Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg

Greetings,

One can always go to the local authorities, then jurisdiction and how the local 
justice/court system works comes into play.

The RIRs have an authoritative view about who owns what, and they share it with 
everyone, so to me that's the simplest way.

Regards,
Carlos



On Friday, 19 January 2024 at 15:06, Tomás Leite de Castro via anti-abuse-wg 
 wrote:


> Hello Carlos,
> 
> > Even if who signs it can't hold what they claim with the RIRs' trust anchors
> 
> 
> If you believe this is true, then you can forward a claim to the local 
> authorities as signing a Fake LOA is a criminal offense which could end in 
> imprisonment.
> 
> Best Regards,
> 
> 
> Tomás
> 


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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Tomás Leite de Castro via anti-abuse-wg
Hello Carlos,

> Even if who signs it can't hold what they claim with the RIRs' trust anchors

If you believe this is true, then you can forward a claim to the local 
authorities as signing a Fake LOA is a criminal offense which could end in 
imprisonment. 

Best Regards,


Tomás

> On 19 Jan 2024, at 08:52, Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, 19 January 2024 at 08:36, Gert Doering  wrote:
> 
>> 
>> It's a good writeup to enlighten the unenlighted, but hardly a "novel
>> approach" ("introduces the idea...") - this is how we've run our network
>> for the last 20 years, or so. IRR filters based on RIPE route: objects,
>> and later on ROA info.
>> 
>> Paper never played any role in authorizing route announcements here (not
>> even fax).
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Great for you and the networks you manage, unfortunately (in the ~75k 
> networks/autonomous systems) there is still people around the world that 
> accept and rely on simple signed papers by someone. Even if who signs it 
> can't hold what they claim with the RIRs' trust anchors... ;-) 
> 
> ps: unfortunately i have not enabled IPv6 on something today (did my part 
> long ago...), but last week i still received a LoA :-) so yes, some people 
> are still pushing papers.
> 
> Cheers,
> Carlos
> 
> 
>> Gert Doering
>> -- NetMaster
>> --
>> have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?
>> 
>> SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer
>> Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann
>> D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen)
>> Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279
> 
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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg


Greetings,

On Friday, 19 January 2024 at 11:40, Richard Clayton  
wrote:

> A key point that the article misses is that yes, LOAs can (and have
> been) forged. 

Yes, that didn't reach the final version in an explicit way... :-)



> However forging them is a criminal act (in the US it will
> be charged under "wirefraud" statutes) -- and numerous of the criminal
> proceedings which have been undertaken for theft of IP resources have
> used the wirefraud statutes.

Luckly! :-)

 
> Yes, stealing a private key (or guessing a password to it) and then
> creating cryptographic signed objects is also likely to be criminal but
> it may be somewhat harder for courts to understand (and for the matter
> for prosecutors to identify suitable caselaw that makes the current > case
> somewhat more open and shut).

I completely agree. And there is a fairly recent & notorious case...

 
> [[ Also, I have been told that some forgeries are laughably inept,
> whereas laughably weak passwords are a little harder to spot ]]

Nonetheless, the key idea is that we should be turning to "cryptographic 
trust", instead of papers (forged or not).


Best Regards,
Carlos


 
> --
> richard Richard Clayton
> 
> Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
> Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
> --
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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Richard Clayton
In message , Carlos
Friaças via anti-abuse-wg  writes

>Great for you and the networks you manage, unfortunately (in the ~75k 
>networks/autonomous systems) there is still people around the world that 
>accept 
>and rely on simple signed papers by someone. Even if who signs it can't hold 
>what they claim with the RIRs' trust anchors... ;-) 

A key point that the article misses is that yes, LOAs can (and have
been) forged. However forging them is a criminal act (in the US it will
be charged under "wirefraud" statutes) -- and numerous of the criminal
proceedings which have been undertaken for theft of IP resources have
used the wirefraud statutes.

Yes, stealing a private key (or guessing a password to it) and then
creating cryptographic signed objects is also likely to be criminal but
it may be somewhat harder for courts to understand (and for the matter
for prosecutors to identify suitable caselaw that makes the current case
somewhat more open and shut).

[[ Also, I have been told that some forgeries are laughably inept,
whereas laughably weak passwords are a little harder to spot ]]

-- 
richard   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755


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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg


On Friday, 19 January 2024 at 08:36, Gert Doering  wrote:

> 
> It's a good writeup to enlighten the unenlighted, but hardly a "novel
> approach" ("introduces the idea...") - this is how we've run our network
> for the last 20 years, or so. IRR filters based on RIPE route: objects,
> and later on ROA info.
> 
> Paper never played any role in authorizing route announcements here (not
> even fax).

Hi,

Great for you and the networks you manage, unfortunately (in the ~75k 
networks/autonomous systems) there is still people around the world that accept 
and rely on simple signed papers by someone. Even if who signs it can't hold 
what they claim with the RIRs' trust anchors... ;-) 

ps: unfortunately i have not enabled IPv6 on something today (did my part long 
ago...), but last week i still received a LoA :-) so yes, some people are still 
pushing papers.

Cheers,
Carlos

 
> Gert Doering
> -- NetMaster
> --
> have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?
> 
> SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer
> Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann
> D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen)
> Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Gert Doering
Hi,

On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at 08:24:32AM +, Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg 
wrote:
> FYI
> 
> https://www.first.org/blog/20231222-Is-the-LoA-DoA-for-Routing
> 
> This article introduces the idea that instead of using LoAs for routing 
> purposes, people should instead rely on ROAs and ROV.

It's a good writeup to enlighten the unenlighted, but hardly a "novel
approach" ("introduces the idea...") - this is how we've run our network
for the last 20 years, or so.  IRR filters based on RIPE route: objects,
and later on ROA info.

Paper never played any role in authorizing route announcements here (not
even fax).

Gert Doering
-- NetMaster
-- 
have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?

SpaceNet AG  Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer
Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann
D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen)
Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279


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[anti-abuse-wg] Is the LoA DoA for Routing? - article at FIRST blog

2024-01-19 Thread Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg
FYI

https://www.first.org/blog/20231222-Is-the-LoA-DoA-for-Routing

This article introduces the idea that instead of using LoAs for routing 
purposes, people should instead rely on ROAs and ROV.

Best Regards,
Carlos

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