Re: [Sks-devel] SKS should not accept or replay non-exportable certifications

2013-09-13 Thread John Clizbe
Phil Pennock wrote:
 On 2013-09-12 at 19:40 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
 While this seems like it is probably a fixable bug for someone who knows
 their way around the codebase, I forsee problems with synchronizing the
 pool, if some SKS keyservers start following the spec and others remain
 non-compliant.
 
 Any thoughts or suggestions on how to resolve this problem?
 
 A hack would be to have a filter on, which strips them by default, and
 clean=off disables that.  The data's out there, trying to pretend it's
 not would be problematic in many ways, so we might as well just ensure
 that normal retrievals don't pick up the sigs, and also of course block
 _new_ uploads of such sigs.

Actually, the hack here, as discussed over on gnupg-users, is trying to use
lsign to mark a key to keep it off of the keyservers. The problem is that
produces a key, that if the erroneous use is followed, that has no binding
self-sig on the UID. While a regular certification and a self-sig are both
signatures, the selfsig performs other important functions within OpenPGP.

There is nothing to fix here, either in SKS or in GnuPG. The thread on
GnuPG-users has the needed discussion.

-- 
John P. Clizbe  Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
 mailto:pgp-public-k...@gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?
A:An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels


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Re: [Sks-devel] SKS should not accept or replay non-exportable certifications

2013-09-13 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 9/13/2013 5:48 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
 RFC 4880 is explicit:
 
 Some implementations do not represent the interest of a single user 
 (for example, a key server).  Such implementations always trim local 
 certifications from any key they handle.

I don't see a MUST in there.  The language is not explicit without it.
Is it a case of they SHOULD always, they MAY always, or they MUST
always?  Without specification it's unclear.

Although I am inclined to think the current behavior is a bug, I'm also
inclined to think this is making a mountain out of a molehill.


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Re: [Sks-devel] SKS should not accept or replay non-exportable certifications

2013-09-13 Thread John Clizbe
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
 Someoneā„¢ (0x75D292D353ADACCD) made a non-exportable certification on
 your user ID John P. Clizbe jpcli...@keyservers.net
 (2048R/0x2313315C435BD034).  Someone else uploaded that key to a
 keyserver (ok, i admit it was me :P).  The keyserver network is
 currently propagating that non-exportable certification, in
 contravention of the OpenPGP standard.

Well, thank you for at least admitting your key vandalism.

And because you, err Someoneā„¢, made and uploaded a regular local signature
as opposed to a self-sig, it gets cleaned when I refresh my key. GPG won't
import your bogus sig -- I suppose it could be forced to do it, but I'm really
not interested in your self-created corner-case. To me, that's the system
operating as it should. There's LOTS of cruft out there on the keyservers and
in most cases, the clients handle it.

BTW: childish stunts such as this ARE NOT the way to sway or to win my
opinion. They are more likely to lead me to the opinion that the perpetrator
is overly prone to extreme histrionic outbursts.
(As some friends of mine would say, OH MARY! @_@ The drama-llama called. He
wants his hump back. or Drama Queen, take your Drama-meen.)

 There is nothing to fix here, either in SKS or in GnuPG. The thread on
 GnuPG-users has the needed discussion.

 I don't think this conclusion is warranted.

Then code the patch and quit the hissy-fit. Note -- honoring the
not-exportable flag on a self-sig breaks the standard in IMO a worse way,
UID(s) without binding sig(s).

I agree with Werner and Dave Shaw that you are wrong. If you are so convinced
you are correct, post, with _ALL_ the particulars not just those that support
your stance, to the IETF-OpenPGP list and get their opinion.

As some of the other posters on the GnuPG-Users thread pointed out, there are
other ways _within_ the standard to handle what you want to get accomplished.
Key vandalism and histrionics do not advance your cause.

-- 
John P. Clizbe  Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
 mailto:pgp-public-k...@gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?
A:An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels



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Re: [Sks-devel] SKS should not accept or replay non-exportable certifications

2013-09-13 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
On Fri, 2013-09-13 at 18:09 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: 
 Did anyone on this list expect the keyserver network to
 propagate non-exportable certifications?
Nah,... not really, IMHO it should be considered a bug, and ideally such
existing signatures should be removed if possible.

And I guess the intention of the RFC is rather clear (with or without
MUSTs)... implementations should not export such signatures... and SKS
counts IMO as an implementation.


Cheers,
Chris.


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