DeCSS and imminent harm ...

2000-08-30 Thread Ernest Hua
Title: DeCSS and imminent harm ...





Can someone point me to the argument where
either Judge Kaplan or some motion picture
industry person claims publication of DeCSS
code results in imminent or irreparable
harm?


It seems to me that if you (whether "you"
refers to a lowly individual or a massive
industry) were warned that doing something
was futile, but you did it anyway, that it
would be YOUR fault that you were dumb
enough to ignore the expert advice, DCMA
not withstanding.


It appears that DCMA is the only way to
"save" their asses right now because the
technology and the fundamental architecture
(of priviledged players) is just broken
from the start, and they knew it.


I personally know that the expert advice
was given, and I think numerous public
"notice" was given, including ones by
Bruce Schneier and others.


So I just don't get why (other than perhaps
Kaplan was too personally close to the film
industry) Kaplan can rule against DeCSS.


I would think that there are similar laws
protecting whistle blowers from be harassed
with massive "damage" civil suits.


Ern





Re: No liberalization for source code, API's

1999-09-21 Thread Ernest Hua

> If you had one question you would
> want asked, what would it be?

Sorry ... 2 questions ...

Why does the executive branch keep
trying to foreclose judicial review
of encryption export policy?

Why did you try to censor your fax
to the California State Legislature
that begged them not to make a cheap
political statement on encryption?

These all seem to point to someone
trying to hide activities from
scrutiny.

Ern





Re: Ho hum... State of Emergency Continues....

1999-08-14 Thread Ernest Hua

Can anyone please put up a reference
to this International Emergency
Economic Powers act?

Thanks!

Ern

- Original Message - 
From: Robert Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, August 13, 1999 4:40 PM
Subject: IP: Ho hum... State of Emergency Continues


> Source:  White House Press Briefings
> http://library.whitehouse.gov/ThisWeek.cgi?type=p&date=1&briefing=0
> 
> August 11, 1999
> 
> NOTICE
> 
>   THE WHITE HOUSE
> 
> Office of the Press Secretary
> _
> For Immediate Release August 11, 1999
> 
> 
>   NOTICE
> 
> - - - - - - -
> 
> CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY
> REGARDING EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS
> 



FBI PR specialist on KQED Forum San Francisco at 9:00am

1999-08-03 Thread Ernest Hua

I think his name was agent Grotz, but I'm
not sure.  Definitely Mr. PR.  When certain
callers complained heavily, and he couldn't
defend himself, he backtracked to the usual
"we have a program for that" or "just call
my office and we'll talk" or "look at our
new core values".

Very bureaucratic of him.

Barbara at the end at least made the
important point about how the FBI's (and
the NSA's) stupid encryption policy has
crippled our infrastructure.

Way to go, Barbara!

Otherwise, far too many right wing nuts
calling in.  One item which I have
complained about in this group and in
Cypherpunks is that, as strongly as some of
you might feel about Waco and Ruby Ridge
and the like, it simply does not help the
cause of encryption freedom to whip out the
jack-booted language any chance you get.

In the public's mind, such inflamatory
statements really cloud the substance behind
the encryption issue, which is already
confusing enough by itself.

Luckily, the FBI is having trouble educating
the public on this topic as well, precisely
because it is so confusing.

Ern





Your article on Encryption and the FBI/DEA

1999-07-06 Thread Ernest Hua
27;ed documents prove
that law enforcement has nothing to do with this.
They are just used as the PR front because the NSA
needs lots of legitimate bogeymen now that the
Cold War is over.

What is clear from all of this is that the NSA is
trying desperately to not only protect but EXPAND
its technical intercept capabilities.  In
addition, they are looking to legalize a massive
invasion of privacy which no democratic country
would openly embrace.  Despite the fact that
simple encryption is quickly and easily turning
their multi-billion dollar Echelon network into a
useless junk heap, the NSA is still trying to make
this decades-old concept work for them.  Many
administration officials have admitted as much
that this is the ultimate desperate attempt to
salvage a technology which the NSA has sunk way
too much resources into, and that their business
of raw communications intercepts will pretty much
be over by the end of the next decade.

Instead, what Mr. Novak appears to be advocating
is that we deliberately weaken the information
infrastructure of tomorrow to save yesterday's spy
technology.

If he really buys what the FBI and the NSA is
spoon-feeding him, how about something even more
important and closer to home ...

What would Mr. Novak say if the FBI were to ask
everyone here and in Europe to plant cameras in
every neighborhood street corner?

How about, in every room in their houses?

Oh, and, of course, these would ONLY be used with
legally authorized court orders.  You certainly
wouldn't want your lil' Suzy and Johnny be
molested by anyone?  Would you?

What was that statistic?  That over 60% of all
child abuse occurs within the homes of the
victims, committed by people the victims trusted?

THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN AT RISK!!!

WE MUST SAVE OUR CHILDREN!!!

So what do you say, Mr. Novak?


Ernest Hua, TeraLogic Inc, Mountain View, CA
[EMAIL PROTECTED], (650) 526-6064





PECSENC report accuses FBI/NSA of stalling and manipulation

1999-06-10 Thread Ernest Hua

> In the United States,
> both the FBI and NSA have at times cast votes
> intended to roll back existing policies, and they
> have at a minimum managed to stall licenses that
> seemed to fit existing policy.

This passage seems particularly disturbing.  It seems
that, even when some policy has changed, the FBI
and the NSA refused to play along.

Ern



From:
http://www.seas.gwu.edu/seas/institutes/cpi/library/docs/cpi-1999-02.pdf

GROWING DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS
IN THE FACE OF U. S. EXPORT REGULATIONS

[SNIP]

This is no longer the case. The Commerce
Department has staffed up heavily in the
encryption field, but its processes now include
parallel reviews by the FBI and NSA under a 30-day
deadline that can be extended further with a
simple "no" vote by either agency. For whatever
reason, these agencies are now taking the full 30
days -- and often 90 days. Against a backdrop of
continued export liberalization over the past four
years, this degradation in export control
performance strikes a jarring note.

The Commerce Department's performance in this area
is not necessarily out of line with the
performance of other countries. The German
government often takes two to three months to
approve a license for a new product and six weeks
to approve a license for routine shipments. The
difference is that German companies know with
certainty that a license will be issued at the end
of the process; and the German government imposes
no key recovery requirement on
exporters. Therefore, they can make commitments to
deliver products that require a license even
before they get the license. In the United States,
both the FBI and NSA have at times cast votes
intended to roll back existing policies, and they
have at a minimum managed to stall licenses that
seemed to fit existing policy. A key recovery
policy, for example, has been applied sporadically
to U.S. multinationals and with some inconsistency
to other exports. For this reason, it is not
prudent for exporters to assume that a license
will be issued or to make commitments on the
assumption that the license will be issued - even
when existing policy makes it seem likely that a
license will eventually be granted. Because an RFP
by a foreign company may provide only 30 days for
responsive proposals, and the proposals often must
include an assurance that an export license will
be obtained, some U.S. companies lose bidding
opportunities simply because the U.S. government
does not process licenses quickly enough.

[SNIP]






Conspiracy site

1999-05-14 Thread Ernest Hua

http://www.nytimes.com/techweb/TW_Newsgroups_Beat_U_K_Spy_List_Gagging_Order
.html

You are now officially considered a conspiracy site,
quite equivalent [sic] to that of Lyndon Larouche.

What do you have to say for yourself?

Ern





NY Times article on EU acceptance of Enfopol

1999-05-13 Thread Ernest Hua

http://www.nytimes.com/techweb/TW_Europe_Votes_For_ISP_Spying_Infrastructure
.html

Ern



Just what is the "offense" of encryption?

1999-05-13 Thread Ernest Hua




> From: http://www.sjmercury.com/breaking/docs/081732.htm>> 
SENATE PANEL OKS MONEY FOR HIGH-TECH> CRIME FIGHTERS>> 
[SNIP]>> The bill deals with several> technology-related 
offenses such as> encryption, use and possession of> devices that 
can intercept cable TV> signals, phone slamming and spreading> 
computer viruses.
 
Would the author, anyone at theS.J. Mercury 
or at the Department ofJustice care to explain just whatexactly is the 
the "offense" ofencryption?
 
May I remind you, and anyone elsewilling to 
blindly accept governmentpress releases and "leaks", 
thatencryption is not only completely legal,but absolutely vital to the 
health andstability of the information age.
 
It is only scare mongering agencies likethe 
National Security Agency and theF.B.I.  that are trying to 
preventeveryone from protecting their privacybecause they would lose 
their God-likeomniscient powers if they cannotrandomly wire tap anyone 
they wish.
 
If it weren't for these 
organizations'subversive behavior, our criticalinfrastructure would be 
well protected,and we would not be spending billions ofdollars and 
several major governmentagencies and committees trying to fixour 
vulnerabilities.
 
Let's face it, it never pays to listento a 
spy agency on how to protect ourelectronic infrastructure.
 
Ernest Hua, TeraLogic Inc, Mountain 
View, CA[EMAIL PROTECTED], 
(650) 526-6064


Finally! A Newsweek article!

1999-05-13 Thread Ernest Hua




Anyone knows if TIME has any corresponding 
piece?
 
http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/ty0320_1.htm
 
Ern
 


Re: Judges in Bernstein case

1999-05-10 Thread Ernest Hua

As someone who pointed this out to me
last week, the Supreme Court still has
loads of Reagan appointees, so there is
still likely to be an up hill fight against
deference to national security [sic]
interests.

Ern

-Original Message-
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Monday, May 10, 1999 11:07 AM
Subject: Judges in Bernstein case


>Fred Baube wrote:
>> And, just out of curiosity, who appointed Judges Fletcher and 
>> Bright ?  I would like to see this in news reports, but I sup-
>> pose this would require some genuiine research work on the part 
>> of reporters, and anyways it might remind people that certain 
>> recent Presidents, and one in particular, spoke libertarianism 
>> while implementing statism.
>
>Judge Betty Fletcher, who wrote the opinion, was appointed by
>President Carter in 1979.  Judge Thomas Nelson, who wrote the
>dissent, was appointed by President Bush in 1990.  Judge Myron
>Bright, who concurred with the opinion, is on loan from the
>Eighth Circuit Court; I don't know who appointed him.
>-- 
> Jim Gillogly
> Highday, 19 Thrimidge S.R. 1999, 17:35
> 12.19.6.3.4, 7 Kan 12 Uo, First Lord of Night
>




Re: Bernstein Opinion Up

1999-05-06 Thread Ernest Hua

>Judge Nelson unfortunately bought the government's bogus claim that
>crypto source code was more like a machine than speech, claiming that
>"Only a few people can actually understand what a line of source code
>would direct a computer to do."  But even Nelson did not say he'd
>definitely uphold the regulations as constitutional; he just thought
>Bernstein should have used a different legal theory to argue his case.


I think the worst of Nelson's argument is precisely the "only a few people"
stretch, which, if turned on its face, would argue that Navajo or obscure
music can subject to restrictions without violation of 1st Amendment simply
because it is difficult to find that many people who understand it.

This "only a few people" argument should really be attacked directly to
prevent missteps at the Supreme Court level.  Did the Appelate briefs have
anything to say about this argument?

Ern





Interesting Post article with lots of mention of NSA

1999-04-14 Thread Ernest Hua




Seems like this is stuff the NSA should not want 
to
divulge as it could easily point out 
intercept
vulnerability and perhaps even 
"sources" and "methods".
 
http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-04/03/078l-040399-idx.html
 
Perhaps this is why the French changed its minds 
about
encryption?
 
Ern
 


Re:

1999-03-14 Thread Ernest Hua

At one time, I actually was trying to get a group
order, but several people bailed out on me.  So
I have 4 extra copies at home sitting around.  I
don't even remember the price any more so if
you want a copy, I am willing to send you one
for the price of shipping.  Just let me know.

Ern

-Original Message-
From: Bluefish [@ home] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sunday, March 14, 1999 11:50 AM


>I'm looking for books (such as Secret Power by Nicky Hager) covering the
>subjects of international/national espinonage and automatic codebreaking,
>sold to a resonable price. Any hints where I should look? Had trouble
>finding related on www.bookpool.com and www.amazon.com.
>
>I'm most interrested by the following subjects:
>  * ECHELON
>  * EU initied spy projects suchs Efnopol, and librarisation of the
>goverment/police scanning and bugging of public phonesystems &
>internet.





Re: Encryption key would lock up criminals

1999-03-03 Thread Ernest Hua

>But an NCIS spokesman, who declined to be identified, told the hearing that
>just as criminals used telephones at every level for their activities, so
some
>would use the TTPs.


So the phones are being bugged right, eh? To what extent?

>Although Mr Castell admitted that the present generation of criminals were
not
>computer wizards, he predicted that the next generation would be
sophisticated
>users of information technology.

Duh.

>Mr Cope said there had been a lack of dialogue between business and law
>enforcement agencies and he suggested a possible compromise. Agencies would
>bear the additional costs of being able to extract information from TTPs
and
>would only exercise their powers when there was a threat to national
security.

Really? And what is being done right now that does NOT
pertain to national security?

> "Criminals are lazy, greedy and they make mistakes," John Abbott, NCIS
> Director General told the Trade and Industry Select Committee, which is
> hearing witnesses on electronic commerce issues.

And which "stupid" criminals are threatening national security?
Sure ... they can build suit-case A bombs and handle toxic
bio-weapons, but they don't know how to get PGP or type in
their own encryption algorithms ... Yeah ... That's right!

>"We estimate that 60% of our drug seizures are related to the interceptions
of
>communications."


I still have trouble understand the precise relationship
between drugs and national security. Are we being
invaded? Are towns and cities being overrun? Are key
resources being denied to us?

The contradictions keep coming ...

Ern





What happened to this NY Times article on STOA and Echelon?

1998-12-09 Thread Ernest Hua

Does anyone have any idea what happened
to this article on STOA and Echelon?

http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/nytimes.htm

I cannot seem to find it in the NY Times
archives.  Is it really from 1998?  Could
it be from 1997?

Anyone been in contact with the author?

Ern




Re: Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs

1998-12-09 Thread Ernest Hua

I don't understand something ...

Why doesn't The Register have anything
on Echelon and the EU discussion which
got squashed (undoubtedly by UK or USA
lobbying)?  It would appear that both
in the USA and in the UK, there is
very little news about Echelon and
global surveillance.

Ern




The utility of 1st amendment recognition of source code and human rights ruling

1998-12-09 Thread Ernest Hua

Interesting passage below.  In particular,
notice the reference to the European Court
of Human Rights ruling.  Can this help with
the crypto cause?  After all, if software
is published elsewhere, it would be a
violation of freedom of speech to prevent
its publication in any way.

Ern

> From: http://www.heureka.clara.net/sunrise/spooks2.htm
>
> Much of what Richard Tomlinson or David
> Shayler have to say is being censored
> from the British Press ... When Shayler
> alleged a botched MI6 attempt to
> assassinate Colonel Gadafy, all the
> press was able to report was vague plots
> concerning Colonel Gadafy without
> revealing what these were. It took a
> report in the New York Times, ironically
> filed from London, to blow the whole
> thing wide open ...  The following day,
> The Guardian decided to go it alone and
> publish what was being reported in the
> New York Times. They used a ruling by
> the European Court of Human Rights in
> the Spycatcher case which ruled that the
> prevention of publication of material
> that had appeared elsewhere was a breach
> of the right to freedom of expression.




Re: Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs

1998-12-08 Thread Ernest Hua

Ok ... here are some references to get started:

1.  Yahoo and Wired and other news articles which
mentions EU's attempt to discuss Echelon, and
an attempt to get Congress to hold a hearing
on the matter:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/despatches/newsid_4/40671.stm
http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15295.html

http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15429.html


http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/wr/story.html?s=v/nm/19981203/wr/privac
y_1.html
http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15864.html

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_exnews/19981112_xex_push_hearing.shtml

Surprisingly, neither the New York Times nor
the technology-literate San Jose Mercury have
said anything about any of this.

2.  Here is something from Duncan Campbell via
Mok-Kong Shen:

The following article came from Duncan
Campbell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> through a
mailing list:

__
21/9/98

The debate about ECHELON - last week in
the European Parliament - has again
highlighted the role of the NSA station
at Menwith Hill, Yorkshire.  The report
prepared earlier this year for the STOA
(Scientific and Technical Options
Assessment) of the European Parliament
resulted in widespread coverage in
Europe and the US.

We have recently made a new batch of
copies of the 1993 Dispatches
documentary on Menwith Hill - "The Hill"
- based on revelations based on NSA
documents obtained by women peace
protesters at the Hill.   It also covers
ECHELON and other NSA activities in the
UK.   Tapes (45 mins) can be ordered
from:

Ian Hide
IPTV Ltd
1 Meadowbank
Edinburgh EH8 8JE

At £10.95 including postage.

I will e-mail trancripts of the programme
free of charge to anyone requesting it.

Duncan Campbell

3.  Here is a quote from UK's Ross Anderson via
Peter Gutmann of NZ:

This is probably the best one-sentence
summary of export controls I've seen.
It predates the recent Wassenaar
announcement by about half a day, but is
even more appropriate in the aftermath:

"The real aim of current policy is to
ensure the continued effectiveness of US
information warfare assets against
individuals, businesses and governments in
Europe and elsewhere" -- Ross Anderson,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

This probably underscores the real relationship
between Echelon and the feverish attempt by the
US and UK to restrict crypto anywhere (including
domestically).

My guess is that the current behavior by the FBI
is either just a copy-cat wanna-be by Louis Freeh
(probably drooling after the capabilities the NSA
has), or he is actually being manipulated by

There may be others with better references:

1.  John Young has lots of caches and pointers:

http://www.jya.com

Including:

http://jya.com/ep091498-1.htm

2.  Other people on the [EMAIL PROTECTED] list and
[EMAIL PROTECTED] list might have info.
Cypherpunks tend to be very noisy; "cryptography"
has better signal to noise ratio.

I kind of wonder if you would be harassed due to
UK's Official Secrets Act?

In any case, I'm copying the "cryptography" list to
see if anyone has any constructive (non-emotional)
information to help you study the matter.

Good luck!  Please let us know what you conclude out
of all of this!

Thanks!

Ern

-Original Message-
From: John Lettice <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 9:24 AM
Subject: RE: Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs


>I think the answer is because we're largely oblivious to it. But we're
>willing to learn, if you'd care to point us in the right direction.
>
>John Lettice
>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Mike magee [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>> Sent: 08 December 1998 11:40
>> To: 'Ernest Hua'
>> Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
>> Subject: RE: Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs
>>
>>
>> Oh -- I'll pass that one on to John, who wrote the story
>>
>> Pray tell him more :)
>>
>> Mike Magee
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Ernest Hua [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 2:57 AM
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Subject: Re: Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs
>>
>> I don't understand something ...
>>
>> Why doesn't The Register have anything
>> on Echelon and the EU discussion which
>> got squashed (undoubtedly by UK or USA
>> lobbying)?  It would appear that both
>> in the USA and in the UK, there is
>> very little news about Echelon and
>> global surveillance.
>>
>> Ern




Reality check on Wassenaar details ...

1998-12-04 Thread Ernest Hua

Does anyone know if other limits have changed
for the better (or worse)?

One specific item I noted was that the version
as kept by JYA contains the following:

d. Operating systems specially designed for
   "real time processing" equipment which
   guarantees a "global interrupt latency
   time" of less than 20 µs.

With cache line locking and >700MHz processors,
it would seem that 20us (that's micro, not nano)
is an unreasonable restriction.

Ern