RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)
>”And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action
>more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour
>than pure active imitation or direct copying.”
I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation, without
luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately describe this
replication and sharing of signs/behavior.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 2:30 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; Stephen
Jarosek
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis
(Was semantic problem with the term)
Stephen - interesting outline.
I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean by a
'holon'.
And I agree with your notion of non-local 'entanglement' which I would refer
to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local.
And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action more
through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour than
pure active imitation or direct copying.
Edwina
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On Sat 01/04/17 3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:
List,
Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions
that I work with:
1) First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;
2) The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;
3) An atom or a molecule is a holon;
4) In the video Inner Life of the Cell <https://youtu.be/FzcTgrxMzZk> ,
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear,
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.
In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s
description of matter as “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things
that matter?
This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be”
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance
to firstness.
It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis:
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS
Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.
sj
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca
<javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ]
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca
<javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ; Jeffrey Brian
Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was
semantic problem with the term)
Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them,
the Six Relations of:
Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness
Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness
Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness
Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating
within a mode also of Firstness
Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness
Thirdness-as- Secondness
I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of
type etc.
I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this
list.
I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you see
Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)
Stephen - interesting outline. I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean by a 'holon'. And I agree with your notion of non-local 'entanglement' which I would refer to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local. And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 01/04/17 3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: List, Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions that I work with: 1) First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation; 2) The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a mind-body in order to define the things that matter; 3) An atom or a molecule is a holon; 4) In the video Inner Life of the Cell [1], what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level. In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s description of matter as “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things that matter? This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance to firstness. It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS [2] Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality. sj From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [3]] Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca [4]; Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term) Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, the Six Relations of: Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating within a mode also of Firstness Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness Thirdness-as- Secondness I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of type etc. I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this list. I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I think the triad is primal. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [5] On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [6] sent: Edwina, Jon S, List, With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations. As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple element
