In a message dated 11/25/2003 1:23:08 PM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> I know that there have been cases which determined that its illegal to use
> an indiscriminate weapon (e.g., a shotgun tied to a door) to deter such
> entries, but what about a discriminate, automated, w
At 19:01 -0500 on 11/15/03, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2003 13:03:33 +0100
From: "Ralf-P. Weinmann" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Nicko van Someren <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Mac_crypto]
Tim May [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>On Nov 25, 2003, at 9:56 AM, Sunder wrote:
>> Um, last I checked, phone cameras have really shitty resolution,
>> usually
>> less than 320x200. Even so, you'd need MUCH higher resolution, say
>> 3-5Mpixels to be able to read text on a printout in a pic
On Nov 25, 2003, at 9:56 AM, Sunder wrote:
Um, last I checked, phone cameras have really shitty resolution,
usually
less than 320x200. Even so, you'd need MUCH higher resolution, say
3-5Mpixels to be able to read text on a printout in a picture.
Add focus and aiming issues, and this just won't
"Bedazzled" Log-in Method Whitepaper
Author: George Hara
(http://www.filematrix.xnet.ro/ideas/whitepapers/login.htm)
Introduction
Using strings of characters as passwords has always been a security issue
because they are hard to remember and can be stolen by key-loggers or
screen-text
Um, last I checked, phone cameras have really shitty resolution, usually
less than 320x200. Even so, you'd need MUCH higher resolution, say
3-5Mpixels to be able to read text on a printout in a picture.
Add focus and aiming issues, and this just won't work unless you carry a
good camera into the
We have recognized that, HN6[]under appropriate exigent circumstances,
strict compliance with the knock and announce requirement may be excused.
United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
no-knock entry justified where officers had reasonable suspicion that
entering dr
Hello
I was trying to find some old references I used to have concerning an idea men tioned
in sci.crypt way back.
It was Phil Zimmermann I think who mentioned something about a possibly new idea for
a new public key scheme. He called it "The cryptographic uses of polygonal sequences"
and is
At 01:04 PM 11/24/03 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
>Thats not how it works. The idea is that you make your choices on
>the machine, and when you lock them in, two things happen: They
>are electronically recorded in the device for the normal count, and
>also, a paper receipt is printed. The voter checks
At 8:04 PM -0800 11/24/03, Tim May wrote:
>I expect there may be some good solutions to this issue, but I haven't
>yet seen them discussed here or on other fora I run across. And since
>encouraging the democrats has never been a priority for me, I haven't
>spent much time worrying about how to impr
> Especially for domains, it's important to do some validation,
> though in the absence of widely-deployed DNSSEC, it's hard to
> do automatically.
DNSSEC is not happening, blame Randy Bush and the IESG for
refusing the working group consensus and imposing their own
idea that cannot be deployed.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JUNIOR WARDRICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-4494
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
September 24, 2003, Argued
November 20, 2003, Decided
OUTCOME: Defendant's convictions and sentence were affirmed.
As Judge Widener
At 04:20 PM 11/21/2003 -0800, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
We need to consider the technical workings of the do-not-spam list and the
requirements that we would like the FTC to meet.
.. [reasonable goals] ... [hashed-form lists instead of plaintext]...
5) Allow domain name owners to list their dom
> You might check out David Chaum's latest solution at
> http://www.vreceipt.com/, there are more details in the whitepaper:
> http://www.vreceipt.com/article.pdf
That is irrelevant. Whatever the solution is it must be understandable and
verifiable by the Standard high school dropout. Also, the tr
On Nov 24, 2003, at 3:52 PM, Bill Frantz wrote:
At 2:30 PM -0800 11/24/03, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 01:04 PM 11/24/03 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
Thats not how it works. The idea is that you make your choices on
the machine, and when you lock them in, two things happen: They
are electronically
At 05:45 PM 11/20/2003 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
At 4:40 PM -0800 11/20/03, Ralf-P. Weinmann wrote:
>... There should be a means to cache credentials after an initial
>trust relationship between communicating parties has been established.
Cache entries would be a way for someone who obtains the pho
At 2:30 PM -0800 11/24/03, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>At 01:04 PM 11/24/03 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
>>Thats not how it works. The idea is that you make your choices on
>>the machine, and when you lock them in, two things happen: They
>>are electronically recorded in the device for the normal coun
In a message dated 11/24/2003 11:12:38 PM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> I expect there may be some good solutions to this issue, but I haven't
> yet seen them discussed here or on other fora I run across.
Like what?
Regards, Matt-
On Nov 24, 2003, at 8:26 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 11/24/2003 11:12:38 PM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I expect there may be some good solutions to this issue, but I haven't
yet seen them discussed here or on other fora I run across.
What part of "I exp
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