[Crm-sig] HF issue 307

[Øyvind Eide]

(This was sent in February but did not make it to some or all of you — 
apologies if it is a repetition)

The 37th joined meeting of the CIDOC CRM SIG and ISO/TC46/SC4/WG9 and the 30th  
 FRBR - CIDOC CRM Harmonization meeting, the sig reviewed and accepted the 
proposed scope note of E16 Measurement  and asked Oyvind to provide examples 
for image and symbolic object e.g. word count of the crm based on the pdf of 
CRM 5.0  

Berlin, December 2016

Example 1:

The pixel size of the jpeg version of Titian’s painting Bacchus and Ariadne 
from 1520–3, as freely downloadable from the National Gallery in London’s web 
page  
is 581600 pixels.

Example 2:

The scope note of E21 Person in the Definition of the CIDOC Conceptual 
Reference Model Version 5.0.4 as downloaded from 
 
consists of 77 words.

Kind regards,

Øyvind

Re: [Crm-sig] An interesting case of rights to think about..

[martin]

Dear Franco,

I think your analysis is exactly up to the point. I think the question 
is not so much, if the CRM is interested in modelling such a thing, 
obviously it is out of scope so far, but to understand the distinction 
between human terms and the actual concepts they represent. Clearly, the 
identification of the river with a human being is a metaphor, which 
shows how far stretched such metaphors can be, but still be operational 
if suitably interpreted, otherwise the Maori wouldn't have won the case. 
That does not mean, that we should extend E39 Actor with this river, nor 
that the Maori confuse rivers with human actors. Therefore I do not see 
a need to change the scope note, even if it were in scope. Rather, we 
have to do with another instance of an even more abstract phenomenon, 
that might be very interesting to understand some time.


For me, this is a didactic example not to be fooled by surface language 
terms in ontological analysis. George Lakoff, in "Women, Fire and 
Dangerous Things" describes this "prototype effect", i.e, how a core 
metaphor, such as "human being", can be extended in different ways, with 
*no common core* meaning.
The question is always which definition of the behaviour of instances of 
some concept answers which question.


You write: "In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note 
e.g. that the person(s) having property rights on something may not be 
an actor because may be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by 
definition, cannot perform intentional actions. In this case, how do we 
document ownership? And what is the (CRM) relationship of the guardian 
to the ward? "


This touches a fundamental question of exception handling. Since these 
persons are accidentally handicapped and not a systematic life form, I'd 
argue that they fall under the "potentially capable of intentional 
action", and hence are actors.


To be discussed, a very nice topic of logic versus reality, intension 
versus potential.


All the best,

Martin



On 25/3/2017 1:37 μμ, Franco Niccolucci wrote:

Dear Oyvind

I was interested from the question raised by Athina as well, and started 
writing a reply similar to yours, but there remained some doubts, so I left it 
in my large drawer of open issues.

I understand you suggest (as I planned to do) to model the river as an E40 Legal 
Body. i.e. a subclass of E39 Actor, which, according to its scope note, 
"comprises people, either individually or in groups, who have the potential to 
perform intentional actions of kinds for which someone may be held responsible. The 
CRM does not attempt to model the inadvertent actions of such actors.”

Now, although the statement by the NZ government quoted in the article refers to the 
“liability” of the river, is there any intentionality in e.g. a flood? Can the river be 
called in court for the damages? I do not think so. In my opinion, but we should ask 
Maoris, the river has rights but no intentionality. It is similar to natural persons who 
are "unfit to plead", for example because of mental insanity or for young age, 
and so cannot be held responsible for their acts: they cannot have a “mens rea” (guilty 
mind). This consideration applies to bad behaviour, but of course it applies to good one 
as well: for them there is no merit or guilt in doing things. Nevertheless, such people 
have rights: even animals do. They can even hold “legal rights”, for example they may own 
things, with guardian(s) to act as trustees on their behalf.

Obviously the river guardians have to do anything possible to avoid disasters, 
but cannot be held responsible for acts of God. So, what is the difference 
between them and a river authority? This deprives the news of much of its 
appeal: a National Park has similar “rights” although not defined as a person, 
which are managed by its director, the government or whatever. The Maori river 
story seems much more a political/philosophical question rather than a legal 
one.

However the example, beyond the picturesque news, shows that either there is a 
need of rephrasing the above-mentioned scope note; or that the CRM is not 
interested in such situations (I would go for the latter).

If so, who P75 possesses the E30 rights: the guardian, who may be held 
responsible, or the rightful right owner, who cannot? The E40 scope note 
suggests it is the guardian, and probably the same holds for the Maori river.

In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note e.g. that the 
person(s) having property rights on something may not be an actor because may 
be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by definition, cannot perform 
intentional actions. In this case, how do we document ownership? And what is 
the (CRM) relationship of the guardian to the ward?

In sum:
the river guardians -> E39 Actors
the river itself -> E?
the guardians towards the river -> P?

Best regards

Franco



Prof. Franco Niccolucci
Director, VAST-LAB
PIN - U. of Florence
Scientific Coordinator
A

Re: [Crm-sig] An interesting case of rights to think about..

[Franco Niccolucci]

Dear Oyvind

I was interested from the question raised by Athina as well, and started 
writing a reply similar to yours, but there remained some doubts, so I left it 
in my large drawer of open issues. 

I understand you suggest (as I planned to do) to model the river as an E40 
Legal Body. i.e. a subclass of E39 Actor, which, according to its scope note, 
"comprises people, either individually or in groups, who have the potential to 
perform intentional actions of kinds for which someone may be held responsible. 
The CRM does not attempt to model the inadvertent actions of such actors.”

Now, although the statement by the NZ government quoted in the article refers 
to the “liability” of the river, is there any intentionality in e.g. a flood? 
Can the river be called in court for the damages? I do not think so. In my 
opinion, but we should ask Maoris, the river has rights but no intentionality. 
It is similar to natural persons who are "unfit to plead", for example because 
of mental insanity or for young age, and so cannot be held responsible for 
their acts: they cannot have a “mens rea” (guilty mind). This consideration 
applies to bad behaviour, but of course it applies to good one as well: for 
them there is no merit or guilt in doing things. Nevertheless, such people have 
rights: even animals do. They can even hold “legal rights”, for example they 
may own things, with guardian(s) to act as trustees on their behalf.

Obviously the river guardians have to do anything possible to avoid disasters, 
but cannot be held responsible for acts of God. So, what is the difference 
between them and a river authority? This deprives the news of much of its 
appeal: a National Park has similar “rights” although not defined as a person, 
which are managed by its director, the government or whatever. The Maori river 
story seems much more a political/philosophical question rather than a legal 
one. 

However the example, beyond the picturesque news, shows that either there is a 
need of rephrasing the above-mentioned scope note; or that the CRM is not 
interested in such situations (I would go for the latter). 

If so, who P75 possesses the E30 rights: the guardian, who may be held 
responsible, or the rightful right owner, who cannot? The E40 scope note 
suggests it is the guardian, and probably the same holds for the Maori river. 

In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note e.g. that the 
person(s) having property rights on something may not be an actor because may 
be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by definition, cannot perform 
intentional actions. In this case, how do we document ownership? And what is 
the (CRM) relationship of the guardian to the ward?

In sum: 
the river guardians -> E39 Actors
the river itself -> E?
the guardians towards the river -> P?

Best regards

Franco



Prof. Franco Niccolucci
Director, VAST-LAB
PIN - U. of Florence
Scientific Coordinator
ARIADNE - PARTHENOS

Piazza Ciardi 25
59100 Prato, Italy


> Il giorno 25 mar 2017, alle ore 11:15, Øyvind Eide  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Dear Athina,
> 
> I have not moved beyond the article (thanks for posting it, it is a very 
> useful addition to other complex land right issues!) but by reading that it 
> seems like the river has the right of a legal person, not an individual. Is 
> that right? If so, the river can be seen as an organisation, in line with the 
> (and connected to) a group of people (the Whanganui iwi). Or it can be seen 
> as an organisation connected to the two guardians, who will speak on behalf 
> of the legal person (the river).
> 
> Can this be seen as similar to, for instance, a trust? Then a lawyer 
> appointed to speak on behalf of the trust would be in line with the two 
> guardians of the river. 
> 
> All the best,
> 
> Øyvind
> 
>> On 20 Mar 2017, at 12:57, athinak  wrote:
>> 
>> Dear all,
>> 
>> relating to the rights triangle P75,P104, P105 we proposed, here is an 
>> interesting case of right holding: 
>> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being.
>> The approach of the tribe is unique: the river is granted legal rights as 
>> human-being; can we apply this (rights possessed by river?) in the model? is 
>> there a possibility to find an equivalence between human's behavior and a 
>> behavior of a phenomenon and in what way? is there a generalization missing?
>> think about this,
>> BRs
>> 
>> Athina Kritsotaki
>> ___
>> Crm-sig mailing list
>> Crm-sig@ics.forth.gr
>> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig
> 
> 
> ___
> Crm-sig mailing list
> Crm-sig@ics.forth.gr
> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig

Re: [Crm-sig] An interesting case of rights to think about..

[Øyvind Eide]

Dear Athina,

I have not moved beyond the article (thanks for posting it, it is a very useful 
addition to other complex land right issues!) but by reading that it seems like 
the river has the right of a legal person, not an individual. Is that right? If 
so, the river can be seen as an organisation, in line with the (and connected 
to) a group of people (the Whanganui iwi). Or it can be seen as an organisation 
connected to the two guardians, who will speak on behalf of the legal person 
(the river).

Can this be seen as similar to, for instance, a trust? Then a lawyer appointed 
to speak on behalf of the trust would be in line with the two guardians of the 
river. 

All the best,

Øyvind

> On 20 Mar 2017, at 12:57, athinak  wrote:
> 
> Dear all,
> 
> relating to the rights triangle P75,P104, P105 we proposed, here is an 
> interesting case of right holding: 
> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being.
> The approach of the tribe is unique: the river is granted legal rights as 
> human-being; can we apply this (rights possessed by river?) in the model? is 
> there a possibility to find an equivalence between human's behavior and a 
> behavior of a phenomenon and in what way? is there a generalization missing?
> think about this,
> BRs
> 
> Athina Kritsotaki
> ___
> Crm-sig mailing list
> Crm-sig@ics.forth.gr
> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig