On 10/26/2018 11:18 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
>> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>>> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
>>> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
>>> There is no n
On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
>> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
>> There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the S
On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
> There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the STIBP code
> when enhanced IBRS is used.
>
> Sign
On Wed, 17 Oct 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
on a hyperthread sibling
> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
That's technically wrong. It still can launch an attack, but the attack
wont work
With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the STIBP code
when enhanced IBRS is used.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.
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