But getting the bits from under the ocean somewhere back to
Fort Meade without being detected must be more interesting.
Can't they hire their own fiber in the cable, splice it, and feed the
preprocessed data in there?
It probably is true that the right wavelength laser will
penatrate
]
Subject: Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on
telecom cables
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2003 07:39:36 +0100 (CET)
But getting the bits from under the ocean somewhere back to
Fort Meade without being detected must be more interesting.
Can't they hire their own fiber in the cable
Time to time, usually when it appears on Cryptome, I skim through the
revisions of Wassenaar agreement lists of controlled technologies. It's a
neat way to keep myself up to date with what technologies are available on
the market and the approximate degree of security they offer.
One of the
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 02:38:56PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
Undersea, I've heard that NSA uses splices, and that NSA has its own sub
for that purpose. (And the company I used to work for did some work on
undersea NSA optical projects, so I tend to believe the rumors I heard
there.)
Well, I can only speak about OTDRs.
Maybe it could be possible to build a dedicated TDR system intended to be
connected to installed cablings, periodically test the cables by sending
pulses along them and watch what returns, compare the result with
long-term average, and report differences.
