Dear Armchairs,
A question has been bothering me for sometime. The
question involves the hypothetical scenario as
follows. (I am new on this list and I hope I have
posed the problem in a clear way):
Lets assume that the advertisement behavior during
elections of political parties in a two party system
can be modeled by a tit-for-tat strategy. The parties
have the option to engage in either *positive*
advertisement or *negative* advertisement. Positive
advertisement involves only highlighting the good
aspects of oneself, whereas negative advertising
involves only highlighting the 'deficiencies' of the
other party. If one party uses negative advertising,
the other party will do the same and it will become
the dominant strategy for all elections. Such a
situation is generally not socially beneficial because
many people are so put off by negative advertisement
that they choose not to vote. Lets assume that this
hypothetical political system is stuck in a situation
where the two parties are engaged in negative
advertisements and the voters are becoming
increasingly frustrated with the system.
Now suppose that a *viable and credible* third party
enters the race (this party has a realistic chance of
winning). The first move of this party is to use
positive advertisement.
Does economic theory say anything about what would
happen next? Should the two original parties continue
with negative advertisement or switch to positive
advertisement (a switch that is socially beneficial).
If the first two ignore the positive advertisement of
the third party, will the third party soon decide that
its dominant strategy is to use negative
advertisement?
Can someone clarify this situation for me or direct me
to material that may help answer this question?
Thanks
Arham Choudhury
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