Re: [freenet-chat] Towards a Freenet Filesystem
On 5/23/06, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Oh and you shouldn't have to mkdir for a get! Why not? The directory is just an abstraction in memory; no disc directory is being created. Well sure but it's more intuitive if you are able to just do /freenet/[EMAIL PROTECTED] - or at least /freenet/quick/[EMAIL PROTECTED] (I accept that some files will take *ages* to fetch and so need a different API). That depends on the intended use; do we want to make the Freenet key space to look like an extension of the file system, or do we want a file-like, scriptable, interface to the network? I rather suspect you'd need some *ugly* ioctl to make the /freenet/[EMAIL PROTECTED] interface work for large files or SSKs. How do you report bad key format or splitfile error or any Freenet-specific error with the simple FS interface? --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Towards a Freenet Filesystem
On 5/22/06, David McNab [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: /keys/[EMAIL PROTECTED] - performs a GET of the given key from freenet, and allows it to be read like a file. First line is mimetype\n /privatekeys/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/name - the filename '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' is the private key corresponding to /keys/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/name - reading from this file produces a single line, the equivalent public key - writing to this file performs a freenet PUT. First line written should be mimetype\n, then the raw key data I don't like the idea of the MIME type being the first line of the file; it's something that will have to be stripped when the file is moved to the rest of the system or worked on by standard programs. I'd rather have a directory for each key. Assuming the freenet fs has been mounted on /freenet, downloads would look like: $ cd /freenet/downloads $ mkdir [EMAIL PROTECTED]; cd [EMAIL PROTECTED] $ tail status lots of messages done $ cat mimetype text/plain $ cat name dissident_report $ cat data ~/`cat name` $ ls ~/dis* /usr/glenda/dissident_report $ And uploads would look like: $ cd /freenet/uploads $ cat new 42 $ cd 42 $ cat text/plain mimetype $ cat ~/manifesto data $ tail status various messages done $ cat key [EMAIL PROTECTED] $ The influence of Plan 9 (the original source of user-space filesystems) may be visible here. --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Towards a Freenet Filesystem
On 5/22/06, David McNab [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: /keys/[EMAIL PROTECTED] - performs a GET of the given key from freenet, and allows it to be read like a file. First line is mimetype\n /privatekeys/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/name - the filename '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' is the private key corresponding to /keys/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/name - reading from this file produces a single line, the equivalent public key - writing to this file performs a freenet PUT. First line written should be mimetype\n, then the raw key data I don't like the idea of the MIME type being the first line of the file; it's something that will have to be stripped when the file is moved to the rest of the system or worked on by standard programs. I'd rather have a directory for each key. Assuming the freenet fs has been mounted on /freenet, downloads would look like: $ cd /freenet/downloads $ mkdir [EMAIL PROTECTED]; cd [EMAIL PROTECTED] $ tail status lots of messages done $ cat mimetype text/plain $ cat name dissident_report $ cat data ~/`cat name` $ ls ~/dis* /usr/glenda/dissident_report $ And uploads would look like: $ cd /freenet/uploads $ cat new 42 $ cd 42 $ cat text/plain mimetype $ cat ~/manifesto data $ tail status various messages done $ cat key [EMAIL PROTECTED] $ The influence of Plan 9 (the original source of user-space filesystems) may be visible here. --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Towards a Freenet Filesystem
On 5/22/06, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, May 22, 2006 at 06:12:04PM -0400, Joel Salomon wrote: I don't like the idea of the MIME type being the first line of the file; it's something that will have to be stripped when the file is moved to the rest of the system or worked on by standard programs. It can be an extended attribute, no? Doesn't FUSE support these now? If the MIME type is essential to Freenet's handling of the file, have it in a separate file so the concept is portable to OSes beyond Linux/FUSE. If it's just a frill, put it in an extended attitbute if you like, but not in the file text itself. Oh and you shouldn't have to mkdir for a get! Why not? The directory is just an abstraction in memory; no disc directory is being created. (Unless FUSE has some fundamental design flaws.) The influence of Plan 9 (the original source of user-space filesystems) may be visible here. --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Tagging on mailing lists
On 5/3/06, Ian Clarke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/qralston/writing/tagging-harmful/ My $0.02: He suggests using filters and folders rather than [foo]. I use Gmail's Labels fairly heavily --- I just counted thirty-four. I do, however, lump all my freenet lists together under freenet, (La)TeX lists under Τεχ, Firefly and Serenity lists under firefly, c.; the extra subtag is useful to me. Without it I'd have half again as many labels as I do and they would no longer be useful. When Gmail adds sub-labels, you can remove the [foo] tag. --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] small worlds and time-correlation
A thought regarding what borg on 0.7 Frost called promiscuous peering: Granted that you lose some anonymity to peers you are directly connected to, you regain some deniability by being connected to many non-trusted peers. The real trouble seems to be that this behavior breaks 0.7's small-world assumption --- or so I was warned. However, I suspect that most people trading node references on Frost or IRC are only doing so until they get a certain number of them, then stop. The effect of this is to create a different sort of small-world network; people you are connected to are likely to be connected to each other, to a certain extent. There may not always be a short path from one node to another but there will be many parallel paths. Does this much change how the network works? --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: Growing pains
On 4/5/06, Lars Juel Nielsen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't see that; you're only giving your IP address to people you've grown to trust -- via an encrypted-to-them message. If there's mutual trust between you and anybody else, in any way, then they can connect your IP to however it is they know you. Am I missing something? They might have gathered the noderef from the postings on IRC and thus going through the extra work is pointless. I have been (or rather pretended to be) careful about sending my node information only to people I know and trust (which simply meant were willing exchange node refs in private chat rather than in full view of the world). I could also set up two nodes, one at school and one at home, both with the same Frost identity. My initial connections are from school but I only use trusted connections at home --- and I can very tightly control who gets my home node info. If there's a security/anonymity hole in the plan I've laid out, please tell me. The alpha darknet is not too early to start thinking about realistic connection procedures. --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: Growing pains
On 4/5/06, Joel Salomon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I could also set up two nodes, one at school and one at home, both with the same Frost identity. My initial connections are from school but I only use trusted connections at home --- and I can very tightly control who gets my home node info. I'm going to stick with this plan. My home computer (the primary use of freenet) is connected only to a computer I know is not malicious (my school PC). Even if my school computer is connected to a Snooping Bad Guy node, request coming from me at home are (or should be) indistinguishable from those of anyone else I've connected to. Does controlling two separate computers give me Freenet's secure anonymity? --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: Growing pains
On 4/4/06, Joel Salomon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Does anyone see a problem with this idea? Are encrypted Frost messages secure enough even while the darknet isn't quite dark? On IRC, Terrasque responded: Horovits, im paranoid :) and have a personal interest in security. I'd rather swap with random people over irc than with trusted people over freenet For those who have done the math and security calculations: Whose risk is greater here? Ought we to move to floppy disc and hidden drop exchange of refs? --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Growing pains
I've just started running 0.7 alpha darknet --- were the initial runs of previous versions this heady? --- and I must congratulate Mathew on a job well done. One thing that has become quickly obvoius is that there is not yet any good method of starting one's connection to the darknet. Go to http://code.bulix.org/?raw, where is just about any number between 1350 and 1650 (as I'm writing) and you'll see the secret node information for almost every node on the darknet --- and they've all been posted to public IRC, too. As toad pointed out, this has two problems: 1) Security -- Most people connecting during this heady time are not being terribly concerned about trusting the nodes they connect to, leaving them open to harvesting by the unscrupulous. 2) Network Topology -- We've been connecting to *everybody*, when the network works best when it grows as a small world system, as designed. One possible soIution is Frost, either an existing 0.5 Frost or on insecure references and 0.7 Frost: Announce that you are willing to trade node references via encrypted private messages. In the real darknet, you'd decide you knew and could trust me, you'd send me a private message asking if I knew and trusted you, and then we'd exchange node references via encrypted private mesages. For the nonce, just send me an encryted-to-me message with your node info and I'll reciprocate. Does anyone see a problem with this idea? Are encrypted Frost messages secure enough even while the darknet isn't quite dark? ++H ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: Growing pains
On 4/4/06, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The problem is people on Frost know what you've been doing on the network, and can connect all your illegal libellous remarks with your IP address. I don't see that; you're only giving your IP address to people you've grown to trust -- via an encrypted-to-them message. If there's mutual trust between you and anybody else, in any way, then they can connect your IP to however it is they know you. Am I missing something? --Joel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]