Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
On Fri, Apr 26, 2002 at 05:15:33PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote: > I apply the same logic to government. If I believe, as I do, that people > often overestimate the value they get from government, I should fix that if > I can by persuasion. What if you can't fix it by persuasion and everyone becomes worse off because of your advice? Or what if you do manage to persuade everyone, and then they blame you for giving them what they thought they wanted? > Wei asks about the case of advising slave owners about productivity > improvements. So how large are any negative externalities on the slaves > from improving productivity, versus benefits to both owners and slaves? > Without any particular reason to expect them to be enormous, I guess I'd > give the advice. The negative externality is not necessarily all on the current slaves. By increasing the productivity of slaves, you've made it profitable to spend more resources on capturing people into slavery, which obviously has huge negative externalities. BTW, how do you make interpersonal comparisons of expected (rather than actual) benefits and costs, when people do not have common priors or the same capacity for logical reasoning? What if some (crazy) person believes that having a smaller government is worth a quadrillion dollars? How would that balance out with the (slightly less crazy) people who believe that a bigger government is a net benefit?
more probability than econ
Howdy, Sorry about this one not being economics proper, but I hope some will get a kick out of it anyway. It's about fairness of Euro coins, with a digression on spinning, tilting, and tossing pennies. It's in the latest issue of chance news: www.dartmouth.edu/~chance/chance_news/current_news/current.html It's the first article after the Forsooth quotes. I hope you enjoy it! -jsh __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Health - your guide to health and wellness http://health.yahoo.com
Re: Basketball Puzzle
So the agent story seems the most plausible to Armchairs, then? I tend to agree. Another point I saw mentioned on this topic (not on this list) was that agents' primary selling point is endorsements. They hold that as a carrot, against the risk that a low-profile agent won't be able to persuade Nike to pay an athlete $10 million to wear their new shoes. However, only a tiny minority of players earn significant endorsement income -- one would think that the majority made up of role players and bench warmers would do its utmost to minimize agents' role in the decision-making of the players' union. Another puzzle is that the players' union has very little threat power in negotiations, since the league has not yet recovered from the enormous damage done by the lockout-abbreviated season a few years back. The league would laugh at any new lockout threat, since the vast majority of players would lose hard in such a scenario. Therefore, if this issue matters so much, the league has the advantage. On the other hand, maybe the money at stake just isn't enough for either side's bureaucratic inertia to overcome -- no one wants to spend political capital on what might well be Pareto optimal to the current situation (if you don't count the high school players). -ASG
Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
I wrote: >If the reason that government gets bigger as taxes become more efficient >is that most people have a downward-sloping demand for government, and >so "buy" more of it as the price gets lower, then it seems paternalistic >of me to keep the price artificially high, just because my demand is less. >I'd like to have a reputation as a neutral economic advisor, who will >advise people on how to get what they want, even if what they want isn't >what I would prefer them to want. Three people responded. Chris Coyne wrote: >I would argue that you cannot be a neutral economic advisor. As an >economist you are a technician who explains the consequences of various >actions. But you cannot advise the best route to achieve certain ends >without committing yourself to those ends. An economist hired to increase >attendance at sporting events implicity commits himself to the ethical >valuation that increasing attendance is good. It does not relieve the >economist of the responsibility for having made ethical judgements to say >that he has borrowed them from others. Therefore, by increasing >government efficiency you are implicity agreeing to the ends (and likewise >in working to increase sports attendance). Kevin D. Sachs wrote: >Isn't government different from sports (although sports leagues are >cartels, so...)? As governments grow, the "market" for wealth transfers and >hence, rent seeking grow. You can make government internally more >operationally efficient, but if that leads to government growth and >therefore growth in inefficient rent seeking, then allocative efficiency >suffers. As economists, aren't we interested in allocative efficiency >gains? Wei Dai wrote: >Government can get bigger if whoever is in control of the government >forces the rest of the population to pay for it. Even if a majority of >people want bigger government, the losses suffered by the minority can >more than make up for the gains of the majority. ... >Why would you want a reputation for being willing to advise people even >when it's against your self interest, or your analysis of social welfare, >to do so? I mean, I can see why you would want a reputation for always >providing honest advice when you agree to do it, but why would you want to >be known for never turning down a request for advice? >What if a slave owner asked you how to improve the productivity of his >slaves? Would you answer him? As an professional advisor hopeful, I want to pick a simple neutral-but-moral policy about how I give advice and stick to it. I'm not satisfied with just saying things that are true - I also don't want people to fear that I will shut up whenever speaking might hurt some group I favor over others. And the more exceptions and complications my policy has, the harder it is for others to monitor it and check whether I'm following it. So it must be simple. Among the simple neutral-but-moral policies about advice, I've chosen this. On average I think it good and moral to give people more of what they think they want, even when I think they are mistaken about what they want, and even when there are modest, but not enormous, negative externalities from them getting what they want. So even if I believed there were modest negative externalities from smoking, and that people were mistaken in thinking the enjoyment was worth the health risk, I would still give advice about how to lower the cost of cigarettes. Persuasion is the best way to try to overcome their mistakes, and if externalities are modest then the perceived gain to the people who want it should outweigh the harm to others. I apply the same logic to government. If I believe, as I do, that people often overestimate the value they get from government, I should fix that if I can by persuasion. So the issue here comes down to: how large are the net marginal externalities from most people choosing more government when it gets cheaper? The perceived harm within the people who favor more government must be less than the benefit, or they wouldn't favor it. So we're left with estimating how many people don't favor more government, and their perceived harm. And I estimate this group and its harm is too small to tip the balance. Wei asks about the case of advising slave owners about productivity improvements. So how large are any negative externalities on the slaves from improving productivity, versus benefits to both owners and slaves? Without any particular reason to expect them to be enormous, I guess I'd give the advice. Btw, if people could be persuaded, this is the form of government I'd advise them to choose: http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.html Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
At 09:12 AM 4/26/2002 -0400, you wrote: But as an economist, I should >try to figure out how to make sports markets more efficient, rather than >trying to sabotage them so more people will do things I prefer. Isn't government different from sports (although sports leagues are cartels, so...)? As governments grow, the "market" for wealth transfers and hence, rent seeking grow. You can make government internally more operationally efficient, but if that leads to government growth and therefore growth in inefficient rent seeking, then allocative efficiency suffers. As economists, aren't we interested in allocative efficiency gains? Kevin D. Sachs, Ph.D. Assistant Professor phone: 513.556.7198 University of Cincinnatifax: 513.556.4891 Department of Accounting/IS email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 302 Lindner Hall, P.O.Box 210211 Cincinnati, OH 45221-0211
Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
On Fri, Apr 26, 2002 at 09:12:53AM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote: > If the reason that government gets bigger as taxes become more efficient > is that most people have a downward-sloping demand for government, and > so "buy" more of it as the price gets lower, then it seems paternalistic > of me to keep the price artificially high, just because my demand is less. Government can get bigger if whoever is in control of the government forces the rest of the population to pay for it. Even if a majority of people want bigger government, the losses suffered by the minority can more than make up for the gains of the majority. > I'd like to have a reputation as a neutral economic advisor, who will > advise people on how to get what they want, even if what they want isn't > what I would prefer them to want. Why would you want a reputation for being willing to advise people even when it's against your self interest, or your analysis of social welfare, to do so? I mean, I can see why you would want a reputation for always providing honest advice when you agree to do it, but why would you want to be known for never turning down a request for advice? What if a slave owner asked you how to improve the productivity of his slaves? Would you answer him? > >Also, labor supply curves tend to bend backwards at high incomes, so > >perhaps we should subsidize instead of tax the non-work time of > >high-income people? > > I don't follow this argument. It was more of a question than an argument, but I figured out that the answer is no.
Re: open source
>Theories generated from within the
>F/OSS community (e.g., Eric Raymond's The Cathedral and the Bazaar) have
>focused instead on the uniqueness of hacker culture.
I don't think that is an accurate description of Eric Raymond's work.
His description of the the norms of the Open Source movement points
out how they parallel the treatment of real property in the common
law (see "Homesteading the Noosphere," webbed on his site). In
another piece ("The Magic Cauldron") he discusses business plans for
making money out of Open Source.
Academics, at least, should be skeptical of the claim that Open
Source depends on the uniqueness of hacker culture, given how closely
it parallels the way in which academics produce their (non-teaching)
output.
--
David Friedman
Professor of Law
Santa Clara University
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/
Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
Professor Hanson- I would argue that you cannot be a neutral economic advisor. As an economist you are a technician who explains the consequences of various actions. But you cannot advise the best route to achieve certain ends without committing yourself to those ends. An economist hired to increase attendance at sporting events implicity commits himself to the ethical valuation that increasing attendance is good. It does not relieve the economist of the responsibility for having made ethical judgements to say that he has borrowed them from others. Therefore, by increasing government efficiency you are implicity agreeing to the ends (and likewise in working to increase sports attendance). Chris Coyne Graduate Student, George Mason University Dept. of Economics >From: Robin Hanson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits? >Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 09:12:53 -0400 > >At 03:00 PM 4/25/02 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >> > ... Today it seems that we can cheaply monitor >> > the act of paying wages, and so income taxes are feasible, and >> > government is larger. >> >>Robin, why are you proposing to increase tax efficiency, knowing >>that it's going to lead to larger government? > >If the reason that government gets bigger as taxes become more >efficient >is that most people have a downward-sloping demand for government, >and >so "buy" more of it as the price gets lower, then it seems >paternalistic >of me to keep the price artificially high, just because my demand is >less. >I'd like to have a reputation as a neutral economic advisor, who >will >advise people on how to get what they want, even if what they want >isn't >what I would prefer them to want. For example, I don't care much >for >sports, and would rather that people attended more to things that I >like, which would lower the price for me. But as an economist, I >should >try to figure out how to make sports markets more efficient, rather >than >trying to sabotage them so more people will do things I prefer. > >>Also, labor supply curves tend to bend backwards at high incomes, >>so >>perhaps we should subsidize instead of tax the non-work time of >>high-income people? > >I don't follow this argument. > >Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu >Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University >MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- >703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323 Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com.
Re: Tax Leisure via Time Audits?
At 03:00 PM 4/25/02 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: > > ... Today it seems that we can cheaply monitor > > the act of paying wages, and so income taxes are feasible, and > > government is larger. > >Robin, why are you proposing to increase tax efficiency, knowing >that it's going to lead to larger government? If the reason that government gets bigger as taxes become more efficient is that most people have a downward-sloping demand for government, and so "buy" more of it as the price gets lower, then it seems paternalistic of me to keep the price artificially high, just because my demand is less. I'd like to have a reputation as a neutral economic advisor, who will advise people on how to get what they want, even if what they want isn't what I would prefer them to want. For example, I don't care much for sports, and would rather that people attended more to things that I like, which would lower the price for me. But as an economist, I should try to figure out how to make sports markets more efficient, rather than trying to sabotage them so more people will do things I prefer. >Also, labor supply curves tend to bend backwards at high incomes, so >perhaps we should subsidize instead of tax the non-work time of >high-income people? I don't follow this argument. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
open source
This might interest list members: http://www.researchoninnovation.org/tiip/archive/2002-1c.htm Code, Culture and Cash: The Fading Altruism of Open Source Development ONLINE PAPER First Monday, Volume 6, Number 12 - December 3rd 2001. by David Lancashire --Summary by Karim Lakhani: Context How can a bunch of loosely affiliated volunteer computer hackers take on software industry giants and win? How can they create stable and effective software products without the scaffolding of a firm's bureaucracy and highly paid programmers? The Free/Open Source software (F/OSS) movement is doing just that. The Apache web server software and the GNU/Linux operating system, all initially developed by volunteers, are prime examples of software products that are winning significant market share against established companies like Microsoft and Sun Microsystems. In this article, David Lancashire attempts to build a theory, backed by data, to help explain the motivations and peculiar geographic concentration of F/OSS developers. Main Hypothesis and Findings On the face of it, F/OSS development seems to violate standard economic assumptions about individual motivation. Theories generated from within the F/OSS community (e.g., Eric Raymond's The Cathedral and the Bazaar) have focused instead on the uniqueness of hacker culture. But Lancashire downplays these accounts as self-serving. Lancashire studies two well-known, complex F/OSS projects, the Linux operating system kernel and the GNOME graphical-user interface (GUI). He obtains country of origin data on over 430 code contributors to these projects and then ranks the countries based on developers per capita and home internet penetration. In the aggregate, US based developers constitute the majority of developers on both projects. However, when ranked on a per capita basis, the US ranks 10th among 11 countries for the home internet measure and it ranks ninth on developers per capita. Surprisingly, countries like Hungary, Sweden and Denmark rank in the top three based on home internet measures and Sweden, Denmark and Australia are top three based on developers per capita. Lancashire posits an economic model based on opportunity costs to explain these findings. His central claim is that the in the past ten years the locus of F/OSS development appears to have shifted over to Europe. This shift to Europe, from his perspective, is due to the opportunity costs faced by US based software developers-soaring demand and high wages for computer professionals decrease the attractiveness of unpaid activities. On the other hand, European developers not only face lower opportunity costs, but they also benefit by gaining a reputation from participating in open source projects. They can then gain access to higher wage jobs abroad. He sees open source participation as a kind of fixed cost of acquiring reputation. Contributions, Limitations and Extensions Lancashire provides a parsimonious explanation of F/OSS motivations. However, he may oversimplify a complex phenomenon. Some researchers identify other economic considerations, including meeting specific user needs and distributing effort requirements . Sociological studies show that F/OSS participants, rather than having a single motivation like reputation, claim heterogeneous motivations , including learning, having fun, ideology and user need. Lancashire's fixed cost hypothesis, while plausible, would benefit from additional empirical testing and incorporation in a broader theory that includes multiple motivations for participation. See also the discussion at Slashdot. References Kollock, P. (1999). The Economies of Online Cooperation. In P. Kollock & M. A. Smith (Eds.), Communities in Cyberspace (pp. 220-239). New York, NY: Routledge. Lakhani, K., & Wolf, B. (2002). BCG Open Source Hacker Survey Raymond, Eric. The Cathedral and the Bazaar. von Hippel, E. (2001). Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open -Source Software. Sloan Management Review, 42(4), 82-86.
