Re: Bridge

1999-06-30 Thread Bill Stewart

At 11:44 AM 6/25/99 -0700, bram wrote:
 There are 52! bridge hands, so a random hand has
 log2(56!) = 226 bits of entropy or 68 decimal digits worth. 
  No, just 52! / (13!)^4 hands, which is around 2^96.
 The interesting part is to come up with an algorithm that only uses 96
bits.

Take the 96 digits as a really big number base two, 
find it's value modulo 52! ...

(Actually 52!/(4*13!))

Doesn't work, though - for values higher than 52!/13!*4 you need to
reject the random number and draw again.  Otherwise you've got an
excessively high probability of repeating the first
2**96 mod 52!/13!*4 hands.

The real point, though, is that you never, *ever* need more than about 80
bits of entropy for *any* amount of random numbers if you use a
crypographically strong pseudo random number generator.

It depends on the application - for encryption keys, it's probably ok,
at least for the next N years, unless the structure of selecting your keyspace
interacts with the crypto algorithm in a way that decreases the strength
of the resulting encryption.  It's unlikely in the general case,
but it can happen.

But for bridge games, if you don't use at least 52!/13!*4 bits,
or more if you're using them wastefully, there are hands that _won't_ happen,
and those hands can be predictable in ways that are useful to the players,
and therefore bias the results of the bridge game as well as complicatng play.
If you know the system will never generate a hand where more than one player
has more than 10 cards of one suit, and you're holding 10 clubs,
this can be fun, but it's less emotionally satisfying than bidding that slam
when you're worried that your opponents have 11 spades because the
deck wasn't shuffled right :-)


Thanks! 
Bill
Bill Stewart, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF  3C85 B884 0ABE 4639



Re: Eason/Kawaguchi stego

1999-06-30 Thread Jay Holovacs



--
 From: David Honig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Jay Holovacs [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Eason/Kawaguchi stego
 
 \begin{nuance}
 Except that encrypted LSBs will be perfectly uniformly distributed
 and normal noise won't.  Its possible to reversibly sculpt crypto 
 data to have a less conspicuous spectrum.
 \end{nuance}

Good stego can choose LSBs from pseudo randomly bit locations. LSBs from
these locations should be indistinguishable from random if appropriate
images are used.

jay



Re: Eason/Kawaguchi stego

1999-06-30 Thread Bill Frantz

At 9:42 AM -0700 6/29/99, Russell Nelson wrote:
So you've got a chicken-and-egg problem -- you have to have yet
another set of public keys for your stego crypto algorithm.

It seems to me you could use an existing public key infrastructure, e.g.
PGP, but build a different message format with the stego requirements in
mind.  Off the top of my head (using PGP 2.6):

(size, data)
(256, key) - RSA encrypted key padded with pseudo-random padding to
 256 bytes. (The size of the RSA key will determine the
 size of the encrypted session key, and the receiver knows
 the size of the RSA key.)
(8, IV)- The (random) initialization vector
(n, data)  - The data encrypted with 3DES in CBC mode + whatever padding
 scheme suits your fancy.  I like having the first 8 byes
 of encrypted data being the length of the data.
(m, pad)   - Pseudo-random padding to fill out the stego block.


-
Bill Frantz | The availability and use of secure encryption may |
Periwinkle  | offer an opportunity to reclaim some portion of   |
Consulting  | the privacy we have lost. - B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge|





Papers at CHES

1999-06-30 Thread Robert Hettinga


--- begin forwarded text


Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 10:51:22 +0200 (MESZ)
From: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: DCSB [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Papers at CHES

Please find below a list of accepted papers and invited presentations at
CHES (Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems) in
Worcester, Massachusetts.

For registration information, please visit our web site at

  http://ece.wpi.edu/Research/crypt/ches

Regards, Christof

***
 Christof Paar,  Assistant Professor
  Cryptography and Information Security (CRIS) Group
  ECE Dept., WPI, 100 Institute Rd., Worcester, MA 01609, USA
fon: (508) 831 5061email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
fax: (508) 831 5491www:   http://ee.wpi.edu/People/faculty/cxp.html
***


---
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
 Worcester, Massachusetts, August 12-13, 1999
http://ece.wpi.edu/Research/crypt/ches
---

Accepted Papers:


A. Shamir
Factoring large numbers with the TWINKLE device

J. H. Silverman.
Fast multiplication in finite fields GF(2^N)

B. Kaliski and M. Liskov
Efficient finite field basis conversion involving dual bases

H. Wu, M. A. Hasan, and I. F. Blake.
Highly regular architectures for finite field computation using
redundant basis

H. Wu
Low complexity bit-parallel finite field arithmetic using polynomial
basis

K. Itoh, M. Takenaka, N. Torii, S. Temma, and Y. Kurihara
Fast implementation of public-key cryptography

P. J. Lee, E. J. Lee, and Y. D. Kim
How to implement cost-effective and secure public key cryptosystems

J. Lopez and R. Dahab
Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over GF(2^m) without
precomputation

L. Gao, S. Shrivastava, and G. E. Sobelman
Elliptic curve scalar multiplier design using FPGAs

Y. Han, J. Zhang, and P.-C. Tan
Direct computation for elliptic curve cryptosystems

J.-S. Coron
Resistance against differential power analysis attacks for
elliptic curve cryptosystems

L. Goubin and J. Patarin
DES and differential power analysis

P. Fahn and P. Pearson
IPA: A new class of power attacks

T. S. Messerges, E. A. Dabbish, and R. H. Sloan
Power analysis attacks of modular exponentiation in smartcards

H. Handschuh, . Paillier, and J. Stern
Probing attacks on tamper-resistant devices

V. Bagini and M. Bucci
A design of reliable true random number generator for
cryptographic applications

D. Maher and B. Rance
Random number generators founded on signal and information theory

W. P. Choi and L. M. Cheng
Modelling the crypto-processor from design to synthesis

R. R. Taylor and S. C. Goldsteiny
A high-performance flexible architecture for cryptography

A. F. Tenca and C. K. Koc
A scalable architecture for Montgomery multiplication

E. Mosanya, C. Teuscher, H. F. Restrepo, P. Galley, and E. Sanchez
CryptoBooster: A reconfigurable and modular cryptographic coprocessor

I. Hamer and P. Chow
DES cracking on the Transmogrifier 2a

M. Hartmann, S. Paulus, and T. Takagi
NICE - New Ideal Coset Encryption -

D. C. Wilcox, L. G. Pierson, P. J. Robertson, and E. L. Witzke
A DES ASIC suitable for network encryption at 10 Gbps and beyond

E. Hong, J.-H. Chung, and C. H. Lim
Hardware design and performance estimation of the 128-bit block
cipher cRYPTON

T. Horvath
Arithmetic design for permutation groups

O. Jung and C. Ruland
Encryption with statistical self-synchronization in synchronous
broadband networks

Invited Talks:
--

Brian Snow, National Security Agency, USA
We Need Assurance

Eberhard von Faber, Debis IT Security Services, Germany
Security Evaluation Schemes for the Public and Private
Market with a Focus on Smart Card Systems

Dale Hopkins, Compaq - Atalla, USA
Design of Hardware Encryption Systems for e-Commerce Applications

Colin D. Walter, Computation Department - UMIST, U.K.
An Overview of Montgomery's Multiplication Technique:
How to make it Smaller and Faster

David Naccache, Gemplus, France
Significance Tests and Hardware Leakage

---
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
 Worcester, Massachusetts, August 12-13, 1999
---

---
Information:http://ece.wpi.edu/Research/crypt/ches
E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Program Chairs: Cetin Kaya KocChristof Paar
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---

--- end forwarded text


-
Robert A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Digital Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,

The Beer Bottle Cipher (some fun summer reading for you...)

1999-06-30 Thread Ron Rivest


The Beer Bottle Cipher
Ron Rivest
 6/30/99

Last week an MIT student hacker broke into the famous Yale University
secret drinking society known as "Skull and Bones".  He made a
startling discovery that has implications for national security,
saloons, and camp counselors nationwide.

What he discovered gives a surprising explanation for the origin and
meaning of the well-known drinking song "99 Bottles of Beer on the
Wall."  The song, familiar to many, starts with the verse:

99 bottles of beer on the wall,
99 bottles of beer.
Take one down,
Pass it around,
98 bottles of beer on the wall.

Successive verses are the same, with the numbers reduced by one each
time.  The song ends (sadly, but in glorious harmony) with "No bottles
of beer on the wall".

Apparently, this drinking song describes an encryption procedure used
by Skull and Bones' members to protect sensitive information.  The
procedure, called the "Beer Bottle Cipher," was devised in the early 
1700's by a mathematically-inclined Skull and Bones member.  The song 
was crafted as a mnemonic for the procedure.

The MIT student discovered a yellowed manuscript in the SB vault
describing the origin and meaning of the song.  ("Lock-picking that
vault was a piece of cake," the student was reported as saying.)  

The Skull and Bones society uses the Beer Bottle Cipher to protect
its most valuable information.  For example, it protects embarassing
personal secrets revealed by new members at their initiation ceremony.
(Details of the initiation ceremony, such as whether it is actually
held in the nude, as has been reported, were not described in this
manuscript.)

The MIT student has anonymously posted a copy of the manuscript on the
Net.  This note gives a technical overview of the cipher.

This discovery may have implications for the current congressional
debate about encryption policy, since current export policy would
now prohibit the singing of this song in the presence of foreigners.

(In recognition of this development, the U.S. Navy has just instructed
its sailors to begin the song with 56 bottles of beer rather than the
conventional 99 bottles of beer when they are in a foreign port, or in
the presence of foreigners. And Louis Freeh is rumored to be asking
Congress to pass a constitutional amendment banning the song altogether.)

We now give the encryption procedure itself.

Suppose we start with "n bottles of beer on the wall".  Imagine that
this row of bottles holds an n-digit number---each bottle holds one
decimal digit.  (Imagine the bottles lined up left to right, with the
left-most bottle holding the most-significant digit.)

The plaintext to be encrypted is first represented as a number, using
two bottles for each letter (A = 01, B = 02, and so on). A "space" is
represented as 00.  Thus, the secret "BALD MOTHER" would be
represented by the number 0201120400131520080518, using 22 bottles.

If, as in this case, the plaintext needs fewer than 99 bottles, then
it uses just the right-most bottles, and the left-most bottles hold
zeros, so the total number of bottles is 99.  (For longer secrets,
start out with more bottles, and sing more verses.)

There is also an encryption key, known as the "skull".  The skull is a
long secret number known only to the president and vice-president of
the society.  (George Bush (senior) is believed to have served as an
SB president, which may help explain his later political successes.)

In addition, there is the "table", which is where the "empties" go.
That is, when you "take one down, pass it around", one bottle is taken
off the wall (from the right end) and put down at the right end of the
row of empties.  In the encryption procedure the bottles on the table
are not really empties, since they still contain digits, and the
actual procedure is a bit more complicated.

Anyway, you start with n bottles of beer on the wall holding the
plaintext and end up when the song is over with n empties on the table
holding the ciphertext.

The procedure is complicated enough that you probably should not be
drinking beer when you try to do it.  The song helps you keep on
track throughout.

Once you have got set up to encrypt, with the plaintext on the wall,
skull in hand, and table empty, you just sing the song.  Each phrase
in the song tells you exactly what to do next.  The four phrases are:
"k bottles of beer"
"on the wall"
"Take one down"
"Pass it around"

Each phrase has a meaning, instructing you how to encrypt, as follows:

"k bottles of beer"

-- First you take the left-most bottle of beer on 
   the wall and move it over to the right-most end.
   The k bottles in a row on the wall represent a 
   k-digit number.  As you sing "k bottles of beer" 
   you multiply that number by the 

Re: The Beer Bottle Cipher (some fun summer reading for you...)

1999-06-30 Thread Martin Minow

At 12:07 -0400 1999.06.30, Ron Rivest described the Beer Bottle Cypher,
asking:

The actual security of this cipher seems to be an open question... Can it
be broken?


Have you tried getting an export license for it?

Martin Minow
[EMAIL PROTECTED]