Re: What is currently happening to http://www.cryptome.org/ ?
On 7 Feb 2001, at 10:18, I wrote: What is currently happening to http://cryptome.org/ Since last night I only get "Forbidden - You do not have permission to access the requested file on this server." Does anyone know whether the site has been taken down? Axel H Horns It looks as if my ISP (T-Online, TOL) is blocked locally by JY for whatever reasons. Other ISPs seem not to be affected. --AHH
Re: any IDEA licensees out there?
On 8 Dec 2000, at 20:41, Rodney Thayer wrote: I tried contacting Ascom about licensing IDEA. I've got no response. Any licensees out there would be willing to tell me who they're talking to? In 1998 I ordered one IDEA end user license (USD 15,--) by using a web form under http://www.ascom.ch/systec/security/Policy/idea_olof.html I got some "IDEA USER REGISTRATION CARD" via snail mail to be returned to ASCOM. It looks as if this URL would not work anymore. Regards, Axel H Horns Patentanwalt -- Patentanwalt Axel H Horns[EMAIL PROTECTED] Voice ++49.89.30630112 Fax ++49.89.30630113 My PGP RSA Key is available, ID = 0xD8433289 PGP C5D2 5E53 D241 4988 17E4 904D 9467 31BC
[FYI] Electronic filing of European patent applications and subsequent documents
[I would be interested on any comments on the issue whether or not this technical concept is really *sound* from computer security view; see the spec link indicated below. --AHH] http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/president/e/2000_12_07_e.htm -- CUT --- Decision of the President of the European Patent Office dated 7 December 2000 on the electronic filing of European patent applications and subsequent documents The President of the European Patent Office (EPO), having regard to Rules 24(1), 27a, 35(2), 36(5), 77(2)(d) and 101 EPC, having regard to the basic requirements to be fulfilled by any electronic record, namely (a) authenticity - ie confirmation that a document is what it purports to be, and was authored by the person who purports to have done so, (b) integrity - ie consistency of the data and, in particular, detecting and preventing its unauthorised alteration or destruction, (c) confidentiality - ie ensuring that a document's existence or content is not disclosed to unauthorised persons, and (d) non-repudiation - ie ensuring that the sender (with the recipient's co-operation) has reliable evidence that the data has been delivered, and that the recipient has reliable evidence of the identity of the sender, so that neither party can successfully deny sending or receiving the data and a third party can verify its integrity and origin, having regard to the basic standards of electronic records management, namely that [...] Article 17 Entry into force This decision shall enter into force on 8 December 2000. Done at Munich, 7 December 2000. Ingo KOBER President -- CUT --- For the gory technical details, see http://db1.european-patent-office.org/dwl/epoline/epo-olf-standard.pdf
[FYI] Secret plan to spy on all British phone calls
http://www.observer.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,6903,406191,00.html --- CUT --- Secret plan to spy on all British phone calls Kamal Ahmed, political editor Sunday December 3, 2000 Britain's intelligence services are seeking powers to seize all records of telephone calls, emails and internet connections made by every person living in this country. A document circulated to Home Office officials and obtained by The Observer reveals that MI5, MI6 and the police are demanding new legislation to log every phone call made in this country and store the information for seven years at a vast government-run 'data warehouse', a super computer that will hold the information. The secret moves, which will cost millions of pounds, were last night condemned by politicians and campaigners as a sinister expansion of 'Big Brother' state powers and a fundamental attack on the public's right to privacy. Last night, the Home Office admitted that it was giving the plans serious consideration. Lord Cope, the Conservative peer and a leading expert on privacy issues, said: 'We are sympathetic to the need for greater powers to fight modern types of crime. But vast banks of information on every member of the public can quickly slip into the world of Big Brother. I will be asking serious questions about this.' Maurice Frankel, a leading campaigner on per sonal data issues, called the powers 'sweeping' and a cause for worry. The document, which is classified 'restricted', says new laws are needed to allow the intelligence services, Customs and Excise and the police access to telephone and computer records of every member of the public. It suggests that the Home Office is sympathetic to the new powers, which would be used to tackle the growing problems of cybercrime, the use of computers by paedophiles to run child pornography rings, as well as terrorism and international drug trafficking. Every telephone call made and received by a member of the public, all emails sent and received and every web page looked at would be recorded. Calls made on mobile phones can already be pinpointed geographically, as can those made from land lines. The police would be able to use 'trawling' computer techniques to look through millions of telephone and email records. Campaigners say innocent people could have such highly personal information accessed. The document admits the moves are controversial and could clash with the Human Rights Act, which gives people a right to privacy, European Union law and the Data Protection Act, which protects the public against official intrusion into private lives. The office of the Data Protection Commissioner, Elizabeth France, has already expressed 'grave concerns' . 'A clear legislative framework needs to be agreed as a matter of urgency,' says the document, which is dated 10 August and is thought to have been sent to Home Office Minister Charles Clarke. 'Why should data be retained? In the interests of justice, to preserve and protect data for use as evidence to establish proof of innocence or guilt. For intelligence and evidence gathering purposes, to maintain the effectiveness of UK law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies to protect society.' The document is written by Roger Gaspar, the deputy director-general of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the Government agency that oversees criminal intelligence in the United Kingdom. Gaspar, as head of intelligence for NCIS, is one of the most powerful and influential men in the field. The report says it is written 'on behalf of Acpo [the Association of Chief Police Officers], HM Customs and Excise, security service, secret intelligence service and GCHQ [the Government's secret listening centre based at Cheltenham]'. Gaspar argues telephone companies should be ordered to retain all records of phone calls and internet access. At the moment many telephone and internet service providers keep data for as little as 24 hours. 'In the interests of verifying the accuracy of data specifically provided for either intelligence or evidential purposes, CSPs [communication service providers such as telephone or internet companies] should be under an obligation to retain the original data supplied for a period of seven years or for as long as the prosecuting authority directs,' the document says. 'Informal discussions have taken place with the office of the data protection commissioner. Whilst they acknowledge that such communications data may be of value to the work of the agencies and the interests of justice they have grave reservations about longer term data retention.' The document says the new data warehouse would be run along similar lines to the National DNA Database for profiles of known criminals. It would cost about £3 million to set up and £9m a year to run. The report demands that the Government 'should be prepared to defend our position'. A spokesman for NCIS refused to be
Re: Is PGP broken?
On 29 Nov 2000, at 7:07, Stephan Eisvogel wrote: Adam Back wrote: (And also without IDEA support for patent reasons even now that the RSA patent has expired.) Do you know when the IDEA patent will expire? I will hold a small party myself then. B) The EP 0 482 154 of ASCOM TECH AG has been filed on May 16, 1991. Add 20 Years. If ASCOM TECH AG pays annual renewal fees to the respective national Patent Offices every year. Otherwise it might lapse earlier. Axel H Horns
[FYI] Microsoft Signed code: Security or censorship?
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/001127/15/aqa88.html --- CUT - Monday November 27, 5:01 PM Signed code: Security or censorship? Depending on Microsoft's approach, code signing could not only secure the desktop, but the software giant's control over it as well A push by Microsoft to secure each program that runs on its next- generation PC operating system could easily be used to tighten its control over software developers, warned security experts last week. Several reports claimed that Microsoft plans to secure the code of its next-generation consumer operating system, codenamed Whistler, with digital signatures in an effort to prevent viruses and Trojan horses. Known as code signing, the technique links a software developer's name with a program or Internet applet using digital signatures. The code cannot be changed without destroying the signature, giving users a way to link a company with a program. If something goes wrong, the user will know whom to blame. Yet the technique could also give Microsoft a way to regulate the code that's allowed to run on the consumer desktop, said Bruce Schneier, chief technology officer of security service provider Counterpane Internet Security. "It certainly consolidates power," he said. While Schneier believes code signing, if done right -- "a big if", he said -- could better secure the desktop, the control over the issuance of digital signatures for software developers should be a concern. [...] --- CUT -
[FYI] SDMI cracked.
http://www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/10/12/sdmi_hacked/index.html - CUT SDMI cracked! Hackers break the recording industry's vaunted music protection system. By Janelle Brown Oct. 12, 2000 | Watch out -- recording industry executives are about to start running for cover. All of the Secure Digital Music Initiative's watermarks -- its much ballyhooed music protection scheme -- have been broken. A spokesperson for SDMI has denied the reports, but according to three off-the-record sources, the results of the Hack SDMI contest are in and not one single watermark resisted attack. [...] Is there an alternate solution, though? Many SDMI members think there isn't one -- and that this could mean that SDMI will now implode for lack of any plausible ideas for how to meet the recording industry's demands for secure music. [...] - CUT
Re: software patents in Europe
colorparam0100,0100,0100/paramOn 13 Sep 2000, at 8:55, Steve Bellovin wrote: colorparam7F00,,/param A final decision will be made in November. /colorOn November 20, 2000 up to November 29, a Diplomatic Conference of the Mamber States of the European Patent Convention will be held in Munich: http://www.epo.co.at/epo/dipl_conf/index.htm The "Basic Proposal" is available via: http://www.epo.co.at/epo/dipl_conf/proposal.htm The key point with regard to software business methods patents is the Revision of Art. 54 of the European Patent Convention which currently reads: http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html Article 52 - Patentable inventions (1)* European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step. (2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information. (3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such. (4)* Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as inventions which are susceptible of industrial application within the meaning of paragraph 1. This provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods. The Basic Proposal discusses: Article 52 Patentable inventions Patentable inventions (1) European patents shall be granted (1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step for any inventions in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. So, the Draft would mean that in particular Art. 52 Para. (2) lit. c) EPC together with Art. 52 Para. 3 EPC prohibiting patenting of programs for computers "as such" is to be replaced by a feature according to which the invention must belong to any "field of technology". However, there is no real difference. If a programm running on a particular computer causes some kind of physical side effect it was considered by case law not to be a program "as such" and, moreover, of technical nature. In fact, a considerable number of crypto algorithms is covered by patents granted by the European Patent Office; e.g. IDEA under Patent Number EP 0,482,154 B1. The only message seems to be that the EPC shall not be amended for allowing pure "business method patents" not involving any IT infrastructure. Axel H Horns Patentanwaltcolorparam0100,0100,0100/param
[FYI] European Parliament will vote in july on inquiry committee on Echelon
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/ech/6852/1.html CUT - European Parliament will vote in july on inquiry committee on Echelon Jelle van Buuren 15.06.2000 Internal wrangling about procedural mistakes and rumours about British attempts to block inquiry. After a week of internal wrangling in the European Parliament, parliament's president Nicole Fontaine assured that the decision on an inquiry committee on the Echelon spying system will be taken by the plenary session of the European Parliament. The decision will however not be taken this week, as the Greens demanded, but in july. The Greens accused last week the big political parties of the European Parliament of obstructing the inquiry. The major political parties first rejected the wish to install an inquiry committee and favoured a weaker temporary committee. Then, they asked the parliaments legal service opinion on the mandate for such a committee. The legal service declared last week a temporary committee cannot lead an inquiry. The Conference of Presidents (which unites the leaders of the political groups in Parliament) was unable to decide last week on how to proceed the investigation. The Greens accused the major political parties of obstruction and asked for a plenary vote this week on the issue. The leader of the Socialist Group, Enrique Baron Crespo, sought to dismiss the Greens proposal on procedural grounds, arguing that at this late stage it could not be added to the parliaments agenda. The rumour is British officials were pressuring Nicole Fountaine and the big political parties to block any probe into the operation of Echelon. But now Fontaine has made it clear the parliaments plenary will vote on the issue in july. The Greens will repeat their demand for a fully- fledged inquiry committee on Echelon. Paul Lannoye, president of the Green Group said: 'The decision of the Parliament's Presidency sets an important precedence. By having a vote in plenary, the wishes of 180 signatories of all political groups to have an inquiry committee is treated with democratic respect.' CUT -
[FYI] European Justice and Home Affairs Council considers preventive measures against Echelon
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/6816/1.html --- CUT European Justice and Home Affairs Council considers preventive measures against Echelon Jelle van Buuren 30.05.2000 Technical working group asked to look into measures to prevent abuse of interception of telecommunications The European Council on Justice and Home Affairs discussed yesterday during lunch Echelon, the Anglo-American spying network that according to reports of the European Parliament is being used to intercept sensitive economical and political communication. Although the European ministers of Justice said hard proof is failing for the accusations, they are worried about the possible misuse of electronic spionage. ' While telecommunication interception may be an important tool in combatting crime or for the defence of national security, in no case may it be used to gain commercial advantage,' according to the Council. The ministers decided to install a technical working group, which has to investigate if 'technical measures', like strong encryption, are possible to prevent the misuse of intercepted material. The Council hailed the initiative of the European Commission to bring forward appropriate measures for 'achieving a more secure information society'. Further, it instructed Council working parties to encourage 'preventive measures which may protect against the abuse of new technologies.' Dutch minister of Justice Benk Korthals said to the Dutch press there was no real proof of spying, but it was better to take preventive measures. He asked for further studies on the possibility to make international rules regarding the interception of telecommunications. Also, he warned for the possibility organised crime would get the technical possibilities to intercept satellite communications. --- CUT
[FYI] (Fwd) EU Echelon investigation knobbled? [OT]
--- Forwarded message follows --- From: Martin Cooper [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:EU Echelon investigation knobbled? [OT] Date sent: Tue, 23 May 2000 14:37:48 +0100 Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] According to the latest issue of Private Eye, the EU investigation into Echelon is being "quietly" dropped as a result of lobbying by the European Labour group. AIUI there is some connection with the Eurofighter procurement, but I couldn't make out quite what it was. M. --- End of forwarded message ---
[FYI] ECHELON for combat of european national culture of bribery?
http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/6662/1.html -- CUT - Former CIA Director Says US Economic Spying Targets "European Bribery" Duncan Campbell 12.03.2000 "We have spied on that in the past. I hope ... that the United States government continues to spy on bribery." Former United States Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey confirmed in Washington this week that the US steals economic secrets "with espionage, with communications [intelligence], with reconnaissance satellites", and that there was now "some increased emphasis" on economic intelligence. He claimed that economic spying was justified because European companies had a "national culture" of bribery and were the "principle offenders from the point of view of paying bribes in major international contracts in the world". [...] -- CUT -
WIPO in support of Key Recovery?
Currently the World Intellectual Property Organization WIPO (an UN subsidiary) makes efforts to implement facilities for electronic filing of patent applications according the "Patent Cooperation Treaty" (PCT) to be operative in 2001: http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/govbody/wo_pct/index_28.htm De facto this means that on the long run all national Patent and Trade Mark Offices will have to comply with this technical system. I think this is relevant well beyond the Intellectual Property theatre; this project seems to be de facto also a pilot for further e- government developments, particularly in the field of electronic court filing. So, it might be of some general interest to know that the GAK, key escrow, and key recovery discussion is not finished. This is the latest draft for a *technical* standard of electronic filing to be adopted by the WIPO PCT bodies: http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/govbody/wo_pct/pdf/pct28_3a1.pdf --- CUT -- -- [...] SCIT/P 8/99 Rev.1 Annex 5, page 19 3.4.8 Key Recovery A subscriber should be able to recover data, which they have encrypted or that was encrypted for them, even though their decryption private key becomes unavailable. The key may become unavailable for a variety of reasons including, inability to access the stored key (e.g., forgets password), corruption of the stored key, failure of the storage medium, and theft of the key or storage medium. An organization should be able to recover its data, which has been encrypted by subscribers, when the subscriber is unable or unwilling (e.g., disgruntled, incapacitated, unavailable) to decrypt the data. The IP Office PKI may provide the capability for key recovery of internal and external subscriber decryption keys. In order to meet these requirements, a copy of each user's private decryption keys must be obtained and securely stored to enable the authorized recovery of encrypted data. Key recovery does not apply to the subscriber's signing keys. The subscriber's private signing keys are not recoverable due to the requirement for effective nonrepudiation. Nonrepudiation is supported by having the subscriber generate his signing key pair on his own system and only transferring his public verification key to the Certification Authority during the registration process. The private signing key must remain under the sole control of the subscriber so that there is no opportunity to mascarade. The following discussion applies to decryption key recovery only. It is a highly sensitive PKI function since it deals with the confidentiality of communications and files which may, as with patent application prosecution, be held in confidence by law. Key recovery for external subscribers may only be initiated by the subscriber, a Registration Authority, or a Local Registration Authority by following established key recovery procedures and interacting with the Registration Authority. For internal subscribers, a Registration Authority or Local Registration Authority should initiate key recovery only after authorization by appropriate IP office management. Such authorization may result from a request from the internal subscriber or from a requirement by management to access data encrypted by the subscriber. [...] --- CUT -- -- Surprising especially in view of the fact that the Patent and Trade Mark Offices acting as "Receiving Offices" in the PCT system are authorities which usually co-operate with the security branches of the government since the invention of the patent system ... At least they should have made a conceptual distinction between private keys for secure transmission and private keys for secure archive storage. I think this would make an important difference. Axel H Horns
NEC Claims World's Strongest Encryption System - still more snake oil?
http://www.idg.net/idgns/2000/01/24/NECClaimsWorldsStrongestEncryption System.shtml --- CUT - NEC Claims World's Strongest Encryption System by Martyn Williams, IDG News Service\Tokyo Bureau January 24, 2000 TOKYO (01/24/2000) - NEC Corp. today announced it has developed a new encryption technology, CipherUnicorn-A, which it claims to be the strongest in the world. The technology is based upon common key encryption - in which a single key is used for both the encoding and the decoding functions - but has a twist, explained Hiroshi Miyauchi, research manager at NEC's CC Media Laboratories. As in other common key systems, a randomly generated master key, 128 bits in size, is first created. However, unlike in other systems, this is not used to encrypt or decrypt the file. NEC's system creates a intermediate key of several thousand bits in length from the master key, and that serves as the base for the encryption process. [...] [...] --- CUT -
[FYI] EU Directive 1999/93/EC on electronic signatures finally published
DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures Official Journal of the European Communities L13 (2000) of 2000-01-19, pp. 12ff. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/dat/2000/l_013/l_0132119en00120020.pdf
[FYI] DN: SPEECH/99/122 by Mr Erkki LIIKANEN on Crypto
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gtdo c=SPEECH/99/122|0|RAPIDlg=EN CUT --- Speech by Mr Erkki LIIKANEN Member of the European Commission for Enterprise and Information Society Trust and Security in Electronic Communications : The European Approach Information Security Solutions Europe (ISSE 99)Welcome Address Berlin, 4 October 1999 DN: SPEECH/99/122 Date: 1999-10-05 TXT: EN PDF: EN Word Processed: EN SPEECH/99/122 Speech by Mr Erkki LIIKANEN Member of the European Commission for Enterprise and Information Society Trust and Security in Electronic Communications : The European Approach Information Security Solutions Europe (ISSE 99) Welcome Address Berlin, 4 October 1999 1. INTRODUCTION Ladies and gentlemen, To start with, I would like to congratulate The European Forum for Electronic Business and Teletrust for organising this conference. A comprehensive European event on security held on a yearly basis was much needed in Europe. I therefore wish that ISSE will become a major event in Europe when it comes to discussing information security issues, not only amongst the converted, but also, and hopefully increasingly, the laymen. The very launch of this event, and the broad audience it attracted on its first edition, already demonstrates a few things: First, that there is a growing interest for information security issues in Europe. This is a direct result of the rapid growth of the Internet and electronic commerce in Europe. The latter is good news for Europe considering the growing importance of the networked economy in terms of growth and employment. Second, that European Union policies have been successful. I don't mean to take all the credit for the take-up of the Internet and electronic commerce in Europe especially since our conviction is that the development of the information society must, and can only be market-led. Yet it is clear that the liberalisation of telecommunications in the Union has created the right conditions for the expansion of the Internet and electronic commerce. 2. WHY IS CRYPTOGRAPHY SO IMPORTANT? Cryptographic technologies are at the heart of information security. A few years ago, cryptography was still an arcane topic restricted to a closed circle of people in the known. It is only recently, with the growth of the Internet, that cryptography and on-line security has made it to the headlines. Why? Simply because cryptography is the preferred, if not only, means to ensure authenticity and confidentiality in electronic communications. Without it, there will be no safe electronic communications. The bottom line is: no security, no trust, no notable shift towards commercial and financial transactions on the Internet! And all the impressive forecasts we have seen regarding the growth of electronic commerce will remain pie in the sky. With close to 200 million Internet users, there is already, today, a strong market basis for security products and services. This is clearly indicated by the multiplication and the impressive growth figures of cryptographic companies. For the time being, the security market largely remains a corporate one. This is no surprise since business-to-business activities carried out over proprietary networks still account for over 85% of the total electronic commerce market. But the security market will only really explode once it becomes a mass market. The odds are, that the Internet will be everywhere in Europe in a matter of five years or so. We can expect half of the European population to be hooked on the Internet by 2005. Not only that there will be a computer connected to the Internet in half of Europe's homes. But access terminals become increasingly diversified and include, not only the computer, but increasingly the digital TV set- top box, the personal assistant or the mobile phone, and very soon cars and even home appliances. But then again, who will routinely shop on-line if the credit card number cannot be transmitted safely? If there is no guarantee that the orders placed will be not fed into a marketing database to create a highly detailed buyer's profile? The same applies to simply surfing the Net. For how much longer will Internauts accept to leave footprints on every Web site they visit, allowing outsiders to track down their every move and interest? How many people will be discouraged from getting on-line by the fear of loosing their privacy? This means that all along the chain of Internet services, there is an essential need for security features. Since the technology is there, this doesn't seem to be a problem, only a breath-taking business opportunity for the cryptographic industry. But actually no! The situation can be compared to telecommunications services in Europe: Their growth is directly linked to the
CROCKER and population count opcodes on CDC mainframes
This is a brief excerpt from the CV of Mr. J. Kenneth Moore, Sr. Some months ago there was a discusion on this list regarding the "population count" opcodes of several CDC mainframes in the 70ies. It was uncovered that this opcode was for plaintext detection. Now I am wondering whether a project named "CROCKER" and mentioned in Mr. Moore's CV was related to the implementation of population count opcodes by CDC. Said particular opcodes appeared to be quite useless outside code-breaking business. Regards Axel H Horns --** http://jya.com/nsa-crocker.htm http://www.ariva.com/jkm1/jkm-res.htm --- CUT - [...] Conducted an in-depth analysis of the flow of data though the NSA computer complex from the point of intercept to the production of reports. This was the world's largest computer installation with over twenty high-speed mainframes from a variety of vendors. Interviewed product users, schedulers, systems analysts and computer operations staff. Analyzed computer utilization data and co-authored a technical report with findings and recommended specific areas for improvement. Hardware: IBM S/360, Univac 1100, Burroughs B6600, CDC Cyber, CDC 1604, GE 635, IBM 7074, IBM 1401, Digital PDP-10. Responsible for integrating and testing a memory control unit for the CROCKER Processing System. The CROCKER system was designed to improve the processing throughput of decryption software by loading large amounts of encrypted intercept into parallel banks of shared high-speed mass memory and processing the data with multiple special purpose parallel processors. The system was integrated with an IBM 360/65 mainframe, three special function processors and eight memory banks of high-speed core memory. A fast switching unit implemented with TTL LSI chips on wire wrap boards controlled access to the memory. Integrated boards in rack-mounted back plane. [...] --- CUT -
Trilateral PKI Standard
Under http://www.ipjur.com/pki.pdf I have posted a document "Trilateral Technical Standard for the On-line Exchange of IP Documents in a PKI Environment" dated November 05, 1999. It conveys a commpon position of the European Patent Office, the US Patent Office, and the Japanese Patent Office on a crypto standard for electronic filing of patent applications and the like. In general it seems to be not so bad (relying on well-known standards) but there are somewhat unclear text portions on key recovery. Axel H Horns
