On 8/14/16 6:46 AM, Steve Atkins wrote:
> If there were a protocol that said "if you receive mail signed by this
> domain / this key and the recipient isn't in the To: or Cc: field,
> block it", or some similar protocol that signed the envelope
> recipient, that would pretty much eliminate DKIM
>If there were a protocol that said "if you receive mail signed by this domain
>/ this key and the recipient isn't in
>the To: or Cc: field, block it", or some similar protocol that signed the
>envelope recipient, that would pretty much
>eliminate DKIM replay as a threat in some cases.
It
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 7:12 PM, Tim Starr wrote:
> The only benefit I can see from sending the exact same message from
> somewhere else would be to drive recipients to the same payload link, which
> suggests another possible way to stop this from paying off after detection: