On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 10:35:47PM +0200, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html/2009Sep/0043.html
>
> "It is extremely unlikely that Microsoft will ever implement support for
>
> - we do not believe it provides value for our customers"
>
i don't have an op
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:30:03PM +0800, Tobby Lau wrote:
> certificates till 2010
2010 is 3 months away.
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 10:24:22AM -0700, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> > yes, i was asking about anonymous ssh - the above url assumes "write cvs
> > access".
>
> Please file a bug with bugzilla.mozilla.org, product mozilla.org,
> component Server Operations (or perhaps Server Operations Security)
>
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 09:44:55AM -0700, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
>
>
> https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Mozilla_Source_Code_Via_CVS#CVS_Client_Settings
>
>
> These instructions don't show the use of ssh. I'm not sure that the
> combination of anonymous cvs and ssh is available at this time.
On Fri, Aug 07, 2009 at 04:29:40PM -0700, Nelson Bolyard wrote:
> OK, so do a cvs checkout over ssh instead.
how do i do this?
(i don't have a cvs account on .m.o)
?
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on step reduced md5 to 16 steps (of 64 steps using all of the same
input) this attack takes less than 20 minutes on a pc.
this makes the system 4 times smaller while keeping *the structure* of
the system.
examples at:
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Jun/0216.html
if someone give me an acc
On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 03:36:08PM +0200, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
>> if you send an encrypted message to
>> someone from whom you have never received a signed S/MIME message, you will
>> use weak encryption.
huh, is this an official statement?
if this is true this me
let's clarify what is CA from the user's point of view.
i *did* install certificates in a test scenario, so my self signed
openssl setup is without doubt CA to the users - no matter if it
verifies up to the root chain.
the point is i don't want certs in *my* keystore with CN="joro the terrorist"
On Tue, Jun 02, 2009 at 01:59:47AM +0300, Eddy Nigg wrote:
> On 04/07/2009 06:37 AM, Ian Hickson:
>> I have now specified the element in HTML5.
>>
>> http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/#the-keygen-element
>>
>> I would appreciate review by people who know what this stuff means,
On Fri, May 29, 2009 at 01:09:13PM +0530, tito wrote:
> plz see my command here..
> C:\OpenSSL\bin>openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -verbose -days 180 -notext
> > -batch -spkac spak1.txt -out spaksign.pem -passin pass:mypass
> > Using configuration from openssl.cnf
> > error loading the config file '
On Fri, May 29, 2009 at 10:21:16AM +0530, tito wrote:
> how to sign the CRMF request key i get in openssl ?
> if i am using keygen tag, i think it gives SPKAC format..can we sign SPKAC
> using openssl ?
> i am able to generate CRMF and SPKAC..but doesnt know how to sign those in
> openssl.please h
On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 10:13:16AM -0700, Robert Relyea wrote:
>>
> So the question is, will a final solution from your equations give us
> a
> solution relevant to the real MD-5.
>>
i am ready to bet up to 2 beers that an oracle that solves the final
equations will give a *real* preimage at
On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 10:42:38AM -0700, Robert Relyea wrote:
> So to understand correctly, MD-5 is implemented in a series of
> operations module 2^32, so you can treat the whole thing as a GF(2^n)
> ring. I believe this is a ring (2 doesn't have a multiplicative
> inverse), not a field (th
On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 08:16:39AM -0400, Subrata Mazumdar wrote:
> Hi,
> I am not able generate key using window.crypto.generateCRMFRequest()
check:
https://developer.mozilla.org/En/JavaScript_crypto/GenerateCRMFRequest
this works for me:
m=crypto.generateCRMFRequest("CN=vvv", "regToken", null
On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 12:02:04PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> sage program is available at:
> ...
development moved to:
http://www.guninski.com/mds5.sage
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spent some time on this.
i tried algebraic preimage attack on md5 - working in $GF(2)[x0 .. x_i]$ and
using groebner basis with arguments that avoid crashes.
to my surprise i got unexpected correct *partial* results that pass the
insanity check.
example of what the proggie finds.
the final sta
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