Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
Let us put it this way. There might be several simultaneous leaks of this same 
private asn because multiple country netblocks are being announced.  Or this is 
actually malicious.

I have no way to tell without checking what abuse is coming from there. I'm 
sure RFG is researching that part of it, and won't ask him about it till he's 
ready to disclose.

On 15/04/19, 10:02 AM, "anti-abuse-wg on behalf of ac" 
 wrote:

On Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:40:35 +0530
Suresh Ramasubramanian  wrote:
> On 15/04/19, 9:26 AM, "anti-abuse-wg on behalf of ac"
>  wrote: 
> >Sorry for top posting, but I fail to see how any of this is
> > abuse related?  
> 
> Given that it is RFG raising this, I think it is a pretty safe bet
> that this ASN is associated with some abusive activity that he has
> seen. 
> 
Okay, but this is not yet clear? pvt asn is leaked often (and
sometimes voluminous) - so is common/frequent and in itself means
nothing, if this is that, - but as this affects that network, there is
no abuse? or I am missing something?










Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
On 15/04/19, 9:26 AM, "anti-abuse-wg on behalf of ac" 
 wrote:
  
>Sorry for top posting, but I fail to see how any of this is abuse related?

Given that it is RFG raising this, I think it is a pretty safe bet that this 
ASN is associated with some abusive activity that he has seen. 





Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread ac



Sorry for top posting, but I fail to see how any of this is abuse related?


On Mon, 15 Apr 2019 04:39:10 +0100
"Sascha Luck [ml]"  wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 06:30:50PM -0700, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> >Even if I accept that one of these explanation is accurate and
> >correct, I am still left with one question:  Who is "they" in this
> >context?  
> 
> If it's a leaked internal private ASN, the next ASN upstream in
> the path should be the correct one. So, in essence, they are
> doing it to themselves.
> 
> It could also actually be a private peering that was never
> supposed to be visible in the DFZ. IIRC it is common practice to
> use private ASNs for this. In which case it is the peer leaking
> it.
> 
> >P.S.  There are three reasons why I am not prepared to believe that
> >this is all just some "fat fingered" or merely incompetent mistake.
> >The first is the number of different national flags I am seeing on
> >this page:
> >
> >https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes
> >
> >That doesn't look much like an "internal network" to me!  
> 
> It just means that a lot of networks leak private ASNs. Why does
> that surprise you?
> 
> >But we can debate these points later on.  First I'd like to know who
> >"they" is.  If somebody can figure out who "they" is in this
> >context, then someone, perhaps even me, can shoot a polite and
> >friendly inquiry via email to whatever "they" are actually doing
> >this stuff, asking them what's up and how come they thought that it
> >was a Good Idea to use a reserved ASN, and whether or not "they"
> >plan to continue doing so.  
> 
> "They" are the admins of the advertised networks (if this *is*
> failure-to-remove-private-ASNs) 
> 
> >But right now I can't even do that, because I have no idea who is
> >actually responsible for any of this.  If you do, then please do
> >enlighten me.  
> 
> Probably the actual owners of the advertised prefixes.
> 
> rgds,
> SL
> 




Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Sascha Luck [ml]

On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 06:30:50PM -0700, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:

Even if I accept that one of these explanation is accurate and correct,
I am still left with one question:  Who is "they" in this context?


If it's a leaked internal private ASN, the next ASN upstream in
the path should be the correct one. So, in essence, they are
doing it to themselves.

It could also actually be a private peering that was never
supposed to be visible in the DFZ. IIRC it is common practice to
use private ASNs for this. In which case it is the peer leaking
it.


P.S.  There are three reasons why I am not prepared to believe that this
is all just some "fat fingered" or merely incompetent mistake.  The first
is the number of different national flags I am seeing on this page:

https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes

That doesn't look much like an "internal network" to me!


It just means that a lot of networks leak private ASNs. Why does
that surprise you?


But we can debate these points later on.  First I'd like to know who "they"
is.  If somebody can figure out who "they" is in this context, then someone,
perhaps even me, can shoot a polite and friendly inquiry via email to
whatever "they" are actually doing this stuff, asking them what's up
and how come they thought that it was a Good Idea to use a reserved ASN,
and whether or not "they" plan to continue doing so.


"They" are the admins of the advertised networks (if this *is*
failure-to-remove-private-ASNs) 


But right now I can't even do that, because I have no idea who is actually
responsible for any of this.  If you do, then please do enlighten me.


Probably the actual owners of the advertised prefixes.

rgds,
SL



Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ronald F. Guilmette


In message , 
Richard Clayton  wrote:

>Hurricane Electric is seeing announcements from other ASs some of which
>have AS65000 declared to be origin of the prefix

I understand.  The announcements are, in effect, mislabled.

>Best practice is to remove internal use AS's from announcements -- not
>much bad happens if you don't (well, you might not get as much
>reachability if other folk are also using that reserved AS within their
>networks...)

Is anybody anywhere filtering out this kind of malarkey?

>>The only other thing I feel compelled to say, or ask right now, is just
>>this:   Who should I be notifying if there is an issue with this ASN?
>
>the NOC for the people making the incorrect announcement

Yes.  And can you tell me who that is please?

I'm asking for a bit of help here, because I'm out of my depth.  But
judging from the short bio sketch of you that I just now read on your
personal web page, this would seem to be right up your alley.


Regards,
rfg



Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ronald F. Guilmette


In message <5c95b9d5-58b4-4a86-8052-e928f1d8a...@incibe.es>, 
=?utf-8?B?w4FuZ2VsIEdvbnrDoWxleiBCZXJkYXNjbw==?=  
wrote:

>Well, someone is announcing those prefixes as linked to AS65000...

Yes.

Who?




Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ronald F. Guilmette


In message <20190415010759.ga51...@cilantro.c4inet.net>, 
"Sascha Luck [ml]"  wrote:

>Most likely this is either used in error as an advertising ASN by
>someone who doesn't know what they are doing (like the RFC1918
>space that crops up in the DFZ now and again) or it's used
>internally in their networks and they have omitted to configure
>their routers to strip private ASNs from their advertisements
>(yes, I've forgotten this myself on occasion).

OK, so let's just say, for the sake of argument, that I believe that
one or the other of these explanations is the "correct" one.  (I don't,
actually, but we can ignore that for the moment.)

Even if I accept that one of these explanation is accurate and correct,
I am still left with one question:  Who is "they" in this context?


Regards,
rfg


P.S.  There are three reasons why I am not prepared to believe that this
is all just some "fat fingered" or merely incompetent mistake.  The first
is the number of different national flags I am seeing on this page:

https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes

That doesn't look much like an "internal network" to me!

The second is the evident activity spikes that I am seeing on this page:

https://stat.ripe.net/AS65000#tabId=routing

The third reason is one that I am not prepared to go into right now.  Let's
just say that I didn't find this ASN totally by accident.

But we can debate these points later on.  First I'd like to know who "they"
is.  If somebody can figure out who "they" is in this context, then someone,
perhaps even me, can shoot a polite and friendly inquiry via email to
whatever "they" are actually doing this stuff, asking them what's up
and how come they thought that it was a Good Idea to use a reserved ASN,
and whether or not "they" plan to continue doing so.

But right now I can't even do that, because I have no idea who is actually
responsible for any of this.  If you do, then please do enlighten me.




Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Richard Clayton
In message <44806.1555289...@segfault.tristatelogic.com>, Ronald F.
Guilmette  writes

>Here is what I am hoping some actual expert can explain to me:
>
>https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_asinfo
>https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes
>https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes6
>https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers
>https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers6
>
>I will save all further comment until someone offers me some kind of an
>explanation of this apparently strange stuff.  For now, I will only add
>that whereas bgp.he.net is showing there as being a total of 66 IPv4
>prefixes announced by this (reserved) ASN

Hurricane Electric is seeing announcements from other ASs some of which
have AS65000 declared to be origin of the prefix

Which may sound the same as what you said, but isn't

>I am unable to fathom how and why a reserved ASN should be
>announcing -anything- at -any- place or point where anybody on the outside
>can see it.

Best practice is to remove internal use AS's from announcements -- not
much bad happens if you don't (well, you might not get as much
reachability if other folk are also using that reserved AS within their
networks...)

>The only other thing I feel compelled to say, or ask right now, is just
>this:   Who should I be notifying if there is an issue with this ASN?

the NOC for the people making the incorrect announcement -- if there is
a question as to how valid the rest of the path might be, then that may
take you a little while to establish (and you may get lied to when you
make enquiries)

BTW: great though HE's portal is, you really should be picking apart the
mass of data held by RIPE if you want to form a view as to might be
doing bad things (that's not the only place you need to look, but it's a
good start and in this case the number of detectors seeing this origin
and the timeline puts it rather more in perspective)

-- 
richard   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature


Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ángel González Berdasco
Well, someone is announcing those prefixes as linked to AS65000. If he itself 
was using AS65000 internally with those prefixes, and that leaked to their 
public interface, it would be a false positive, but lacking some agreement 
between the receiver and their peer involving AS65000, imho those entries were 
used internally by some party, which then inadvertently shared them to peers 
that didn't filter it, etc. With the end result that such entries could made 
these prefixes unreachable.

Here, one side will be the owners of those ip ranges, but there's not an owner 
of the AS as such. Who should be complaining that they are 'advettising their 
AS' incorrectly?

What if a prefix was 10.0.0.0/8 ? Would IANA need to state that it didn't allow 
AS x to advertise a private range? Maybe that step should be skipped for  
reserved ranges.

Most likely, this case is a self-inflicted damage, though.

Best regards






Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ronald F. Guilmette


Apologies for following up on myself, but I did just ant to mention
that in addition to the very limited "snapshots" of thw routes being
announced by AS65000 that can be obtained from bgp.he.net, I am
also looking at this page:

https://stat.ripe.net/AS65000#tabId=routing

which shows that in the quite recent past (this month) AS65000 has had
several rather dramatic spikes in BGP update activity amounting to
hundreds of routes announced, and then, almost as quickly, withdrawn.

Am I the only person who thinks this might be even a bit noteworthy?


Regards,
rfg



Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Sascha Luck [ml]

On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 05:43:55PM -0700, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:


https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_asinfo
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes6
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers6

The only other thing I feel compelled to say, or ask right now, is just
this:   Who should I be notifying if there is an issue with this ASN?
It has no WHOIS reords, and thus, no contacts... no email addresses, no
phone numbers, no snail-mail addresses.  Nothing...

... and yet this thing has, according to bgp.he.net, no fewer than 27 IPv4
peers and another 2 for IPv6 only!

I await an explanation from some actual expert.  For myself, I can only
say that none of this makes a damn bit of sense to me.  But I am willing
and eager to be educated.


Most likely this is either used in error as an advertising ASN by
someone who doesn't know what they are doing (like the RFC1918
space that crops up in the DFZ now and again) or it's used
internally in their networks and they have omitted to configure
their routers to strip private ASNs from their advertisements
(yes, I've forgotten this myself on occasion).

rgds,
SL



[anti-abuse-wg] Mysteries of the Internet: AS65000

2019-04-14 Thread Ronald F. Guilmette


As I believe I have made abundantly clear, I am in favor of the proposal
2019-03, and more generally, I am supportive of the notion that order
is preferable to chaos, particularly when it comes to routing on the
Internet.  The reasons for this preference of mine are so manifest that
they do not even warrant recitation here.

My hope is that I have made Carlos and Jordi aware, via my postings
here, of at least some of the particular points on which we may differ,
and which I would like to see changed in the next draft of 2019-03.

There is one important point of disagreement on which I have not yet
spoken however, and that is Carlos' belief, which may or may not be
shared also by Jordi, that I personally qualify as an "expert" (for
purposes of 2019-03) simply because I have, in some small number of
instances, become aware of what have appeared to be quite deliberate
and malevolent hijackings.

I need to state for the record that this is just wrong.  I am NOT an
"expert" with regard to Internet routing, either legitimate or otherwise.
I do not run a network.  Nor have I ever done so, with the only exception
being my own tiny little network here at home .  I do not own any
equipment that speaks BGP, nor have I ever done so.  I am just a simple
end-luser who has been mad as hell about spammers for about the past 20
years, and who has simply educated himself, as best as he could, to
follow clues and to try to figure how what the spammers are doing and
how they are doing it.  In this process, I have been required to learn
a small bit about routing along the way, but that does not in any sense
qualify me as an "expert" in the area of Internet routing.

In fact, there are and have been, up to and including the present day,
things that I see happening on the Internet that make absolutely no sense
to me whatsoever, and that I cannot for the life of me explain.  I have
just seen one such thing today, and I would like to ask those on this list
who actually -are- qualified experts to please explain it to me, because
all I see here is a mystery wrapped inside of a riddle and stuffed inside
of an enigma.  Here is what I am hoping some actual expert can explain to me:

https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_asinfo
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_prefixes6
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers
https://bgp.he.net/AS65000#_peers6

I will save all further comment until someone offers me some kind of an
explanation of this apparently strange stuff.  For now, I will only add
that whereas bgp.he.net is showing there as being a total of 66 IPv4
prefixes announced by this (reserved) ASN, the data I am getting from
RIPEstat is indicating a much smaller number of IPv4 announcements (35).
Either way, I am unable to fathom how and why a reserved ASN should be
announcing -anything- at -any- place or point where anybody on the outside
can see it.  (And at least some of those blocks -can- be successfully
tracerout'd to from where I am sitting here in California, so this is by
no means a merely local phenomenon.)

The only other thing I feel compelled to say, or ask right now, is just
this:   Who should I be notifying if there is an issue with this ASN?
It has no WHOIS reords, and thus, no contacts... no email addresses, no
phone numbers, no snail-mail addresses.  Nothing...

... and yet this thing has, according to bgp.he.net, no fewer than 27 IPv4
peers and another 2 for IPv6 only!

I await an explanation from some actual expert.  For myself, I can only
say that none of this makes a damn bit of sense to me.  But I am willing
and eager to be educated.


Regards,
rfg


P.S.  If I have seems self-effacing about the limits of my knowledge above,
that was entirely intentional and deliberate.  Upon looking at this case
of AS65000, I was convinced rather quickly that something is horribly wrong
here.  But trying to figure out who should be held accountable for this mess
is, I confess, utterly beyond me.