Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the slippery slope, there's no going back. my $.02 ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 22:59:13 -0400, you wrote: On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) =20 I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to blackmail me, traceable or not. And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right?=20 And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for deceased fowls. Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as true in, say, much of Asia, though. =20 Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is voted down. If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. The problem with THAT kind of thinking is that over the course of history, it has gotten a lot of people needlessly killed. Don't forget the perfectly well meaning people who thought they were being Good German Citizens by turning in Jews and those who sympathized with and helped them. PLEASE! Keep Freenet Anonymous! Keep Freenet FREE! Keep Freenet UN-detectable and UN-Traceable Perhaps next time it won't be Jews, maybe it will be some perfectly reasonable person who just happens to have a Politically Incorrect opinion, politics or religion. Mark my words, someday there WILL be another Dachau! The question is, Will we sit by and be 'Good German Citizens', or will we act in some way to help whoever's lined up at the ovens next time? The ghost of Bergen Belsen looms on the horizon and the blood of ten million Russian citizens almost all innocent bystanders waits to see how we will handle OUR turn. May we Honor their sacrifice. - -- My gpg public key (0x92769D7E) can be found on my freesite: http://127.00.1:/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/mytwoce nts/23//m2ckey.html (you must be running freenet for this link to work) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.44 iD8DBQFC1Jdfz+9G5ZJ2nX4RA+hwAKD3U8xRk0/qBOmHEZnLJ5bOnELCfgCeI60V avudAucJHLR2A2RlXrGH79Q= =Vym7 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:27:31PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by your government, if not worse in many cases. Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for the last 6 or 7 years... Then go to another darknet. Anyway there are technical issues preventing this, namely the need to keep records of inserts (which would obviously be very useful to attackers who can bust nodes). Ian. On 13 Jul 2005, at 14:48, Matthew Exon wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to me doesn't make me any happier about it. It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they could not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the current situation. So it's a reduction in the volume of bad stuff, not a complete solution. I can buy this argument, but I'm not sure it's going to convince very many people. You guess that you reduced the problem by 90%, but the problem was unmeasurable both before and after, so what can you really promise to these people? Only that you're pretty certain you haven't solved the problem completely. I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it won't work out so neatly. No, that would be pointless. I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own standards for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles aren't welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up their own network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). OK. This is a philosophical disagreement. I'd go so far as to say I'd rather have the government censoring my communications than a simple majority of freenetters. At least with the government, mob rule is moderated somewhat by courts and constitutions. To really climb onto the soapbox for a bit, democracy is horribly overrated: the real source of freedom in our society is the humanist philosophical underpinnings of a legal system built from the experience of hundreds of years. Democracy is an important piece of the machine, without which it doesn't work very well, but democracy on its own isn't much better than nothing. I'm not ready to submit to the tyranny of the majority yet. As an aside, I wouldn't put too much faith in Chinese christians spending a lot of time worrying about child porn. I'm sure they're not in favour of it, but it's just not the hot-button issue that it is in the West. Porn in general, maybe, but probably not enough to stop them joining the students' porntastic darknet. Well it's certainly a big deal in the West. And the future of democracy in the West is by no means assured. Democracy isn't looking particularly healthy in the USA right now, but comparing it to China or Burma would be a gross exaggeration. If Americans struggling against oppression in the US are too worried about the possibility of child porn to use Freenet, frankly, screw 'em. They can use bittorrent. I'm less than convinced that those worries would stop Chinese christians or democracy activists, and they're a far bigger concern for me. Tibetans would be free to set up their own darknet within Tibet, but what's the point if they can't smuggle footage of human rights abuses out to Amnesty International? And the new darknet would be such a tempting target for the Chinese government; much more so than a million students who, at the end of the day, much of the government regards as pretty harmless. So harmless that they murdered 2000 of them in 1991. Obviously I don't want to get backed into the position of seeming to minimise the horror of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and I don't want arguments about that to get in the way of my arguments about the accessibility of
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 05:46:59PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: On 13 Jul 2005, at 17:14, Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:27:31PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by your government, if not worse in many cases. Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for the last 6 or 7 years... Then go to another darknet. The whole point of this is that there is only one darknet, a global one where everyone is (indirectly) connected to everyone else, so there is no other darknet. Given other social networks, e.g. PGP WoT, it's likely there will be fragmentary darknets. But certainly there will be one very big darknet that a lot of nodes are on. I can see that there are network effects that would make it helpful to have a single darknet. Anyway there are technical issues preventing this, namely the need to keep records of inserts (which would obviously be very useful to attackers who can bust nodes). Good, although I would rather the discussion ended for the right reason (ie. the idea is fundamentally contrary to Freenet's goals), rather than a technicality. It's a pretty fundamental technicality. As far as goals go - maybe. I'll bounce you an interesting mail from Matt. Ian. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 20:58:13 -0500, you wrote: Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the slippery slope, there's no going back. my $.02 Exactly my point! As a matter of fact, How about implementing something very much the reverse? Make censorship of ANY kind as close to impossible as can be managed. The same goes for ANY kind of ability to trace back to the insertion point or identify an author (excepting of course any clues or slipups on the author / inserter's part, that's their responsibility) and then make sure that freenet will work if the connections to and from it are piped through an anonymizing proxy such as TOR. - -- My gpg public key (0x92769D7E) can be found on my freesite: http://127.00.1:/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/mytwoce nts/23//m2ckey.html (you must be running freenet for this link to work) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.44 iD8DBQFC1VByz+9G5ZJ2nX4RA8HCAKDKkYNoGij+L8Y2ZWat32xjJ6wZaQCcDdRI VPG0KCQp7AXspf8JGdPgXuc= =QDzM -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:06:35PM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine trust, was that it creates a very real chance of groupthink within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some like-mindedness in those who *are* determined as trustworthy - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the masses - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a consensus of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as well. You don't think there is a 95%+ consensus in the west on child porn being bad? No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are good, like-minded individuals. The recent Brazillian invasion stories about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a darknet (in the sense that it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the network splits into the two groups. Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an Why would the subgroups be so small? It is likely that the larger network is built of medium sized darknets that have linked up... alternate network? If that minority wishes to repair their network, then they have to find each other through other, presumably more vulnerable, channels, right? It sounds to me like this has potential to enforce groupthink through network value effects. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? Yes if we are going to seriously consider this, we should try to describe it as accurately as possible: A posts content offensive to B under SSK A's site A's peers are A1, A2, A3. After Pre-mix A is known as Z and has connections with Z1, Z2, Z3. B sees it *somehow* and does not like it. B's peers are B1, B2, B3. After Pre-mix B is known as Y and has connections with Y1, Y2, Y3. A's site was inserted through () represents tunnel: (A1, A3, L7) Z1, H5, R6, L4, S2, S1 A's site is known to be stored on: S1 who has peers: S2, S3, S4 B's request path was () represents tunnel: (B2) Y1, H2, R4, S3, S1 Given that: Some nodes are offended by everything. Some nodes are offended by nothing. Some nodes never bother to check. Some nodes are unattended. Can you give the ensuing operations on the network, describing each hop and what is involved? Then can we try to make a formulas for: bandwidth consumed, hops required, number of people viewing A's site, how many replicas of the content are made in this process, the amount of storage required, the upper bound of using this as a DNS mechanism, the effectiveness of using this as a goatse troll style attack on the network, the upper bound on the effectiveness of using this with colluding cancer nodes to find the identity of: A, B, and S, and when it is all said and done the probability that A's site will actually be brought down? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
