Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-25 Thread Daniel Bratell 

LGTM2

/Daniel

On 2022-04-22 20:52, 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev wrote:

Hi guys,

Any other comments or concerns?



Tarek ElBahnasawy

Sr. Technical Program Manager

Web Platform

telbahnas...@google.com 



On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:38 PM Yoav Weiss  
wrote:


LGTM1

On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 7:54:48 PM UTC+2
mattre...@google.com wrote:

> Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change
the secure context requirements for the API, this signal is
not meaningful here?

Yes, this was feedback for the secure context change and isn't
relevant here. We decided to communicate the secure context
change in a separate intent but forgot to remove the feedback.

> More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be
`*`, the top-level origin would need to change their policy
for embedded contexts to lose their permission, right?

Correct.
On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 4:45:26 AM UTC-7
yoav...@chromium.org wrote:

On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:51 AM 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via
blink-dev  wrote:


Contact emails


mattre...@google.com


Explainer

https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/



Specification

https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/


https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112



Design docs


https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing




Summary

Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled
feature. Information about connected gamepads is only
provided to contexts that are allowed to access the
"gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin
iframes and does not change behavior on existing sites.


Note that the Securing Gamepad API
article
and Chrome Platform Status entry
also
describe a change to require Secure Context. This
intent only applies to the policy-controlled feature.
The secure context requirement will be communicated in
a separate Intent.


Blink component

Blink>GamepadAPI




TAG review

N/A


Risks



Interoperability and Compatibility

Firefox initially rolled out this change with the
default allowlist set to 'self' which broke some sites
that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin iframe. To
avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to
'*' (all) which has the same behavior as the current
implementation. Since the behavior is the same we do
not anticipate any breakage.


Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82


WebKit: No signals


Web developers: Strongly Negative
(https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145
) Chris
from Megapixel VR asked not to restrict to secure
contexts due to breaking locally hosted (but not
localhost) services and the use of self-signed
certificates.

Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't
change the secure context requirements for the API, this
signal is not meaningful here?
More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will
be `*`, the top-level origin would need to change their
policy for embedded contexts to lose their permission, right?


Other signals: None



Is this feature fully tested by
web-platform-tests

?

Yes


Flag name

chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access


Requires code in //chrome?

False

Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-22 Thread 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev 
Hi guys,

Any other comments or concerns?

Tarek ElBahnasawy

Sr. Technical Program Manager

Web Platform

telbahnas...@google.com


On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:38 PM Yoav Weiss  wrote:

> LGTM1
>
> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 7:54:48 PM UTC+2 mattre...@google.com
> wrote:
>
>> > Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure
>> context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
>>
>> Yes, this was feedback for the secure context change and isn't relevant
>> here. We decided to communicate the secure context change in a separate
>> intent but forgot to remove the feedback.
>>
>> > More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the
>> top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to
>> lose their permission, right?
>>
>> Correct.
>> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 4:45:26 AM UTC-7 yoav...@chromium.org
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:51 AM 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev <
>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>
 Contact emailsmattre...@google.com

>>>
 Explainer

 https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/

 Specification

 https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/

 https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112

 Design docs


 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing

 Summary

 Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled feature. Information
 about connected gamepads is only provided to contexts that are allowed to
 access the "gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin iframes
 and does not change behavior on existing sites.

 Note that the Securing Gamepad API
  article and 
 Chrome
 Platform Status entry
  also describe a
 change to require Secure Context. This intent only applies to the
 policy-controlled feature. The secure context requirement will be
 communicated in a separate Intent.

 Blink component

 Blink>GamepadAPI
 

 TAG review

 N/A

 Risks

 Interoperability and Compatibility

 Firefox initially rolled out this change with the default allowlist set
 to 'self' which broke some sites that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin
 iframe. To avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to '*' (all)
 which has the same behavior as the current implementation. Since the
 behavior is the same we do not anticipate any breakage.

 Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82

 WebKit: No signals

 Web developers: Strongly Negative (
 https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145) Chris from Megapixel VR
 asked not to restrict to secure contexts due to breaking locally hosted
 (but not localhost) services and the use of self-signed certificates.

>>> Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure
>>> context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
>>> More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the
>>> top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to
>>> lose their permission, right?
>>>
>>>

 Other signals: None


 Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
 
 ?

 Yes

 Flag name

 chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access

 Requires code in //chrome?

 False

 Tracking bug

 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1314563

 Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status

 https://chromestatus.com/feature/5138714634223616

>>>
 Tarek ElBahnasawy

 Sr. Technical Program Manager

 Web Platform

>>> telbah...@google.com

 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
 Groups "blink-dev" group.

>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
 an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>>>
>>>
 To view this discussion on the web visit
 https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKfE4fJX8VOe1imhcv1AGZdg7EKMoDeO-_So5OemGv2pCeGiRQ%40mail.gmail.com
 
 .

>>>

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Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-20 Thread Yoav Weiss 
LGTM1

On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 7:54:48 PM UTC+2 mattre...@google.com wrote:

> > Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure 
> context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
>
> Yes, this was feedback for the secure context change and isn't relevant 
> here. We decided to communicate the secure context change in a separate 
> intent but forgot to remove the feedback.
>
> > More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the 
> top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to 
> lose their permission, right?
>
> Correct.
> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 4:45:26 AM UTC-7 yoav...@chromium.org 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:51 AM 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev <
>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Contact emailsmattre...@google.com
>>>
>>
>>> Explainer
>>>
>>> https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/
>>>
>>> Specification
>>>
>>> https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/
>>>
>>> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112
>>>
>>> Design docs
>>>
>>>
>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing
>>>
>>> Summary
>>>
>>> Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled feature. Information 
>>> about connected gamepads is only provided to contexts that are allowed to 
>>> access the "gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin iframes 
>>> and does not change behavior on existing sites.
>>>
>>> Note that the Securing Gamepad API 
>>>  article and 
>>> Chrome 
>>> Platform Status entry 
>>>  also describe a 
>>> change to require Secure Context. This intent only applies to the 
>>> policy-controlled feature. The secure context requirement will be 
>>> communicated in a separate Intent.
>>>
>>> Blink component
>>>
>>> Blink>GamepadAPI 
>>> 
>>>
>>> TAG review
>>>
>>> N/A
>>>
>>> Risks
>>>
>>> Interoperability and Compatibility
>>>
>>> Firefox initially rolled out this change with the default allowlist set 
>>> to 'self' which broke some sites that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin 
>>> iframe. To avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to '*' (all) 
>>> which has the same behavior as the current implementation. Since the 
>>> behavior is the same we do not anticipate any breakage.
>>>
>>> Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82
>>>
>>> WebKit: No signals
>>>
>>> Web developers: Strongly Negative (
>>> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145) Chris from Megapixel VR 
>>> asked not to restrict to secure contexts due to breaking locally hosted 
>>> (but not localhost) services and the use of self-signed certificates.
>>>
>> Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure 
>> context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
>> More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the 
>> top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to 
>> lose their permission, right?
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Other signals: None
>>>
>>>
>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests 
>>> 
>>> ?
>>>
>>> Yes
>>>
>>> Flag name
>>>
>>> chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access
>>>
>>> Requires code in //chrome?
>>>
>>> False
>>>
>>> Tracking bug
>>>
>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1314563
>>>
>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>>>
>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5138714634223616
>>>
>>
>>> Tarek ElBahnasawy
>>>
>>> Sr. Technical Program Manager 
>>>
>>> Web Platform
>>>
>> telbah...@google.com
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "blink-dev" group.
>>>
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>>> email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>>
>>
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKfE4fJX8VOe1imhcv1AGZdg7EKMoDeO-_So5OemGv2pCeGiRQ%40mail.gmail.com
>>>  
>>> 
>>> .
>>>
>>

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Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-20 Thread 'Matt Reynolds' via blink-dev 
> Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure 
context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?

Yes, this was feedback for the secure context change and isn't relevant 
here. We decided to communicate the secure context change in a separate 
intent but forgot to remove the feedback.

> More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the 
top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to 
lose their permission, right?

Correct.
On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 4:45:26 AM UTC-7 yoav...@chromium.org wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:51 AM 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev <
> blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> Contact emailsmattre...@google.com
>> Explainer
>>
>> https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/
>>
>> Specification
>>
>> https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/
>>
>> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112
>>
>> Design docs
>>
>>
>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing
>>
>> Summary
>>
>> Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled feature. Information about 
>> connected gamepads is only provided to contexts that are allowed to access 
>> the "gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin iframes and does 
>> not change behavior on existing sites.
>>
>> Note that the Securing Gamepad API 
>>  article and Chrome 
>> Platform Status entry  
>> also describe a change to require Secure Context. This intent only applies 
>> to the policy-controlled feature. The secure context requirement will be 
>> communicated in a separate Intent.
>>
>> Blink component
>>
>> Blink>GamepadAPI 
>> 
>>
>> TAG review
>>
>> N/A
>>
>> Risks
>>
>> Interoperability and Compatibility
>>
>> Firefox initially rolled out this change with the default allowlist set 
>> to 'self' which broke some sites that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin 
>> iframe. To avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to '*' (all) 
>> which has the same behavior as the current implementation. Since the 
>> behavior is the same we do not anticipate any breakage.
>>
>> Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82
>>
>> WebKit: No signals
>>
>> Web developers: Strongly Negative (
>> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145) Chris from Megapixel VR asked 
>> not to restrict to secure contexts due to breaking locally hosted (but not 
>> localhost) services and the use of self-signed certificates.
>>
>
> Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure 
> context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
> More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the 
> top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to 
> lose their permission, right?
>  
>
>>
>> Other signals: None
>>
>>
>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests 
>> 
>> ?
>>
>> Yes
>>
>> Flag name
>>
>> chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access
>>
>> Requires code in //chrome?
>>
>> False
>>
>> Tracking bug
>>
>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1314563
>>
>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>>
>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5138714634223616
>>
>> Tarek ElBahnasawy
>>
>> Sr. Technical Program Manager 
>>
>> Web Platform
>>
>> telbah...@google.com
>>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "blink-dev" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKfE4fJX8VOe1imhcv1AGZdg7EKMoDeO-_So5OemGv2pCeGiRQ%40mail.gmail.com
>>  
>> 
>> .
>>
>

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Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-20 Thread Yoav Weiss 
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:51 AM 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev <
blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote:

> Contact emailsmattreyno...@google.com
> Explainer
>
> https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/
>
> Specification
>
> https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/
>
> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112
>
> Design docs
>
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing
>
> Summary
>
> Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled feature. Information about
> connected gamepads is only provided to contexts that are allowed to access
> the "gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin iframes and does
> not change behavior on existing sites.
>
> Note that the Securing Gamepad API
>  article and Chrome
> Platform Status entry 
> also describe a change to require Secure Context. This intent only applies
> to the policy-controlled feature. The secure context requirement will be
> communicated in a separate Intent.
>
> Blink component
>
> Blink>GamepadAPI
> 
>
> TAG review
>
> N/A
>
> Risks
>
> Interoperability and Compatibility
>
> Firefox initially rolled out this change with the default allowlist set to
> 'self' which broke some sites that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin
> iframe. To avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to '*' (all)
> which has the same behavior as the current implementation. Since the
> behavior is the same we do not anticipate any breakage.
>
> Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82
>
> WebKit: No signals
>
> Web developers: Strongly Negative (
> https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145) Chris from Megapixel VR asked
> not to restrict to secure contexts due to breaking locally hosted (but not
> localhost) services and the use of self-signed certificates.
>

Is it correct to think that since this intent doesn't change the secure
context requirements for the API, this signal is not meaningful here?
More broadly, since the Permission Policy's default will be `*`, the
top-level origin would need to change their policy for embedded contexts to
lose their permission, right?


>
> Other signals: None
>
>
> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
> 
> ?
>
> Yes
>
> Flag name
>
> chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access
>
> Requires code in //chrome?
>
> False
>
> Tracking bug
>
> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1314563
>
> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>
> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5138714634223616
>
> Tarek ElBahnasawy
>
> Sr. Technical Program Manager
>
> Web Platform
>
> telbahnas...@google.com
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "blink-dev" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKfE4fJX8VOe1imhcv1AGZdg7EKMoDeO-_So5OemGv2pCeGiRQ%40mail.gmail.com
> 
> .
>

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[blink-dev] Intent to Ship: Restrict Gamepad usage

2022-04-19 Thread 'Tarek ElBahnasawy' via blink-dev 
Contact emailsmattreyno...@google.com
Explainer

https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/07/securing-gamepad-api/

Specification

https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/

https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/pull/112

Design docs

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dj_7EpT9ttnI96BuNXtLEJkHEq0orHgoLeYaOBz9xsU/edit?usp=sharing

Summary

Adds a "gamepad" permissions policy-controlled feature. Information about
connected gamepads is only provided to contexts that are allowed to access
the "gamepad" feature.  Default policy allows cross-origin iframes and does
not change behavior on existing sites.

Note that the Securing Gamepad API
 article and Chrome
Platform Status entry 
also describe a change to require Secure Context. This intent only applies
to the policy-controlled feature. The secure context requirement will be
communicated in a separate Intent.

Blink component

Blink>GamepadAPI


TAG review

N/A

Risks

Interoperability and Compatibility

Firefox initially rolled out this change with the default allowlist set to
'self' which broke some sites that accessed gamepads from a cross-origin
iframe. To avoid breakage, the default allowlist was changed to '*' (all)
which has the same behavior as the current implementation. Since the
behavior is the same we do not anticipate any breakage.

Gecko: Shipped in Firefox 82

WebKit: No signals

Web developers: Strongly Negative (https://github.com/w3c/gamepad/issues/145)
Chris from Megapixel VR asked not to restrict to secure contexts due to
breaking locally hosted (but not localhost) services and the use of
self-signed certificates.

Other signals: None


Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests

?

Yes

Flag name

chrome://flags/#restrict-gamepad-access

Requires code in //chrome?

False

Tracking bug

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1314563

Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status

https://chromestatus.com/feature/5138714634223616

Tarek ElBahnasawy

Sr. Technical Program Manager

Web Platform

telbahnas...@google.com

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