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From National Review
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Steps to victory in Kosovo.
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
Mr. Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Carter, is counselor
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
ON April 23, NATO is scheduled to hold in Washington a huge celebration of
its fiftieth anniversary. If by then the conflict over Kosovo is still on,
the meeting will provide an opportunity for a council of war -- yes, it is a
war -- and for a reaffirmation of NATO's commitment to prevail. If by then
NATO has won, the event will be a true celebration. If, however, NATO has
embraced a negotiated settlement that yields to Slobodan Milosevic some
concession over what NATO demanded just prior to the bombing, it will be a
wake.
The stakes now involve far more than the fate of Kosovo. They were altered
dramatically the day the bombing began. It is no exaggeration to say that
NATO's failure to prevail would mean both the end of NATO as a credible
alliance and the undermining of America's global leadership. And the
consequences of either would be devastating to global stability. It is
instructive to pause here and ask, Who endorses the use of force to stop the
ethnic killing and cleansing in Kosovo, and who opposes it? All of NATO's 19
democracies stand united (even if a couple are wobbly), and all of Europe's
other democracies are generally supportive. Violently opposed are the
erratic admirer of Hitler in Belarus and the current Russian regime, which
failed in Chechnya in what Milosevic is attempting to do in Kosovo. Two
visions of the European future are thus colliding: one that views Europe as
a community genuinely bound by a shared respect for human rights, and one
that believes ruling national elites have the sovereign right to engage even
in a type of genocide against their minorities.
Ill-wishers of America and Europe understand this well. A leading Moscow
newspaper (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, on March 25) gloated openly -- while also
informing the Clinton administration where the Kremlin really stands -- that
the crisis initiates "the epoch of the collapse of the U.S. global empire
and, evidently, the epoch of Europe's final eclipse." It went on to urge
Russia "to just sit on the fence, saying all the necessary things and
watching NATO destroy itself."
So far, the administration has done very well in keeping NATO together. But
it has not done as well on the military level, and its political fortitude
is questionable. During the first three weeks, NATO's air campaign against
Serbia was timid and morally irresponsible. Sadly, there has been a failure
to react in a timely fashion to the bestial treatment inflicted on the
defenseless Kosovars. Though the ethnic cleansing undeniably predated the
bombing, it was accelerated after the bombing started. The White House team
cannot escape responsibility for the failure to do at least the minimum
possible to impede the victimization of the Kosovars.
It is simply incomprehensible why the needed attack helicopters were not
assembled before the air operation was launched. Did it not occur to any
senior official that Serbian forces would move against the Kosovars? Why
were the helicopters denied to NATO commanders for some ten days after the
operation started, with the entire world watching the mass expulsions and
learning also of large-scale executions? A strong tactical air assault
against Milosevic's ground forces should have been launched from Day One,
even at the risk of losses. It is painful to imagine young Albanians
desperately scanning the skies before being either raped or shot.
Moreover, the bombing has been conducted in a manner that defies even the
most elementary notions of human psychology under conditions of war. Instead
of shocking and intimidating the opponent, the air campaign has striven to
avoid casualties not only to allied airmen but even to Milosevic's
officials, thereby inoculating the Serbs against fear of bombing while
mobilizing Serbian nationalist passions in support of the Belgrade dictator.
Also noteworthy is that, paradoxically, the strategic bombardment of
Serbian assets has been conducted as if its goal were the attrition of the
Serbian army in preparation for a NATO ground campaign. But President
Clinton ruled out the latter, and even into the third week of the bombing he
continued to reassure Milosevic that the U.S. had no intention of engaging
in ground combat. One cannot avoid the suspicion that political expediency
was at work here, at a time when genuine leadership was needed. This
self-denying posture has given Milosevic every incentive to hunker down and
absorb the punishment from the skies, while completing his cleansing of
Kosovo.
Admittedly, a ground campaign cannot be launched instantly. It requires
careful and deliberate
