[CTRL] COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - INTERNAL SECURITY - DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT
-Caveat Lector- http://www.hippy.com/php/article-89.html COINTELPRO letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Special Agent in Charge, Albany SAC, Albany 7/5/68 Director, FBI (100-449698) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT (COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT) Bulet 5/10/68 requested suggestions for counterintelligence action against the New Left. The replies to the Bureau's request have been analyzed and it is felt that the following suggestions for counterintelligence action can be utilized by all offices: 1. Preparation of a leaflet designed to counteract the impression that Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other minority groups speak for the majority of students at universities. The leaflet should contain photographs of New Left leadership at the respective university. Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used. 2. The instigating of or the taking advantage of personal conflicts or animosities existing between New Left leaders. 3. The creating of impressions that certain New Left leaders are informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies. 4. The use of articles from student newspapers and/or the "underground press" to show the depravity of New Left leaders and members. In this connection, articles showing advocation of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal to send to university officials, wealthy donors, members of the legislature and parents of students who are active in New Left matters. 5. Since the use of marijuana and other narcotics is widespread among members of the New Left, you should be alert to opportunities to have them arrested by local authorities on drug charges. Any information concerning the fact that individuals have marijuana or are engaging in a narcotics party should be immediately furnished to local authorities and they should be encouraged to take action. 6. The drawing up of anonymous letters regarding individuals active in the New Left. These letters should set out their activities and should be sent to their parents, neighbors and the parents' employers. This could have the effect of forcing the parents to take action. 7. Anonymous letters or leaflets describing faculty members and graduate assistants in the various institutions of higher learning who are active in New Left matters. The activities and associations of the individual should be set out. Anonymous mailings should be made to university officials, members of the state legislature, Board of Regents, and to the press. Such letters could be signed "A Concerned Alumni" or "A Concerned Taxpayer." 8. Whenever New Left groups engage in disruptive activities on college campuses, cooperative press contacts should be encouraged to emphasize that the disruptive elements constitute a minority of the students and do not represent the conviction of the majority. The press should demand an immediate student referendum on the issue in question. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of students is not active in New Left matters, it is felt that this technique, used in carefully selected cases, could put an end to lengthy demonstrations and could cause embarrassment to New Left elements. 9. There is a definite hostility among SDS and other New Left groups toward the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). This hostility should be exploited wherever possible. 10. The field was previously advised that New Left groups are attempting to open coffeehouses near military bases in order to influence members of the Armed Forces. Wherever these coffeehouses are, friendly news media should be alerted to them and their purpose. In addition, various drugs, such as marijuana, will probably be utilized by individuals running the coffeehouses or frequenting them. Local law enforcement authorities should be promptly advised whenever you receive an indication that this is being done. 11. Consider the use of cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters which will have the effect of ridiculing the New Left. Ridicule is one of the most potent weapons which we can use against it. 12. Be alert for opportunities to confuse and disrupt New Left activities by misinformation. For example, when events are planned, notification that the event has been cancelled or postponed could be sent to various individuals. You are reminded that no counterintelligence action is to be taken without Bureau approval. Insure that this Program is assigned to an Agent with an excellent knowledge of both New Left groups and individuals. It must be approached with imagination and enthusiasm if it is to be successful. As an economy measure the caption "COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT" should be used on all communications concerning this Program. Suggested Reading The Art of Peter Max by Charles A. Riley II, Peter Max A few years ago I went looking for any kind of Peter Max book, in vain. Now at last here's a great collection. Peter Max, along with Andy
[CTRL] Counterintelligence
-Caveat Lector- to persecute them. George Szamuely http://www.nypress.com/content.cfm?content_id=3815now=03/13/2001 content_section=1#szamuely The Bunker Counterintelligence It is a safe assumption that almost everything we have been told about Robert Hanssen, the FBI agent charged with espionage, is untrue. Take the matter of his arrest. The FBI says it picked him up as he dropped off classified papers for his Russian handler at a park in Vienna, VA. For a man who supposedly was extraordinarily prudent, this would seem to be amazingly reckless behavior. The chances of being observed are high. Besides, arent there easier ways to deliver top-secret documents? What about microfilms, computer disks, e-mail? Oddly enough, the FBI nabbed Hanssen but did not bother to wait for the Russian to show up. Wouldnt that have been conclusive proof of espionage, not to mention a spectacular propaganda coup at the expense of Vladimir Putin? We have also been told that the information that alerted the U.S. government to Hanssens treachery came from a CIA double agent working for Russian intelligence. It seems bizarre for us to be crowing about this. Arent the Russians now likely to launch a mole-hunt to find the traitor in their midst? Sure enough, The Washington Post is already writing breathlessly: "The Russian government has launched an aggressive probe to determine who within its ranks may have provided the United States with the KGB case file that led to the arrest of FBI agent Robert P. Hanssen Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, and other senior government officials in Moscow are involved in the investigation." Now, a former KGB man like Putin would suspect that talk of a CIA double agent may just be a U.S. ruse to provoke the Russians into self- destructive recriminations. On the other hand, that may be exactly what the Americans want him to think. The point is, very little of what the FBI is putting out now should be believed. The FBI claims that Hanssen betrayed the names of U.S. agents to the Russians. The men were arrested, tried and executed. Leave aside for the moment the question of whether we really know the fate of agents in Russia. It would not have made much sense for the Russians to respond to Hanssens revelations in such a fashion. If you discover that one of your agents is in reality a double agent, you dont arrest him and thereby endanger your source. You use him to feed false information to your enemy. And there were other absurd stories. Best of all was the one put out by both The New York Times and The Washington Post. Apparently Hanssen had revealed to the Russians a secret tunnel the U.S. government had built under their Washington Embassy so as to listen in on secret communications. Whether Hanssen did or did not reveal this to the Russians, it really does not matter. It is hard to think of a project more futile. Important communications between Moscow and the Embassy are coded. Encryption has ensured that coded messages today are completely indecipherable. Russian Embassy secretaries ordering lunch from the Chinese takeout would have been the only messages the U.S. intelligence services could have listened to. According to a wild Miami Herald story, Hanssen "may have sold Russia information on how the United States tracks foreign submarines and sniffs out nuclear, chemical and biological weapons... The loss of such technical secrets could demolish a number of the nations most important intelligence programs and wipe out more than a billion dollars in research and investment." This is ludicrous. At most, Hanssen may have revealed to the Russians something about how Americans spy on them over here. Yet these wild claims have a purpose: to fuel Washington hysteria about Americas supposed vulnerability to terrorism and espionage. According to CIA Director George Tenet, "technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat to us [A]ge- old resentments threaten to spill over into open violence; and a growing perception of our so-called hegemony has become a lightning rod for the disaffected." Even before the Hanssen arrest, the FBI had been rapidly expanding its counterintelligence activities. Last year a congressional report by the National Commission on Terrorism criticized the CIA and FBI for being "overly risk averse" in investigating terrorist organizations. Last year, the Senate Appropriations Committee proposed spending $23 million to fund a new domestic counterterrorism "czar." Last year also, the House overwhelmingly passed a bill that would create a "Council of Terrorism Preparedness," to be chaired by the president. Then in January, just two weeks before the end of his term, Bill Clinton issued a presidential directive, creating the office of "counterintelligence czar." The directive institutionalizes a program called "Counterintelligence 21," whose purpose is to facilitate cooperation between the FBI, the CIA and the Pentagon. The
[CTRL] Counterintelligence Run Amok
http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/20010307/t20148.html Counterintelligence Run Amok By JAY TAYLOR Fear of foreign spies was already inordinately high in the United States when the sensational espionage charges against Robert Philip Hanssen hit the headlines. The media and the public, always starved for drama, have been captivated. The executive branch is planning tough-sounding remedies, including new super organizations. Existing counterintelligence bureaucracies have exploited the "crisis" to grow and expand. And counterspy measures, resources and personnel are already greater than they were during the height of the Cold War. President Bush is expected soon to approve establishment of a new counterintelligence policy board headed by a counterintelligence czar who will report to a new counterintelligence board of directors. This, despite the fact that there is no more KGB, no more Soviet Union. Judging by discussions in the media, the new so-called proactive measures being planned are those that monitor our own people and control sensitive documents. An example of one of these measures is the explosion in job opportunities for internal security agents in the State Department. If former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's plan is carried out, State will hire 500 new security agents, bringing the total of such officers in the foreign service to 1,500. This compares with a total of only 2,500 foreign service officers who perform the department's core work of diplomacy--reporting, analysis, advocacy and negotiation on bilateral and international issues--including ambassadors, their deputies and other program direction officers. While security expands, some 700 other foreign service positions remain vacant because of lack of funding. Some of the work normally done by diplomats is now being performed by officers in our foreign missions from the CIA and the Pentagon, neither of which have a comparable budget problem. Yet the current danger we face from foreign espionage is a mere fraction of that posed from the 1930s to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The mighty KGB's successor, the SVR, like the Soviet Navy and all the other wings of the old Communist regime's security establishment, is a shadow of its former self. For eight years, the SVR did not even contact Hanssen, one of the best-positioned moles in the United States the old KGB ever had. Except for Cuba, the SVR has lost all of the KGB's sister services, including the once extraordinarily effective East German Stasi. Moreover, since the emergence of Russia as a relatively open but very strained society, the ability of Western services to penetrate the SVR has geometrically increased. The double agent in the SVR who exposed the apparent double-crosser Hanssen apparently handed over the entire KGB file. The deeds of our counterspy turncoats resulted in the deaths of some of our Russian moles and are deserving of harsh punishment, but the consequences of their actions had no critical impact on vital U.S. interests. Notably, the FBI tunnel under the Russian Embassy in Washington reportedly revealed by Hanssen apparently produced no major intelligence. (Likewise the previous big American tunneling exercise, the famous 1950s CIA dig in Berlin, was a bust from the start. A Russian mole in London tipped off the KGB to the project before it even began.) To declare to the press, as some intelligence sources are doing, that Hanssen and Aldrich Ames brought about the "greatest losses in the history of American intelligence" is to focus on damage to the counterspy organizations themselves and not to basic national interests, as for example was the case in the theft of nuclear secrets or submarine codes. The massive spying and internal security apparatus of the KGB did not save the Soviet Union. Why now, when we face no such monolithic monster, do we need a counterintelligence czar, expanded polygraphs, more intrusive monitoring of personnel, a draconian "official secrets act" and many more internal security agents in the State Department and elsewhere? We won the hot and cold wars the old way, by maintaining a reasonable level of internal controls but concentrating on offense--penetration, mole implantation and communications intercepts. We need to safeguard counterintelligence and other sensitive information, but the possibilities and the consequences of both foreign espionage and counterspying should be kept in perspective. As George F. Kennan, architect of America's Cold War containment policy, once observed, counterintelligence takes on aspects that cause it to be viewed as a game, played in its own right. The fascination it exerts, he concluded, tends wholly to obscure, even for the general public, the original reasons for it. - - - Jay Taylor Was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Coordination in the
[CTRL] Counterintelligence the Internet
-Caveat Lector- The Potential Impact of Dedicated Intelligence Internet Sites on the Role of US Army Counterintelligence as a Force Multiplier http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil/timothygeary.htm by Timothy E. Geary Introduction This paper proposes creating dedicated intelligence Internet web sites for Army strategic and tactical CI units. These sites will be accessible from anywhere in the world by Army intelligence personnel through designated Army core groups. The intent of this system is to create a common user data base for tactical and strategic CI Army elements, assist in the cross-training of tactical and strategic assets within the Army, and maximize resource capability to fulfill their force protection role. Within the next two years, other military departments will develop their intelligence networks and common data bases, which will be followed by national level intelligence agencies. The ultimate goal is to develop a data base, which will provide National Military Strategy (NMS) and National Security Strategy (NSS) leaders an evaluated product derived from information provided by the entire U.S. intelligence community. Such a system does not currently exist. Also suggested are several ways this kind of system could facilitate the training and mentoring of CI personnel stationed worldwide. Within the context of this paper, counterintelligence (CI) is defined as "identifying, exploiting, and neutralizing a foreign intelligence service threat against Department of the Army personnel, equipment, facilities, and installations." Protection of these elements become a force multiplier for the warfighter. Today this role includes preventing technology transfer, which becomes a major force protection measure. Impact of Downsizing and Absence of Common Data Bases Downsizing has dramatically reduced the size of the strategic and tactical CI workforce in the Department of Defense, and, in particular, within the Army. To meet this challenge, the US Army is using current information technology to effectively husband its limited resources. Although there are numerous secure intelligence communications systems within the Army, information is compartmented and rarely shared with other units. Common accessible data bases are not widespread within the Army, much less within the US intelligence community at large. Duplication of effort within the US intelligence community does not markedly improve support to the NMS or the NSS. Creating the means to securely transmit and receive classified information from multiple users located around the world will result in a system capable of providing national leaders with a total product, not one developed from a single intelligence service. If Army CI is to prepare for the 21st Century, it must begin using information technology now to understand its capabilities and potential applications. We must rapidly integrate technology "know-how" into all facets of CI, if we are to marshal our limited resources to fulfill mission needs. The level of experience in many Army Military Intelligence Resident Office has been radically reduced as a consequence of the downsizing of the Army's CI workforce. In 1994, for example, there were 22 members assigned to the National Capital Region Resident Office (NCRRO) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Today there are only three. According to Paul Godlewski, Special Agent in Charge of the NCRRO, he has 16 years of military service and the remaining two members have five years each. (Godlewski, 14 Nov 96) NCRRO is not an isolated example of the impact of downsizing within the Army's CI community. If CI is to contribute to force protection by the prevention of technology transfer, then innovative ways of using information technology must be created, explored, and, above-all, shared. Intelligence personnel are beginning to routinely use available technologies to gather supporting information for investigative leads or to fulfill assigned functions, such as, preparing a Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) briefing. For example, an effective SAEDA unclassified briefing can be developed by using the Internet to access the Country Study Fact Sheets produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Department of State (DOS). Unfortunately, successful ventures or accomplishments are generally not recognized by higher headquarters, and as a consequence, success stories are not disseminated throughout a core group command. Higher headquarters are interested in statistical results; not necessarily the methodology used to acquire the end product. This trend must be reversed if technology transfer is to be identified, tracked, and defeated by today's small Army CI contingent. Secure web sites will allow peers, friends, mentors to brainstorm the "how to" attack a problem. This aspect of the proposed system will energize critical thinking throughout the entire system, as opposed to relying on appointed leaders to resolve issues.
