> > Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
> >
> > "Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate
> > the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV ("asset
> > voting", I might call it "commodity voting": your vote is a
> > "commodity" that you transfer
Dear folks,
there is another assumption in Arrow's theorem which people almost
always forget: Determinism. Methods which use some amount of chance can
easily meet all his other criteria, the most trivial example of this
being again Random Ballot (i.e. pick a ballot uniformly at random and
copy its
On Nov 16, 2009, at 4:58 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
> The theorem states (from wiki) that there is no method which has the
> following properties:
>
>* If every voter prefers X over Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
>* If every voter prefers X over Y, then adding Z to the slate
> won't chang
Strictly speaking I don't think Range is an election method according
to Arrow, because you can't determine the winner from the orderings.
It would be hard to make statements about the effect of introducing
candidate Z when you don't have an assumption about what the outcome is
based on.
You can
The theorem states (from wiki) that there is no method which has the
following properties:
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then adding Z to the slate
won't change the group's preference of X over Y.
* There is no di
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't have his proof in front of me (I'm on the road), but I'm pretty sure
that it assumes ordinal ranking.
It seems fairly obvious that the theorem also holds for ratings, because
ratings can be projected onto rankings without affecting any of Arrow's
criteria. To
On Nov 16, 2009, at 2:15 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
> Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs
>> cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
>> preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
> Arrow's
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal
(vs cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
Arrow's Theorem seems like a red herring in the context of the cardina
followed suit. That exclusion was not original with
Arrow.
>
> > From: jlund...@pobox.com
> > Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 11:43:10 -0600
> > To: an...@cs.cornell.edu
> > CC: election-meth...@electorama.com
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations o
v 2009 11:43:10 -0600
> To: an...@cs.cornell.edu
> CC: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval
> andrange voting?
>
> On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
>
> > Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote
On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> Notice that the requirement of Arrow that "social preferences be insensitive
>> to variations in the intensity of preferences" was preposterous. Arrow
>> apparently insisted on this because he believed that it was
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Notice that the requirement of Arrow that "social preferences be
insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences" was
preposterous. Arrow apparently insisted on this because he believed
that it was impossible to come up with any objective measure of
prefere
At 12:22 PM 11/8/2009, Terry Bouricius wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral paper by
James Green-Armytage ("Strategic voting and Strategic Nomination:
Comparing seven election methods"). He fou
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Matthew Welland wrote:
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach "Condorcet"
ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in on
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
> Dear Matthew,
>
> you wrote:
> > Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach "Condorcet" ideals.
> >
> >1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
> > how they work in one or two sentences.
>
> Well, here's
This method is also quite hand countable (unlike many other Condorcet
methods). That was certainly an important feature in those days :-).
It has some randomness in the results (when no Condorcet winner exists).
Here's another one. Elect the candidate that wins all others in
pairwise compar
Dear Robert,
you wrote:
> Round Robin tournament, Ranked Ballot: The contestant who wins in a
> single match is the candidate who is preferred over the other in more
> ballots. The candidate who is elected to office is the contestant who
> loses to no one in the round robin tournament.
>
> that
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
> Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach "Condorcet" ideals.
>
>1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
> how they work in one or two sentences.
Well, here's a very simple "Condorcet" system which can easily be
explained in
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:18 AM, robert bristow-johnson
wrote:
> i will say this: even though it is prohibited in the present IRV that
> Burlington VT has, there is no reason that ties should not be allowed in any
> ranked ballot.
It is unclear how this should work with IRV.
My personal preferen
On Nov 10, 2009, at 6:48 AM, Matthew Welland wrote:
Thanks all for the discussion and pointers. I still can't concretely
conclude anything yet but here are some rambling and random thoughts
based on what was said and my prior experiences.
Plurality
Leads to two lowest common denominator par
On Nov 9, 2009, at 11:48 PM, Matthew Welland wrote:
Approval
Does not meet the desire of some to be able to differentiate
between "I like", "I like a lot" etc. (note: this seems like
perfectionism to me. Large numbers of voters and opinions all over
the bell curve should make individual e
Thanks all for the discussion and pointers. I still can't concretely
conclude anything yet but here are some rambling and random thoughts based
on what was said and my prior experiences.
Plurality
Leads to two lowest common denominator parties which are not accountable to
the voters. This concl
On Nov 8, 2009, at 8:43 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius > wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis
of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral
paper by
James Green-Armytage ("Strategic voting and St
Terry and Matthew,
Terry Bouricius wrote:
> I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
> Tideman's recent book "Collective Decisions and Voting" has an analysis of
> vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
> voting method that has ever b
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius
wrote:
> A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis of
> strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral paper by
> James Green-Armytage ("Strategic voting and Strategic Nomination:
> Comparing seven election m
s of manipulability.
http://econ.ucsb.edu/graduate/PhDResearch/electionstrategy10b.pdf
Terry Bouricius
- Original Message -
From: "Matthew Welland"
To: "Election Methods Mailing List"
Sent: Saturday, November 07, 2009 3:12 PM
Subject: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on li
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