysical.” [Philip Benjamin]    No, 
I never equated dark energy with soul/spirit, because in all ancient languages 
soul/spirit have their roots in breath/breeze. When the last breath was gone, 
the ancients discerned that life is over. Thus ‘life principle’ was equated 
with something similar to  wind! If they had any understanding of “invisible 
matter” they might have equated ‘life principle’ with that--  “matter” 
nevertheless.  Dark matter PARTICLES— not dark energy – as any other matter 
will have chemistries i.e. spin governed particle configurations called 
chemical bonds. A resonant dark twin made of PARTICLES is cocreated at the 
moment of conception. Resonance is rudimentary recognition. That is plausibly 
the basis of self-awareness, if “ self” is real and invisible. Self-talk, 
self-respect etc. cannot be dark-energy talk and dark-energy self-respect. None 
talks to dark energy.     Dark energy is an invention to save the Big Bang 
speculation and the mathematics associated with it. Dark-matter was more 
accurately termed “missing matter” by Fritz Zwicky, because there was areal 
measurable mass difference of distant rotating hot bodies calculated optically 
and gravitationally. Vera Rubin confirmed that. Astrophysical hot bodies are 
composed of H, He and perhaps innumerable particles of the corresponding 
dark-matter. Biosphere consists of 92 + ordinary ‘light matter’ and possibly 
corresponding dark-matter. There is nothing outlandish about that. Philip 
Benjamin       From: 'Rosemary Rock-Evans' via Consciousness-Online 

Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 10:19 AM
To: general_the...@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?    I can 
understand why the young man who commented , said what he did. There is a great 
emphasis on AI and robotics at the moment in many universities. He mentionned 
neural nets, for example, and these are used for finger print recognition in 
the police.    But it is as if we are trying to make things whichare artificial 
have some degree of 'soul' because we want them to be humane - kind. Can we 
program kindness, empathy, self awareness, etc into a machine?    It is very 
laudible, because whoever is doing this, wants machines to be 'humane'. It 
would be wonderful if we could - do not hurt - but machines should be under our 
control, so that they don't hurt, becauseonly things which have a soul can be 
hurt - whether physically or emotionally.    Memory, learning ability - are 
just functions - that in many ways can be replicated - but love, hurt, hate, 
joy, desire, grief, etc - the emotions?Our soul experiences them.    And maybe 
by this simple statement I have defined what 'life' is and consciousness. It is 
the ability to be hurt and to love and be loved. To experience emotions. And I 
would hope that a convincing enough number of youtube videos show that animals 
do both - and that is why we are all 'animals' - we have applied this 
definition without even thinking about it.    And although I do not disagree 
with your idea of theimmortal soul being dark energy, it is the immortal soul 
that counts as the ultimate test of whether one is conscious. A person can have 
a brain and die of grief or loneliness or fear. The brain alone does nothing. 
The emotion is by far the most important factor and all of it is metaphysical.  
  Self consciousness is, I think, something else. A child and a dog do not 
really experienceself consciousness, although they are clearly conscious.    I 
think we need to start valuing the things that make us [and living things] 
'human', without attempting to replicate them - be 'God'. I may be given a self 
driving car, b

Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[smitra]

On 04-05-2022 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 5/4/2022 11:36 AM, smitra wrote:

On 03-05-2022 19:52, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 5/3/2022 5:00 AM, smitra wrote:

On 28-04-2022 07:24, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 4/26/2022 5:32 PM, smitra wrote:


On 27-04-2022 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 10:03 AM smitra  wrote:

On 24-04-2022 03:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

A moment's thought should make it clear to you that this is not
possible. If both possibilities are realized, it cannot be the
case
that one has twice the probability of the other. In the long run,
if
both are realized they have equal probabilities of 1/2.

The probabilities do not have to be 1/2.  Suppose one million 
people



participate in a lottery such that there will be exactly one 
winner.


The
probability that one given person will win, is then one in a
million.
Suppose now that we create one million people using a machine and
then
organize such a lottery. The probability that one given newly
created
person will win is then also one in a million. The machine can be
adjusted to create any set of persons we like, it can create one
million
identical persons, or almost identical persons, or totally 
different



persons. If we then create one million almost identical persons, 
the



probability is still one one in a million. This means that the 
limit


of
identical persons, the probability will be one in a million.

Why would the probability suddenly become 1/2 if the machine is 
set

to
create exactly identical persons while the probability would be 
one

in a
million if we create persons that are almost, but not quite
identical?


Your lottery example is completely beside the point.

It provides for an example of a case where your logic does not 
apply.



I think you
should pay more attention to the mathematics of the binomial
distribution. Let me explain it once more: If every outcome is
realized on every trial of a binary process, then after the first
trial, we have a branch with result 0 and a branch with result 1.
After two trials we have four branches, with results 00, 01, 
10,and
11; after 3 trials, we have branches registering 000, 001, 011, 
010,


100, 101, 110, and 111. Notice that these branches represent all
possible binary strings of length 3.

After N trials, there are 2^N distinct branches, representing all
possible binary sequences of length N. (This is just like Pascal's
triangle) As N becomes very large, we can approximate the binomial
distribution with the normal distribution, with mean 0.5 and
standard
deviation that decreases as 1/sqrt(N). In other words, the 
majority

of
trials will have equal, or approximately equal, numbers of 0s and
1s.
Observers in these branches will naturally take the probability to
be
approximated by the relative frequencies of 0s and 1s. In other
words,
they will take the probability of each outcome to be 0.5.


The problem with this is that you just assume that all branches are
equally probable. You don't make that explicit, it's implicitly
assumed, but it's just an assumption. You are simply doing branch
counting.

But it shows why you can't use branch counting.  There's no 
physical

mechanism for translating the _a_ and _b_ of  _|psi> = a|0> + b|1>_
into numbers of branches.  To implement that you have put it in "by
hand" that the branches have weights or numerousity of _a _and _b_.
This is possible, but it gives the lie to the MWI mantra of "It's 
just

the Schroedinger equation."



Yes, one has to interpret the wavefunction as giving probabilities. 
That's still better than assuming that the physical state evolves 
sometimes according to the Schrödinger equations and sometimes by 
undergoing a nondeterministic collapse without there being any 
evidence for such collapses, without even credible theoretical 
models for it.


Is there any evidence that is NOT from collapse?  How does it get
recorded?  Where is it?  A credible theoretical model is one that
predicts the observed result...not necessarily one that satisfies 
your
metaphysical prejudices.  You seem to have adopted a Platonist view 
of

physics.  But as Sean Carroll (a proponent of MWI) remarked, "But all
human progress has come from studying the shadows on the wall."



A theoretical model cannot be tied to macroscopic concepts that are 
known to only give an effective description of nature.


But that's not "known".  It's only "known" if you assume the
theoretical model...circular reasoning.



If collapse is not effective but a real effect not due to decoherence, 
then there is as of yet no experimental evidence for it.


It's just like concepts in thermodynamics that can be explained in a 
more fundamental way using statistical physics. No one objects to 
doing that on the grounds of any practical impossibility of building 
molecular-scale heat engines.


But the consequences of thermodynamics are confirmed by observation. 
MWI puts them where they are, in principle, unobservable.



Real collapse would have clear 

Re: It feels like Groundhog Day

[Alan Grayson]

On Friday, May 6, 2022 at 12:46:42 PM UTC-6 Alan Grayson wrote:

> On Friday, May 6, 2022 at 8:37:28 AM UTC-6 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>> On Friday, May 6, 2022 at 5:36:38 AM UTC-6 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> I'm changing the title because I think it's bad form for the title of a 
>>> thread to contain the name of a list member, and because I really do feel 
>>> like Bill Murray, we've been over this exact same ground over and over 
>>> again almost verbatim. I'm (probably foolishly) going to do it one more 
>>> time:
>>>
>>> Suppose you wanted to measure the gravitational constant G, how would 
>>> you do it? You'd do it the same way Henry Cavendish did it 200 years ago, 
>>> you'd use Newton's formula F= √(GM/r) where F is the gravitational force of 
>>> attraction between 2 lead balls of equal mass if you chain one of the balls 
>>> to the earth's surface and let the other one swing freely. Now you'll need 
>>> to determine the mass of the balls, and you can do that by noting how fast 
>>> it accelerates when exposed to a known calibration force, for example a 
>>> force provided by a precisely made coiled clockspring, but if the energy in 
>>> the clockspring is half of what it was in Cavendish's day and the inertia 
>>> of the lead ball is also half of what it was in Cavendish's day then the 
>>> value of M you will write in your lab notebook will be the same as the 
>>> value Cavendish wrote in his lab notebook. And the amount of time it takes 
>>> for the freely swinging ball to hit the stationary ball that you write 
>>> in your lab notebook will be the same as the time Cavendish found.  So the 
>>> value of G that you write in your lab notebook will be the same value 
>>> Cavendish wrote in his.
>>>
>>> Newton says the orbital velocity of a planet a distance r from the sun 
>>> is  v= √ (GM/r) , so if G is the same and M is the same (because the 
>>> inertial and gravitational mass are always the same) then the orbital speed 
>>> of a planet is the same, and the solar system would look the same. And 
>>> because the gravitational acceleration on the surface of the earth g= 
>>> GM/R^2 where M is the mass of the earth and R is the radius of the earth, g 
>>> would still be 9.8 m/s, and force would still equal mass times 
>>> acceleration. 
>>>
>>> The one thing both Newton and Einstein agreed-upon is that gravitational 
>>> mass and inertial mass are always exactly the same, and that's why 
>>> Aristotle was wrong, something twice as heavy does not fall to the ground 
>>> twice as fast; that's also why even physicist who are adamantly opposed to 
>>> many worlds and love to badmouth it don't use the argument presented around 
>>> here that the solar system would become unstable. Some around here are 
>>> arguing in effect that Aristotle was right after all, an object twice as 
>>> heavy would fall to the ground twice as fast and we should just ignore 2000 
>>> years worth of progress in physics. Unless somebody says something new that 
>>> I haven't already responded to at least twice before (and at this point 
>>> that seems unlikely) I'm done with this and Groundhog Day is finally 
>>> over.
>>>
>>> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
>>> 
>>>
>>
>> Your analysis is in error because you've changed the problem -- which 
>> assumes the energy of a split universe decreases by 50%, where the wf 
>> allows two outcomes of equal probability. THEREFORE, since E = mc^2, the 
>> masses of the Sun and Earth ALSO decrease by 50%. Further, g, the 
>> acceleration of gravity at the surface of the Earth is *irrelevant* to 
>> whether the orbit can be maintained. Clearly, the orbit will be maintained 
>> if the Earth shrinks to any radius, for a given mass. On this latter point, 
>> I think Bruce made the same error. AG
>>
>
> That makes three members who regard your analysis as faulty, but for you 
> it's still groundhog day. Like I wrote (in effect) earlier, you're not 
> someone I would trust when buying a used car. AG 
>

For you it will always be groundhog day. Because, like a Trumper, you are 
unable to admit you're wrong. AG 

>
>>> dgd
>>>
>>>
>>>

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, May 7, 2022 at 10:30 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, May 6, 2022 at 10:50 PM Russell Standish 
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 05:14:41PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> > *If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's
>> theorem shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. *
>
>
> I agree with what you say, so why won't you also say that's a big win for
> Everett's Many Worlds?
>

Everett's theory does not attach a probability to branches -- it just says
that they all happen. And that is the biggest failure of Everett's theory


> *if they are probabilities of results that implies that some things
>> happen and others don't.*
>
>
> If there are probabilities of results that implies that* SOMETIMES* a
> specific thing happens and *SOMETIMES* that exact same specific thing
> doesn't.
>

Everett says that everything that can happen always happens, so there can
be no applicable notion of probability in that theory.

Bruce

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FW: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?

[Philip Benjamin]

Saturday, May 7, 2022 3:53 PM 'general_the...@googlegroups.com' 
general_the...@googlegroups.com 
Subject: RE: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?

[Rosemary Rock Evans]
"And although I do not disagree with your idea of the immortal soul being dark 
energy,  The brain alone does nothing. The emotion is by far the most 
important factor and all of it is metaphysical."
[Philip Benjamin]
   No, I never equated dark energy with soul/spirit, because in all ancient 
languages soul/spirit have their roots in breath/breeze. When the last breath 
was gone, the ancients discerned that life is over. Thus 'life principle' was 
equated with something similar to  wind! If they had any understanding of 
"invisible matter" they might have equated 'life principle' with that--  
"matter" nevertheless.
 Dark matter PARTICLES- not dark energy - as any other matter will have 
chemistries i.e. spin governed particle configurations called chemical bonds. A 
resonant dark twin made of PARTICLES is cocreated at the moment of conception. 
Resonance is rudimentary recognition. That is plausibly the basis of 
self-awareness, if " self" is real and invisible. Self-talk, self-respect etc. 
cannot be dark-energy talk and dark-energy self-respect. None talks to dark 
energy.
Dark energy is an invention to save the Big Bang speculation and the 
mathematics associated with it. Dark-matter was more accurately termed "missing 
matter" by Fritz Zwicky, because there was a real measurable mass difference of 
distant rotating hot bodies calculated optically and gravitationally. Vera 
Rubin confirmed that. Astrophysical hot bodies are composed of H, He and 
perhaps innumerable particles of the corresponding dark-matter. Biosphere 
consists of 92 + ordinary 'light matter' and possibly corresponding 
dark-matter. There is nothing outlandish about that.
Philip Benjamin


From: 'Rosemary Rock-Evans' via Consciousness-Online 
mailto:general_the...@googlegroups.com>>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 10:19 AM
To: general_the...@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: [Consciousness-Online] FW: Is Artificial Life Conscious?

I can understand why the young man who commented , said what he did. There is a 
great emphasis on AI and robotics at the moment in many universities. He 
mentionned neural nets, for example, and these are used for finger print 
recognition in the police.


But it is as if we are trying to make things which are artificial have some 
degree of 'soul' because we want them to be humane - kind. Can we program 
kindness, empathy, self awareness, etc into a machine?


It is very laudible, because whoever is doing this, wants machines to be 
'humane'. It would be wonderful if we could - do not hurt - but machines should 
be under our control, so that they don't hurt, because only things which have a 
soul can be hurt - whether physically or emotionally.



Memory, learning ability - are just functions - that in many ways can be 
replicated - but love, hurt, hate, joy, desire, grief, etc - the emotions? Our 
soul experiences them.



And maybe by this simple statement I have defined what 'life' is and 
consciousness. It is the ability to be hurt and to love and be loved. To 
experience emotions. And I would hope that a convincing enough number of 
youtube videos show that animals do both - and that is why we are all 'animals' 
- we have applied this definition without even thinking about it.



And although I do not disagree with your idea of the immortal soul being dark 
energy, it is the immortal soul that counts as the ultimate test of whether one 
is conscious. A person can have a brain and die of grief or loneliness or fear. 
The brain alone does nothing. The emotion is by far the most important factor 
and all of it is metaphysical.



Self consciousness is, I think, something else. A child and a dog do not really 
experience self consciousness, although they are clearly conscious.



I think we need to start valuing the things that make us [and living things] 
'human', without attempting to replicate them - be 'God'. I may be given a self 
driving car, but only David can point out the beauty of the cloud formations 
and talk about the clarity of the light. A machine does not know beauty.



It is the separation of the 'feminine' emotional, perceptive side from the 
symbolically unemotional, memory driven so called scientific side that has got 
us into the mess we are in - in Ukraine for example.

The 'masculine' has entirely taken over, where personal desires and objectives, 
avoidance of all unfiltered perceptions of reality, and an ability to devise a 
strategy that meets objectives, but loses all sense of humanity, produces 
carnage.

Note that I have named no names, as Mr Putin is probably not the actual one 
doing this. I suspect he is a puppet. I want to know 'who' or 'what' is pulling 
his strings.



best wishes to you

rosie



PS S

Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[John Clark]

On Fri, May 6, 2022 at 10:50 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 05:14:41PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > *If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's
> theorem shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. *


I agree with what you say, so why won't you also say that's a big win for
Everett's Many Worlds?

> *if they are probabilities of results that implies that some things
> happen and others don't.*


If there are probabilities of results that implies that* SOMETIMES* a
specific thing happens and *SOMETIMES* that exact same specific thing
doesn't.

> *other wise** what does "probability" mean*


Good question. To a poker player and to a believer in Everett's Many
Worlds, probability means doing the best you can with incomplete
information. If one wanted to be charitable one would say that to a
believer in Copenhagen probability means, to the extent it means anything
at all, that "*nothing is real until it is observed**, and never mind what
'real' means*". But I think it would be more accurate to say that to a
believer in Copenhagen probability means "*shut up and just use the
probability number in your calculation and get a result that can be checked
by experimentation, and give up and don't even try to think about what's
actually going on at a more fundamental level*".

> *and what use is it as an empirical concept? *


Whatever probability means nobody can deny it works.

Russell Standish  wrote:

>
>
> *Doesn't this just hinge on what I call in my book the semantic-syntactic
> distinction, aka the  1-3 distinction (long debates between Bruno and JC on
> this), or the subjective-objective distinction, or even discrete-continuous
> distinction. Without this cut, the very concept of information makes no
> sense, and without information, Darwinian evolution doesn't happen.*
>

There doesn't seem to have been any "I" versus "you" distinction 2 billion
years ago when Eukaryotic cells evolved from Prokaryotic cells, so how did
it happen?  For that matter, how did the universe evolve from a thin and
almost completely even distribution of cold hydrogen and helium gas, as it
was about 1 million years after the Big Bang, into a universe filled with
stars and galaxies and black holes as it was just a few hundred million
years later? By the way, thanks to the new Webb telescope we will probably
soon have a more accurate figure on just how long that took, but we already
know it didn't take long, cosmically speaking.

>  QM is a continuous theory, it lacks this cut, which must be added in as
> an extra axiom.
>

It's not just quantum mechanics that has a  "solipsism is untrue" axiom,
every single conscious activity in everyday life, except in the philosophy
classroom, needs and makes use of this axiom.

 John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis


ca9

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